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Section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 enjoins UK domestic courts to ‘take into 
account’ Strasbourg jurisprudence but does not bind them to it. Neither does s.2 oblige 
domestic courts to follow it, imitate it or restrict themselves to it. However, judicial 
guidance to ‘follow’ the ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence has fed a 
restrictive interpretation of the s.2 duty. The eagerness to maintain consistency with the 
Strasbourg Court and the central importance of the House of Lords’ guidance to ‘keep 
pace’ with Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘no more, no less’ has placed obvious limits on 
judicial reasoning under s.2. Further, this Strasbourg focus overly inflates the value of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, which is often affected by a number of factors that make 
following it undesirable or simply impossible. In the end, ‘taking into account 
Strasbourg jurisprudence may require more than simply ‘keeping pace’ with or 
following the ‘clear and constant’ decisions of that court. For many reasons – not least 
related to the scheme of the Human Rights Act to ‘bring rights home’ – domestic courts 
may better address their duty under s.2 by focusing primarily on the cases as they arise 
in the specific context of domestic law, being guided by Strasbourg jurisprudence but 
not reliant upon it.  
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Under section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 domestic courts are enjoined to ‘take 
into account’ Strasbourg jurisprudence when addressing 'a question which has arisen in 
connection with a Convention right’.1 The words ‘take into account’ were carefully 
designed, heavily debated, and overtly intended to afford a measure of ‘flexibility and 
discretion’2 to domestic courts discharging that duty. Exactly how far this discretion 
extends is a complex question and thus the focus of chapter I.  
 
In the absence of any normative guidance, domestic courts have guided themselves to 
‘follow any clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘in the absence of special 
circumstances.’3 In practice, however, several factors may make the focus on prima 
facie ‘following’ Strasbourg jurisprudence inappropriate. As the Lord Chancellor 
explained during the Parliamentary debates, ‘[t]here may ... be occasions when it would 
be right for the United Kingdom courts to depart from Strasbourg decisions ... [and] it is 
important that our courts have the scope to apply that discretion so as to aid the 
development of human rights law’.4  
 
For example, enjoining domestic courts to follow Strasbourg jurisprudence which is 
outdated, affected by a margin of appreciation or based on a misunderstanding of 
domestic law, may serve to apply an overly restrictive interpretation of Convention 
rights domestically and would be difficult to reconcile with judicial reasoning which 
seeks to ‘aid the development of human rights law’. Domestic courts have identified 
these particular situations as ‘special circumstances’ feeding departure from Strasbourg 
jurisprudence but it is unclear that simply ‘departing’ from (or declining to ‘follow’) 
that jurisprudence is enough. Since a domestic court applying jurisprudence of this kind 
risks placing domestic law below compatibility with the Convention, chapter II 
                                                 
1 Section 2(1) Human Rights Act 1998. 
2 Hansard HL vol 584 col 1270 (19 January 1998).  
3 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transports and the Regions ex p. Alconbury Developments 
Limited and others [2001] UKHL 23l; R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator; Do v Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal [2004] UKHL 26 [20] (Lord Bingham); R (On The Application of Animal Defenders 
International) v Secretary of State For Culture, Media and Sport. (Respondent) [2008] UKHL 15. 
4 Ibid.  
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addresses the importance of courts ‘escaping’ that jurisprudence altogether and deciding 
the matter for themselves.  
 
This in turn feeds the possibility that domestic courts are able to depart from Strasbourg 
in order to apply a more generous interpretation of Convention rights domestically. In 
large part the debate around this question turns on the purpose with which the HRA 
1998 is perceived to have been enacted and chapter III accordingly frames discussion of 
the question in these terms. Plainly, however, guidance focused on following or 
maintaining consistency with the Strasbourg jurisprudence is unlikely to support a 
generous interpretation of Convention rights beyond that given by the Strasbourg Court.  
 
In a similar vein, the value ascribed to decisions of the Strasbourg Court raises a 
specific quandary as to the status of jurisprudence outside the Convention remit. Where 
Strasbourg jurisprudence is not helpful or simply nonexistent it may be possible - even 
preferable - that domestic courts look outside the Convention for comparative 
assistance. The specific duty to take into account Strasbourg jurisprudence (both in 
judicial guidance and the language of s.2) therefore makes the ambit of comparative 
study the focus of Chapter IV.  
 
Finally, chapter V will question the effect of a backdrop of concerns external to the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence itself. The type of Convention right in point (qualified or 
unqualified) may alter the discretion under s.2, as may the source of an alleged 
incompatibility (be it statute or common law). Whether Parliament has itself considered 
the issue(s) in play and the existence of the domestic system of precedent may also 
significantly circumscribe the discretion under s.2 HRA. Lastly, the institutional 
position of the Strasbourg Court and the effect of its own reforms may detract from the 
value of relying on Strasbourg jurisprudence as a measure of Convention compatibility 
at all. In any or all of the situations discussed in these chapters, ‘bringing rights home’5 
and ‘taking into account’ Strasbourg jurisprudence may require more than simply 
‘keeping pace’6 with or following the ‘clear and constant’ decisions of that Court.  
                                                 
5 Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, Cm 3782 (October 1997). 
6 Ullah (n 3). 
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CHAPTER I 
INTENTIONS, APPROACHES AND CRITICISMS 
 
Before any meaningful analysis can be presented on the effect of s.2 Human Rights Act 
1998,7 it will be useful to introduce the basis of the arguments. This chapter will 
accordingly deliver a synopsis of the thinking on s.2 to date. In doing so, attention will 
be given to the legislative intentions at the time of the passing of the Act, the drift of 
judicial reasoning and guidance on the s.2 obligation and the academic commentary on 





Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 reads as follows: 
A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention 
right must take into account any— 
 
(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights,  
 
(b) opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of the Convention, 
 
 (c) decision of the Commission in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) of the Convention, or  
 
(d) decision of the Committee of Ministers taken under Article 46 of the Convention,  
 
whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is relevant to the 
proceedings in which that question has arisen. 
 
Contrasted with s.3 of the European Communities Act 1972 - which has the effect of 
binding English courts to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice - the 
scheme under s.2 HRA is comparatively weak. That English courts must merely ‘take 
into account’ the Strasbourg jurisprudence seems, on the face of it, to afford a wide 
discretion and flexibility in the hands of the domestic judiciary. The stipulation that 
domestic courts must take into account relevant jurisprudence indicates that ignoring 
such material altogether is not an option but where there is relevant jurisprudence to 
‘take into account’ the options open for a domestic court range from following the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence in the manner of precedent, considering but ultimately not 
                                                 
7 Herein ‘HRA’ or ‘The Act’. 
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applying a relevant judgment, or simply formally acknowledging the relevant 
jurisprudence and making no further mention of it. As Leigh and Masterman have 
written:  
In deceptively simple terms s.2(1) creates a significant judicial discretionary power to apply 
Strasbourg jurisprudence directly, to take it ‘into account’ but fail to apply it, or to come to a 
decision somewhere between the two extremes by either applying (or being influenced by) the 
Convention jurisprudence to a greater or lesser degree.8  
 
The effect was intentional: s.2 was expressly designed not to tie domestic courts to 
decisions of the Strasbourg Court. The White Paper prior to the enactment of the HRA 
clarified that the scheme of s.2 would require domestic courts to ‘take account of 
relevant decisions … (although these will not be binding)’.9 The then Lord Chancellor 
added that 
... the word ‘binding’ is the language of precedent but the convention is the ultimate source of the 
relevant law … [t]hey are a source of jurisprudence indeed, but not binding precedents which we 
necessarily should follow or even necessarily desire to follow.10 
  
Conversely, Conservative peers could not ‘see the difficulty in enjoining that English 
courts should follow [a Strasbourg] decision’ and considered that it may in fact be ‘in 
every way advantageous in saving an unnecessarily expensive and extremely dilatory 
visit to Strasbourg’.11 Pursuant to such an aim, the importance of facilitating a judicial 
interpretation of Convention rights that is consistent with the interpretation of the 
Strasbourg Court is very clear. After all, the Strasbourg Court is intended to be ‘an 
international court of last resort, rather than a court of first recourse in British cases’.12 
It is also obvious that the most straightforward way in which to ensure compatibility 
with the Strasbourg standard might be to follow the decisions of the Strasbourg Court 
in the manner of a precedential system - that Court being the most authoritative – yet 
the problems with such a construction are equally obvious.  
 
                                                 
8 I. Leigh, R. Masterman, Making Rights Real: The Human Rights Act in its First Decade (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2008) 52; R. Masterman, ‘Aspiration or Foundation? The Status of the Strasbourg 
Jurisprudence and the ‘Convention Rights’ in Domestic Law’ in H. Fenwick, R. Masterman, G. 
Phillipson (eds), Judicial Reasoning Under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 62. 
9 Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, Cm 3782 (October 1997) [2.4]. 
10 Hansard HL vol 583 col 515 (18 November 1997).  
11 Ibid (Lord Simon of Glaisdale). 
12 A. Lester, ‘The utility of the Human Rights Act: a reply to Keith Ewing’ [2005] PL 249, 256. 
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Firstly, under the ECHR the UK is only bound to abide by decisions of the Strasbourg 
Court to which it was a party13 and, crucially, such cases do not have any special 
weight in domestic courts.14 As Lord Hoffman outlined in Re McKerr: 
Under the Convention, the United Kingdom is bound to accept a judgment of the Strasbourg 
Court as binding: Article 46(1). But a court adjudicating in litigation in the United Kingdom 
about a domestic ‘Convention right’ is not bound by a decision of the Strasbourg court. It must 
take it into account.15 
An amendment to bind domestic courts to Strasbourg jurisprudence would have the 
effect of binding domestic courts to judgments against all other High Contracting 
Parties to the Convention (with different legal and cultural traditions)16 when, as Lord 
Irvine noted during the Parliamentary debates, ‘[t]here may ... be occasions when it 
would be right for the United Kingdom courts to depart from Strasbourg decisions’.17 
 
Secondly, carbon copies of Strasbourg reasoning would sit uneasily with the 
Government’s declared intention to provide domestic judges with the opportunity to 
‘make a distinctively British contribution to the development of the jurisprudence of 
human rights in Europe’18 and ‘help to influence the development of case law on the 
Convention by the European Court of Human Rights’.19 The Lord Chancellor, Lord 
Irvine, firmly upheld that domestic judges required ‘flexibility and discretion’20 since 
‘the Courts will often be faced with cases that involve factors perhaps specific to the 
United Kingdom which distinguish them from cases considered by the European Court 
                                                 
13 Art.46(1) ECHR provides: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of 
the Court in any case to which they are the parties’. Art.46(2) provides the task of supervising the 
execution of such a judgment is exercised by the Committee of Ministers. 
14 M. Amos, Human Rights Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006) 20. 
15 In re McKerr [2004] UKHL 12, [2004] 1 WLR 807 [66] (Lord Hoffman). 
16 Cf. E Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg? The British Judiciary’s Approach to Interpreting 
Convention Rights’ [2005] EPL 405, 407 doubting the strength of this argument alone as indicative of 
legislative intentions, Wicks suggests that ‘this unwanted consequence could easily have been removed 
by careful redrafting of the clause’. Respectfully, it is difficult to envisage a linguistic construction which 
would result in binding domestic courts to the decisions of the Strasbourg court without binding it also to 
the outcomes of cases not involving the United Kingdom and Wicks offers no suggestion to that end (A 
construction that binds UK courts only to decisions in cases to which it is a party is already provided for 
by Art.46 ECHR).  
17 Hansard HL vol 584 col 1271 (19 January 1998).   
18 Rights Brought Home (n 3) [1.14]. 
19 Ibid [1.18]. 
20 Hansard HL vol 584 col 1270 (19 January 1998).  
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... it is important that our courts have the scope to apply that discretion so as to aid the 
development of human rights law’.21  
 
Thirdly, (where relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence exists) it would rule out domestic 
reliance on a wealth of jurisprudence from jurisdictions outside the ECHR such as the 
commonwealth systems which arguably have more in common with the English legal 
system than some of the European Convention states.22  
 
Perhaps most importantly, Parliament did not enact the HRA in order to incorporate the 
ECHR directly, or to make it directly enforceable in UK courts. Parliament instead 
retained the power to make any substantial changes to domestic law to itself, as well as 
the possibility that it may legislate incompatibly with the Convention; treating 
Strasbourg jurisprudence in the manner of binding precedent would clearly sit 
uncomfortably next to the HRA as a statute which specifically reserves sovereignty for 
Parliament. Since section 3 HRA is carefully worded to require domestic courts to 
interpret domestic law compatibility with the Convention only ‘so far as it is possible to 
do so’ and declarations of incompatibility under section 4 are discretionary (which 
ultimately need not be acted upon), it would be strange if section 2 compelled a 
particular result where sections 3 and 4 did not.23 The Lord Chancellor thus upheld the 
view that ‘[t]o make the courts bound by Strasbourg decisions could, for example, result 
in the Bill being confusing if not internally inconsistent when the courts are faced with 
incompatible legislation’.24   
 
To these ends, when a Conservative amendment to replace the words ‘must take into 
account’ with ‘shall be bound by’ was debated in the House of Lords, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson concluded that ‘the doctrine of stare decisis … does not find much favour 
north of the Border, finds no favour across the Channel and is an indigenous growth of 
                                                 
21 Ibid cols 1270-1271.  
22 By virtue of dualist relationships with international law (rather than the monist systems employed by 
many European states) and a shared legal heritage. This topic is discussed to in more breadth and detail in 
chapter III.  
23 The HRA does not require declarations of incompatibility to be remedied with legislative change; 
Parliament is free to note the declaration and effect no change at all.  
24 Hansard HL vol 583 col 514 (18 November 1998). 
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dubious merit’.25 Similarly, Lord Lester took the view that any stronger obligation than 
to ‘take into account’ would be to go ‘further than the European Convention itself 
requires’26 and be ‘quite inappropriate ... since such cases deal with laws and practices 
which are not those of the United Kingdom’.27 Lord Irvine thought it would give way to 
becoming ‘more European than the Europeans’28 and that it was important to avoid 
‘putting the courts in some kind of straitjacket where flexibility is what is required’.29  
 
Before further speculation it is important to clarify the proper weight of this evidence. It 
is certainly inappropriate to paraphrase clarifications or opinions given during 
Parliamentary debates in support of any argument without placing them in context. As 
Lord Steyn has put it, ‘[l]anguage is a labyrinth … words in a legal context can never be 
understood except in relation to the circumstances in which they were used’.30 
Moreover, the possibility that one can even consider the collective intentions of a 
legislative body may itself need some qualification.  
 
Firstly, an important distinction might be made between Government intentions and 
Parliamentary intentions. As Lord Steyn put it, ‘[w]hat is constitutionally unacceptable 
is to treat the intentions of the government as revealed in debates as reflecting the will 
of Parliament’.31 Aileen Kavanagh has also outlined a significant distinction between 
what she terms ‘enacted intentions’ and ‘unenacted intentions’.32 ‘Enacted intentions’ 
are those that ‘are manifest and expressed in the words of the statute itself’33 and, 
importantly, ‘Parliament has an institutionalized system for expressing these intentions 
in an authoritative way and for registering the degree of support for them, i.e. through a 
statutory text which has gone through all the required stages of the enactment 
                                                 
25 Hansard HL vol 583 col 513 (18 November 1997). 
26 Hansard HL vol 584 col 1269 (19 January 1998). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Hansard HL vol 583 col 514 (18 November 1997).  
29 Hansard HL vol 583 col 515 (18 November 1997).   
30 Lord Steyn, ‘Pepper v Hart: A Re-examination’ [2001] OJLS 59, 60. 
31 Ibid 68; although it is suggested that the conception of the HRA put forward by the Government in the 
White Paper may be useful for the purposes of identifying the scheme (and thus the context) within which 
a provision was enacted. 
32 A. Kavanagh, ‘The role of Parliamentary Intention in Adjudication under the Human Rights Act 1998’ 
(2006) OJLS 179, 181. 
33 Ibid. 
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process’.34 That the judiciary is given discretion and flexibility by virtue of the language 
in s.2 (enjoining courts only to ‘take into account’ Strasbourg jurisprudence) might 
accordingly be described as an ‘enacted intention’. By contrast, ‘unenacted intentions’ 
are those perceivable from the debates but not included in the text of the statute. Since 
these have no institutionalized equivalent, identifying what the unenacted intentions are, 
or for eliciting the degree of support for them, may be problematic.35  
 
‘Unenacted intentions’ are of particular interest since many commentators rely on 
exactly this brand of evidence, either to support a restrictive interpretation of the ECHR 
domestically, or one that allows domestic development beyond the Strasbourg 
standard.36 For instance, supporters of the latter approach usually point to 
pronouncements during the Parliamentary debates describing the Convention rights as 
‘a floor of rights’,37 that ‘this is a Bill which only gives and does not take away’.38 
Indeed, some members of the senior judiciary have also made use of this type of 
evidence in the course of their reasoning.39 Masterman has suggested that this kind of 
evidence ‘confirms the possibility that domestic courts could legitimately depart from 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence to enhance domestic rights protection’,40 while Jonathan 
Lewis has been highly critical of the failure to realise this potential:  
…. For so long the UK courts have clung to parliamentary intention as a necessary ‘fairy tale’ to 
justify judicial creativity and activism. Here they were presented with unusually explicit evidence 
of parliamentary intention which provided a potent catalyst with which to advance human rights 
protection and they have not fully taken advantage of it...41 
 
Yet, as Kavanagh notes, ‘MPs may have had a variety of intentions regarding specific 
sections of the Bill, both in terms of how they would be applied and the aims they 
                                                 
34 Ibid 182. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Eg E. Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg?’ (n 10). 
37 Hansard HL vol 583 col 510 (18 November 1997) (Lord Irvine). 
38 Ibid.  
39 Eg Baroness Hale in Re P and Others [2008] 3 WLR 76 [119]. After some reference to statements 
given in the Government’s White Paper as well as those of the Home Secretary and the Lord Chancellor 
as reported in Hansard, Baroness Hale felt it ‘clear’ that Parliament intended domestic courts ‘at least in 
some cases, to be able to go further’. 
40 R. Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act: Binding domestic courts to Strasbourg?’ [2004] 
PL 725, 730. 
41 J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ [2007] PL 720, 726. 
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would fulfil’,42 and ‘it is well known that voting on legislation in the House of 
Commons is frequently influenced by factors which have more to do with the political 
consequences of the vote for the MP, than with intentions or beliefs about the substance 
of the Bill’.43  It is hard to disagree. Since the objective of Parliamentary debate is to air 
competing views, it is difficult to ascribe any particular view to the intentions of 
Parliament as a whole. In fact, the idea that such material might uncover the intentions 
of Parliament during the enactment of a particular provision may itself be a fiction. 
While the well known Pepper v Hart44 case indicated that statements made in 
Parliamentary debates could contain ‘a clear indication of what Parliament intended in 
using those words’,45 it is not always clear that the prized collective intention is 
discernible, or even tangible.46 Thus, while a more generous interpretation of 
Convention rights may be possible (‘at least in some cases’)47 ‘unenacted intentions’ 
alone may be insufficient to support this.  
 
However, the rejection of specific amendments (such as the Conservative amendments 
discussed above) may be distinguishable from the category of ‘unenacted intentions’ for 
which Kavanagh advocated caution; straightforward rejections of certain statutory 
language are, at least, a clear indication of what Parliament certainly did not intend.48 
With this view, it is possible to explore certain possibilities which would have been 
ruled out had the binding amendments above been passed: that domestic courts are not 
obliged to follow the decisions of the Strasbourg Court; that judges are probably free to 
develop human rights jurisprudence under the Convention in keeping with domestic 
traditions (rather than being restricted exclusively to the Strasbourg approach); and that 
                                                 
42 A. Kavanagh, ‘The role of Parliamentary Intention’ (n 26) 181; This has been described as the 
distinction between application intentions and further purposes, see A. Marmor, Interpretation and Legal 
Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992) 165ff; see also G. MacCallum, ‘Legislative Intent’ in R. 
Summers (ed.) Essays in Legal Philosophy (Blackwell, Oxford 1968) 237. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593.  
45 Ibid 634-635 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
46 E.g. M Hunt, ‘The Human Rights Act and Legal Culture: The Judiciary and the Legal profession’, in 
Clements and J Young (eds), Human Rights Act: Changing the Culture (Blackwell, Oxford 1999) 93.  
47 Re P (n 33) [119]. 
48 Equally, official reports and white papers may identify significant omissions in the enacted legislation 
so as to indicate the negatively defined intentions in much the same way. Eg Pepper v Hart (n 38) 635 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
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courts are not prohibited from referring to judicial jurisdictions outside the Convention 
remit. On this basis, drawing from reasons given for the rejection of the binding 
amendment – eg that domestic courts ‘must be free to try to give a lead to Europe as 
well as to be led’49 – may support a generous view of the Convention in domestic 
courts.    
 
On the other hand, these possibilities must be balanced with the rejection of further 
amendments made by the opposition, purporting to give an even wider discretion to 
domestic courts. The opposition in the House of Commons (rather inconsistent with the 
arguments made in the House of Lords) tabled an amendment to suggest that the word 
‘must’ in s.2 should be substituted with ‘may’, alongside an amendment to replace ‘take 
into account’ with ‘have regard to’.50 The amendments were thought to be ‘more suited 
to the circumstances in guiding the relationship between United Kingdom and European 
law’.51 It was said that the approach of domestic courts should be ‘within the general 
framework of the jurisprudence of the European Court, but not to be too tightly bound 
by it’;52 Strasbourg jurisprudence should be ‘persuasive rather than prescriptive’.53 
However, it was thought that the effect of the word ‘may’ could be that domestic courts 
‘might produce, on the same set of facts, different results because some may take the 
jurisprudence into account and some may not’.54 As Mr. Douglas Hogg contributed, the 
word ‘may’ would be inappropriate for the aims of the provision, thinking it ‘right that 
the courts of the United Kingdom should take into account the stated decisions and 
opinions, although it is for the courts to determine their relevance and appropriate 
weight’.55 The rejection of this amendment would thus indicate that domestic courts at 
least have some limits on their discretion, although, resisting too much speculation at 
this early stage, a conservative conclusion must be that Parliamentary intentions (alone) 
make it difficult to determine more specifically what these are.  
 
                                                 
49 Hansard HL vol 583 col 510 (18 November 1997) (Lord Irvine) 
50 Hansard HC vol 313 col 389 (3 June 1998) (Mr Clappison). 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid col 390. 
54 Hansard HC vol 313 col 402 (3 June 1998) (Mr Hoon). 
55 Ibid col 395. 
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The only certain conclusions that can be drawn (other than those plainly given in the 
text of the provision itself) must be negatively defined. While domestic courts are 
obliged to ‘take into account’ any ‘relevant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence, they are not 
obliged to follow it, imitate it, restrict themselves to it or expand upon it. Paradoxically, 
and despite intuitive misgivings, the so-called ‘unenacted intentions’ may in this way 




JUDICIAL APPROACHES AND ACADEMIC COMMENTARY 
 
On a purely semantic level the words ‘take into account’ are entirely discretionary and 
offer no guidance as to how domestic courts ought to discharge the duty. Moreover, 
concerns that the guidance given by those words was too vague were dismissed by the 
Lord Chancellor on the grounds that domestic courts might simply be trusted to ‘use 
their commonsense’.56 Predictably, the range of possibilities arising from such 
ambiguity has prompted a range of judicial approaches from following the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence simpliciter to consciously departing from that jurisprudence, and this 
range of judicial approaches has, generally speaking, been afforded little sympathy by 
commentators: courts demonstrating an over inclusive approach are accused of ‘blindly 
following’ or abdicating judicial responsibility to Strasbourg, while courts showing 
more modest reference to Convention jurisprudence, or indeed no reference at all, have 
come under fire for circumventing the obligation altogether.57  
 
This section does not seek to provide an analysis of every case in which s.2 has been 
given mention; s.2 is potentially engaged in every case brought under the HRA and 
space prohibits such a comprehensive study. Attention will instead be focused toward 
outlining the most prevalent or significant judicial approaches: following Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, departing from Strasbourg jurisprudence with reasons and departing from 
Strasbourg jurisprudence without giving reasons for doing so.     
 
                                                 
56 Hansard HL vol 584 col 1271 (19 January 1998). 
57 Eg E. Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg?’ (n 10) 410; The latter approach may, at any rate, fall 
foul of s.6 HRA 1998. 
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I. FOLLOWING STRASBOURG JURISPRUDENCE: (THE ‘MIRROR PRINCIPLE’)58 
Despite the evident legislative intentions (of Government and Parliament, enacted and 
unenacted) not to bind domestic courts to the Strasbourg jurisprudence through s.2, the 
dominant approach in judicial reasoning has tended to interpret the Convention case law 
as more than merely persuasive authority. The prevailing fear appears to be that a court 
failing to follow clear Strasbourg case law runs the obvious risk of appeal, and 
ultimately challenge in Strasbourg. Apart from reflecting badly on the judicial image, 
the result is costly and one which the HRA 1998 is usually said to have been designed 
to avoid or prevent altogether.59 Lord Slynn paid attention to the concern in 
Alconbury,60 being careful to outline that domestic courts should usually follow the 
‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘in the absence of special circumstances’ 
in order to avoid such a result: ‘[i]f [a court] does not do so there is at least a possibility 
that the case will go to that court, which is likely in the ordinary case to follow its own 
constant jurisprudence’.61 Similarly in Anderson,62 Lord Bingham stressed that ‘the 
House will not ‘without strong reasons’ depart from the principles laid down in a 
carefully considered judgment of the court sitting as a Grand Chamber’63 and set out 
authoritative guidance on the s.2 duty in Ullah:64  
[C]ourts should, in the absence of some special circumstances, follow any clear and constant 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court … This reflects the fact that the Convention is an 
international instrument, the correct interpretation of which can be authoritatively expounded 
only by the Strasbourg court … a national court subject to a duty such as that imposed by section 
2 should not without strong reason dilute or weaken the effect of the Strasbourg case law … It is 
of course open to member states to provide for rights more generous than those guaranteed by the 
Convention, but such provision should not be the product of interpretation of the Convention by 
national courts, since the meaning of the Convention should be uniform throughout the states 
                                                 
58 J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ (n 35).  
59Rights Brought Home (n 3) [1.14]; K. Starmer, European Human Rights Law. The Human Rights Act 
1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights (LAG, London 1999) 26.  
60 R. (On the Application of Alconbury Developments Lts) v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions [2001] UKHL 23. 
61 Ibid [26]. 
62 R. (On the Application of Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 46. 
63 Ibid [18]. 
64 Regina (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator; Do v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2004] UKHL 26. 
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party to it. The duty of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it 
evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less.65 
 
This dicta has been given repeated judicial endorsement,66 and the drift of judicial 
guidance on s.2 has been to stress the so-called ‘mirror principle’67 that the Convention 
must be given the same meaning as that given by the Strasbourg Court by reason of it 
being ‘the highest judicial authority on the interpretation of those rights’:68 ‘the 
effectiveness of the Convention as an international instrument depends on the loyal 
acceptance by member states of the principles it lays down’.69  
 
That the dominant approach courts have taken to s.2 is to follow Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is almost unanimously recognised by commentators on the provision. 
Fenwick’s conclusion was that ‘the obligation under s.2 as interpreted by the House of 
Lords comes close to affording binding force to the jurisprudence’,70 and Merris Amos 
added that ‘[i]n the majority of cases, the obligation to take into account Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is construed as an obligation to follow it as well’.71 Paul Kearns has 
suggested that this type of loyalty to the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court is ‘a 
practice that is becoming gradually habitual for our judiciary … the effects of which 
would be difficult to reverse’.72 Nico Krisch recently agreed, writing that ‘the House of 
                                                 
65 Ibid [20] (Lord Bingham). 
66 Eg R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37 [28] (Lord Steyn); Anderson (n 56) [18] (Lord Bingham); (R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Amin [2004] 1 AC 653 [44]; Kay and others v 
London Borough of Lambeth [2006] UKHL 10 [28] (Lord Bingham); R (On The Application of Animal 
Defenders International) v Secretary of State For Culture, Media and Sport (Respondent) [2008] UKHL 
15; Baroness Hale, ‘Who Defines Convention Rights?’ (JUSTICE Tom Sargant Memorial Annual 
Lecture, 15 October 2008) <http://www.justice.org.uk/trainingevents/annuallecture/index.html> accessed 
7 November 2008. 
67 J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ (n 35). 
68 Kay (n 60) [28] (Lord Bingham). 
69 Ibid. 
70 H, Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Cavendish, London 2007) 193. 
71 M. Amos, Human Rights Law (n 8) 18. 
72 P. Kearns, ‘United Kingdom Judges in Human Rights Cases’, in E. Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism 
in Human Rights Cases (United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law, Birmingham 2003) 
82. 
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Lords has refused to make use of this space: the dominant position among the judges is 
instead one of close attention and loyalty to Strasbourg judgments’.73  
 
Nevertheless, while the approach is criticised by some as overly deferential, it may also 
be characterised as a pragmatic one. Firstly, it has also been suggested that while s.2 
manifestly does not oblige domestic courts to follow relevant ECtHR case law, s.6 HRA 
- which provides that it is unlawful for courts (as public authorities) to act in a way 
which is incompatible with a Convention right - does have the binding effect that s.2 
lacks.74 It is generally agreed that s.2 leaves it open for a domestic court to ‘take 
account’ of but ultimately not apply Strasbourg jurisprudence, but a court failing to take 
account of ‘relevant’ jurisprudence arguably fails to discharge the s.2 duty and may fall 
foul of illegality under s.6 of the Act.  
 
Secondly, plausibly the most reliable way to ‘bring rights home’ and ensure 
compatibility with the Convention would be to take account of the approach that the 
Strasbourg Court itself applies. It is at least arguable that this is the purpose of s.2 HRA 
in requiring domestic courts to ‘take into account’ the jurisprudence of that Court. Just 
as it was anomalous to deny individuals their Convention rights in domestic courts but 
give them the right to have them vindicated in Strasbourg before the HRA, there is 
clearly something anomalous in refusing to apply Strasbourg jurisprudence which 
would be applied by the ECtHR itself.75 The Strasbourg Court in Goodwin v United 
Kingdom76 lent some support to this kind of reasoning, saying of its own approach to 
previous jurisprudence:  
While the court is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments, it is in the interest of 
legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart, without good 
reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases.77 
As Elizabeth Wicks has conceded ‘[a] domestic evolution of rights barely 
distinguishable from that which has evolved at Strasbourg will ... avoid (or, at least, 
                                                 
73 N. Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2008) 71 MLR 183, 202-3. 
74 I. Loveland ‘Making it up as they go along? The Court of Appeal on same sex spouses and succession 
rights to tenancies’ [2003] PL 222, 233. 
75 Ibid. See also P.Greatorex, ‘The Human Rights Act: s.2(1): Duty to Take into Account Strasbourg 
Jurisprudence [2001] JR 220, 221. 
76 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18. 
77 Ibid [74]. 
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lessen) the need for Britain to wash its dirty laundry in the public arena of Europe’.78 
Further, Loveland has actually considered that ECHR decisions are so important as to 
be considered as authority even where they did not ‘argue the point through in a 
coherent and thorough manner’.79  
 
Yet, while following Strasbourg jurisprudence will usually shelter UK law from the 
realms of incompatibility, it is clear that loyalty to Strasbourg will do little more. The 
approach is effective where following Strasbourg jurisprudence has the effect of 
bringing domestic standards up to a Strasbourg minimum, but commentators have been 
quick to question how the justification lends weight to following Strasbourg with the 
effect of limiting the development of human rights jurisprudence to that ‘floor’.80 In 
fact, writing before the HRA was in force, Iain Leigh in fact felt that the argument 
probably supported a generous, rather than ‘mirror’, view of the Convention:  
It is implicit that in any given case UK judges might adopt a more rigorous approach than 
Strasbourg and declare legislation incompatible that the Strasbourg court would find to be within 
the margin of appreciation. Moreover, if a higher standard of human rights protection operated 
domestically, it would also staunch the flow of successful applications at Strasbourg.81 
 
Nevertheless, the further importance that the House of Lords has attached to the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence is apparent from the reluctance to depart from the Strasbourg 
line even where the Strasbourg jurisprudence lacks clarity or is in an unsatisfactory 
state. In N v Secretary of State for the Home Department82 the House of Lords 
considered the appeal of a woman who, after her arrival in this country from Uganda, 
was found to have an AIDS-defining illness. The appellant claimed that the treatment 
that she needed would not be available to her in Uganda and that she would die within a 
matter of months if she were to be returned to that country. The House considered the 
relevant decisions of the Strasbourg Court as enjoined to do by s.2 HRA but struggled 
to find clarity in the guidance and were clearly unwilling to depart from the Strasbourg 
                                                 
78 Eg E. Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg?’ (n 10) 414. 
79 Ibid 227. 
80 Eg N. Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (n 67) 202-3; R. Masterman, 
‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act: Binding domestic courts to Strasbourg?’ (n 34); E. Wicks 
‘Taking Account of Strasbourg?’ (n 10); J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ (n 35).  
81 I. Leigh, L. Lustgarten ‘Making Rights Real: The Courts Remedies, and the Human Rights Act’ (1999) 
58(3) CLJ 509, 517.  
82 N v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 WLR 1124. 
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decisions in order to answer the problem domestically. The ECtHR had held in D v 
United Kingdom83 and subsequent cases that Article 3 was breached by deporting AIDS 
sufferers who would not receive proper treatment where the facts of the case were very 
exceptional. Lord Nicholls analogised the appellant’s position in this case to having a 
life-support machine switched off,84 but had difficulty with the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, describing the Strasbourg authorities as ‘in a not altogether satisfactory 
state’85 and concluding that the available decisions ‘lacked [the ECtHR’s] customary 
clarity’.86 Lords Hope and Brown also analysed the ECtHR’s case law but had trouble 
identifying any clear principles. Nevertheless, Lord Hope expressed the view that the 
task of domestic courts was to ‘take [the Strasbourg] case law as we find it, not as we 
would like it to be’ and the House, ‘with considerable misgivings’,87 dismissed her 
appeal. 
 
In large part this reluctance on the part of domestic courts to decide the matter for 
themselves may be attributable to an understanding about the purpose of the HRA as a 
statute which only provides remedies in domestic courts that would otherwise be found 
in Strasbourg. Lord Roger seemed to explain his construction of the duty in s.2 on this 
basis, feeling that bringing Strasbourg remedies into domestic courts required a certain 
loyalty to the meaning of the Convention as given by the Strasbourg Court: 
... Parliament's purpose in enacting the Human Rights Act 1998 so as to ‘bring rights home’ was 
to provide remedies in the British courts for the violations of people's Convention rights ... The 
Convention rights themselves were not to be altered as they passed through customs at Dover and 
entered our domestic law with its particular system of remedies.88 
This particular point has emerged as a matter of some debate, dividing judges and 
academics alike. Contrary to the construction given by Lord Roger (quoted above) the 
House of Lords in Re P and Others89 recently explained that ‘‘Convention rights’ within 
the meaning of the 1998 Act are domestic and not international rights. They are 
                                                 
83 (1997) 24 EHRR 423. 
84 N (n 76) [4]. 
85 Ibid [11]. 
86 Ibid [14]. 
87 EM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for Home Department [2008] UKHL 64 [8] (Lord Hope). 
88 Attorney General's Reference No 2 of 2001 [2003] UKHL 68 [162]. 
89 [2008] 3 WLR 76. 
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applicable in the domestic law of the United Kingdom and it is the duty of the courts to 
interpret them like any other statute’.90  
 
Ultimately, whether a court views the Convention rights arising under the HRA as (a) 
rights as defined by Strasbourg but given effect in United Kingdom law; or (b) rights 
defined by United Kingdom law within the parameters defined by Strasbourg91 may 
directly affect the impact of Strasbourg jurisprudence under s.2 HRA. Specifically it 
may affect the possibility that a court will follow the decisions of the Strasbourg Court 
‘no more, no less’, or progressively develop human rights jurisprudence beyond the 
Strasbourg approach. If the correct construction of Convention rights is that given in (b) 
above (and most recently preferred by the House of Lords in Re P) the hitherto 
reluctance of domestic courts to depart from or build upon Strasbourg jurisprudence 
may become less frequent.92   
 
 
II.  ‘DEPARTING’93 FROM STRASBOURG JURISPRUDENCE (WITH REASONS) 
It will be recalled that the Conservative amendment purporting to bind domestic courts 
to Strasbourg jurisprudence was emphatically opposed on the grounds that any stronger 
obligation than to ‘take into account’ would go ‘further than the European Convention 
itself requires’94 and be ‘quite inappropriate to do so since such cases deal with laws and 
practices which are not those of the United Kingdom’.95 It was in this way envisaged 
that Convention rights would be ‘subtly and powerfully woven into our law’,96 
simultaneously creating opportunity for the development of a so-called (and essentially) 
‘domestic law of human rights’.97  
                                                 
90 Ibid [33] (Lord Hoffman). 
91 The question was put in these terms by Baroness Hale in Re P (n 33) [84]. 
92 The debate around the construction of Convention rights in domestic law is returned to at greater length 
in Chapter III.     
93 ‘Departure’ is used loosely in this context. Since under s.2 a domestic courts is under a duty only to 
‘take into account’ relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence and not to apply it, there is no ‘departure’ in the 
precedential sense. 
94 Hansard HL vol 584 col 1269 (19 January 1998) (Lord Lester of Herne Hill).  
95 Ibid. 
96 Rights Brought Home (n 3) [1.13]. 
97 Eg Laws LJ in Cambridge Centre for Public Law, The Human Rights Act and the Criminal Justice and 
Regulatory Process, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1999) (Overview) xiii. 
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Pursuant to such an aim it would naturally be ‘insufficient simply to identify a previous 
decision of the ECtHR on the matter in issue and to follow it’.98 Accordingly, while the 
drift of judicial reasoning under s.2 has seemingly favoured a ‘mirror’ approach to the 
Strasbourg case law it is clear that the guidance given by the House of Lords (as well as 
the discretion in the provision itself) allows departure from that jurisprudence. As Nico 
Kirsch has written, the vague formula to ‘take into account’ Strasbourg jurisprudence 
‘deliberately creates opportunities for divergence’.99 Further, ‘[f]ormulae such as 
‘special circumstances’ or ‘without strong reason’ still leave the courts significant 
flexibility and have led to ‘creative dialogues’ with the ECtHR as well as open 
departures from its interpretations’.100 
 
It is possible to see that domestic courts have been ready to interpret the guidance in this 
manner. The judgment of the House of Lords Williamson101 is a good example: the case 
concerned the appeal of parents and teachers of children at an independent Christian 
school where discipline was enforced by mild corporal punishment. According to their 
religious beliefs the claimants asserted that the teachers had the right to administer such 
treatment and claimed that s.548 Education Act 1996 (prohibiting corporal punishment) 
interfered with their rights under Article 9 ECHR. Taking into account these decisions, 
Lord Nicholls openly departed from the decision of the Strasbourg Court in Campbell 
and Cosans102 (also concerning the scope of Article 9 and corporal punishment) in order 
to find that the manifestation of the beliefs of the parents and teachers fell within Article 
9. His Lordship gave as reasons for the departure the fact that ‘[u]nlike Mrs Campbell 
and Mrs Cosans, the claimants in the present proceedings do not object to the use of 
corporal punishment. Quite the contrary: they support [it] and object to the statutory 
ban’.103 Accordingly, Campbell and Cosans ‘[could not] be regarded as comparable to 
[the present case]’.104   
 
                                                 
98 N. Sheldon, ‘The Effect of the Human Rights Act on Domestic Precedent’ [2001] JR 208, 210. 
99 N. Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (n 67) 203; I. Leigh, R. 
Masterman, Making Rights Real (n 2) 64.  
100 Ibid 202-3. 
101 R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] 2 AC 246.  
102 (1982) 4 EHRR 293. 
103 Williamson (n 95) [5] (original emphasis). 
104 Ibid [52]. 
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Other reasons for departing from a Strasbourg decision were given by Lord Hoffman in 
Alconbury, feeling that if Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘compelled a conclusion 
fundamentally at odds with the distribution of powers under the British constitution, 
[he] would have considerable doubt as to whether [it] should be followed’.105 Similarly, 
Lord Bingham added in Kay106 that 
… a domestic court may challenge the application by the Strasbourg court of the principles it has 
expounded to the detailed facts of a particular class of case peculiarly within the knowledge of 
national authorities. The 1998 Act gives it scope to do so.107 
  
It is also clear that age may feed reasons for departure: some courts have plainly taken 
the view that more recent Strasbourg case law will be more relevant and thus more 
persuasive than older decisions. This was clearly a consideration in Re F (Care: 
Termination of Contract).108 Considering the compatibility of the Children’s Act 1989 
with Article 9 of the Convention, Mr Justice Wall said he would be ‘disappointed if … 
there were in every case to be extensive citation of authorities from the European Court 
of Human Rights, particularly where reliance was placed on cases pre-dating the 1989 
Act’.109 However, while the approach resembles the European Court of Human Rights’ 
own view of Convention case law (on the grounds that it is the Convention is a ‘living 
instrument’) and Parliament arguably intended it to give domestic courts space to 
disregard outdated judgments,110 it is difficult to see that restricting reference to 
Strasbourg judgments given after any given date (for instance to post-1989 cases as in 
Re F) would not run directly counter to the obligation in s.2 HRA; as Leigh and 
Masterman have written, an attempt such as this ‘[flies] in the face of the duty to take 
account of [Strasbourg] jurisprudence ‘whenever made or given’’.111 
 
A more compelling reason for departure from Strasbourg jurisprudence has been given 
on the grounds that the jurisprudence is affected by a margin of appreciation. Since the 
margin of appreciation ‘constitutes a recognition by Strasbourg court … that is not best 
placed to decide the particular means by which the Convention’s Articles ought to be 
                                                 
105 Alconbury (n 54) [76]. 
106 Kay (n 60). 
107 Ibid [28]. 
108 [2000] 2 FCR 481; The Times, 22 June 2000 (emphasis added). 
109 Ibid. 
110 N. Kirsch ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (n 67), 202-3. 
111 I. Leigh, R. Masterman, Making Rights Real (n 2) 57. 
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fulfilled in an individual signatory state’112 it is arguable that a court faced with 
jurisprudence affected by a margin of appreciation may properly divorce it from its 
reasoning. Lord Hoffmann took this approach in A and others v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department:113 confronted with Strasbourg authority shaped by the margin of 
appreciation, his Lordship said ‘we, as a United Kingdom court, have to decide the matter 
for ourselves’.114  
 
Open willingness to depart from a seemingly relevant decision of the Strasbourg Court 
has also been reasoned on the basis that the decision suffered from unclear reasoning. In 
R v Lyons for instance, Lord Hoffmann felt that there was ‘room for dialogue’ where an 
English court ‘considers that the ECtHR has misunderstood or been misinformed about 
some aspect of English law’,115 and in R v Spear116 the House of Lords were willing to 
depart from Strasbourg jurisprudence117 on the basis that the Strasbourg Court had not 
‘receive[d] all the help … needed to form a conclusion’.118 In a similar vein is the 
reluctance to follow Strasbourg jurisprudence driven by a lack of confidence in 
Strasbourg reasoning itself: speaking during the Parliamentary debates, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson felt it dangerous to ‘tie’ domestic courts to Strasbourg jurisprudence on the 
basis that ‘[w]e are now seeing a wider range of judges adjudicating such matters, a 
number of them drawn from jurisdictions 10 years ago not famous for their observance 
of human rights’.119 Interestingly, the French judiciary has similarly evidenced a certain 
distrust of the Strasbourg Court: ‘its composition with foreign judges coming from very 
different legal cultures and traditions, is the object of doubts and sarcasm’.120 
 
In spite of this evidence that domestic courts are willing to depart from Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in certain circumstances, the approach is generally not distinct from the 
preference prima facie to follow the Strasbourg line. In fact, departure has often been 
                                                 
112 Laws LJ, ‘The limitations of Human Rights’ [1998] PL 254, 258. 
113 [2004] UKHL 56. 
114 Ibid [92]; Re P (n 33).  
115 R v Lyons (No 3) [2003] 1 AC 976 [46].   
116  R v Spear and Others [2003] 1 AC 734. 
117 Morris v United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 52. 
118 Spear (n 110) [12] (Lord Bingham). 
119 Hansard HL vol 583 col 513 (18 November 1997). 
120 L. Heuschling, ‘Comparative Law in French Human Rights Cases’ in E. Örücü (ed), Judicial 
Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (n 66) 36. 
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reasoned in accordance with that approach. In Alconbury for instance, Lord Hoffman 
did not disagree with the view put forward by Lord Slynn that domestic courts should 
only depart from ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘in special 
circumstances’ and evidently felt that construction to be compatible with his view that 
departure may be appropriate where Strasbourg decisions ‘compelled a conclusion 
fundamentally at odds with the distribution of powers under the British Constitution’.121  
 
One exception to this tendency has been given by Laws LJ who has firmly maintained 
that while the Act operates to modernise the law, ‘common lawyers must administer it, 
according to their ancient methods’.122 Before the coming into force of the HRA, His 
Lordship had emphasised the foundational role of the common law in ex parte B:123 
certain rights (broadly speaking those occupying a central place in the Convention and 
obviously including the right to life) were not to be perceived merely as enjoying a legal 
status internationally, but were to be vindicated, as forming part of the substance of the 
English common law.124 As such, in his Lordship’s view, the HRA did not implement a 
new system of rights adjudication reliant on Strasbourg; rather, it provided these 
domestic common law rights with a ‘democratic underpinning’.125 Laws LJ has thus 
been reluctant to follow the ‘mirror’ approach set out by the House of Lords, suggesting 
instead that ‘the duty of domestic courts is ‘to develop, by the common law’s 
incremental method, a coherent and principled domestic law of human rights … 
[t]reating the Convention text as a template for our own laws runs the risk of an over-
rigid approach’;126 ‘[t]he English Court is not a Strasbourg surrogate’127 and ‘the task of 
domestic courts was ‘not simply to add on the Strasbourg learning to the corpus of 
English law, as if it were a compulsory adjunct taken from an alien source, but to 
develop a municipal law of human rights…’.128 
 
                                                 
121 Alconbury (n 54) [76]. 
122 Laws LJ Overview (n 91). 
123 R v Cambridge District Health Authority ex parte B [1995] 1 FLR 1055. 
124 Ibid; P. Kearns, ‘United Kingdom Judges in Human Rights Cases’, in E. Örücü (ed), Judicial 
Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (n 66) 69. 
125 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] QB 728, 
[71]. 
126 R (on the application of Prolife Alliance) v BBC [2002] 2 All ER 756, 771-772. 
127 Ibid [33]-[44]. 
128 Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2002] 2 All ER 668 [17]. 
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There are some examples of domestic courts sympathising with this, and departing from 
Strasbourg jurisprudence with the effect of enhancing the scope of Convention rights 
beyond that given by the Strasbourg Court may often draw from such an approach. 
While uncommon, departures with that result have been made: in Ghaidan v 
Mendoza129 for instance, Buxton LJ consciously and explicitly departed from the 
Strasbourg decision in S v United Kingdom130 in order to grant protection for 
homosexual partnerships under the Housing Act 1967, and one of the reasons given for 
the ‘limited assistance’ of the European jurisprudence in AG’s Ref 2 of 2001131 was that 
‘it is open to member states to provide better protection than the Convention 
requires’.132 Examples of this approach in the jurisprudence of English courts are, 
however, relatively rare and it is unlikely that ‘going’ further will of itself feed reasons 
for departure. Nico Krisch is sympathetic: the development of a municipal law of 
human rights ‘might have appeared as too openly ‘creative’, as a legislative rather than 
judicial function’ and the tendency to closely rely on or follow Strasbourg jurisprudence 
‘may have helped to maintain a more clearly judicial role, one of ‘applying’ the 
law...’.133 As another commentator has explained:  
The English courts have not so far laid any particular emphasis on the importance of interpreting 
the Act generously. In fact, there is an obvious tension between the courts giving effect to the 
HRA as a constitutional instrument and avoiding the charge of excessive judicial activism.134  
On the whole domestic courts have been unreceptive to an interpretation of s.2 HRA 
which appears to be too openly creative or allows the development of human rights 
jurisprudence beyond the Strasbourg position. As Lord Hope said in N:  
It is not for [domestic courts] to search for a solution to [the appellant’s] problem which is not to 
be found in the Strasbourg case law … [or] to determine what extensions, if any, are needed to 
the rights guaranteed by the Convention.135 
It is clear that the prevalent trend in judicial reasoning under s.2 HRA leans more 
towards caution than creativity. 
                                                 
129 Ghaidan v Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30. See also R (LS and Marper) v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire Police, [2002] EWCA Civ 1275 [34].  
130 (1986) 47 D&R 247. 
131 AG’s Reference (No 2 of 2001) (n 82). 
132 Ibid 79. 
133 N. Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (n 67) 203; R. Masterman, 
‘Aspiration or foundation?’ (n 2) 57, 78, 85. 
134 R. Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: the legitimacy of judicial intervention 
under the Human Rights Act 998’ [2004] PL 33, 34. 
135 N (n 65) [25] (emphasis added). 
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III. ‘DEPARTING’ FROM STRASBOURG WITHOUT CLEAR REASONS 
On a straightforward reading of s.2 it is entirely plausible that a court need not give 
reasons for departing from relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence at all (the HRA enjoins 
domestic courts only to take it ‘into account’). Commentators tend to encourage 
domestic courts to depart from the ‘mirror approach’ first laid down in Alconbury,136 
however, departures made without reasons have been received with scepticism.   
 
The Court of Appeal decision in Begum for instance has been heavily criticised by 
commentators on s.2 HRA as a result of Laws LJ’s short regard of the (relevant) 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. His Lordship resisted any express reliance on Strasbourg case 
law on the basis that the case concerned ‘a matter of our domestic law of human 
rights’.137 Perceived as overtly elevating the role of the judiciary in the development of 
human rights jurisprudence under the HRA, Laws LJ’s approach has been described by 
one commentator as ‘judicial creativity at its height’.138 According to Paul Kearns ‘the 
tenor of Laws LJ’s dicta leaves us in no doubt that he [was] trying to carve a new way 
forward in UK human rights law based on an independent human rights regime only 
once derived from Strasbourg but no longer reliant on it’.139 The sparse analysis given 
by Laws LJ to the relevant Strasbourg case law was condemned by Wicks as 
‘superficial’ and ‘not within the spirit of s.2(1)’,140 while Loveland suggested that 
‘…the court has in effect turned a Nelsonian blind eye to the relevant European Court of 
Human Rights jurisprudence’ on the basis that ‘that authority [did] not support the 
conclusion which the court may have wished to reach’.141 
 
                                                 
136 R. Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act: Binding domestic courts to Strasbourg?’ (n 
34); E. Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg?’ (n 10); J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human 
Rights’ (n 35). 
137 Begum (n 122) [25]. 
138 P. Kearns, ‘United Kingdom Judges in Human Rights Cases’, in Esin Örücü (ed), Judicial 
Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (n 66) 82. 
139 Ibid. 
140 E. Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg?’ (n 10) 417. 
141 I. Loveland, 'Does Homelessness Decision-making Engage Article 6(1) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights?' [2003] EHRLR 177, 192. 
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The development of breach of confidence into a privacy remedy is another example: in 
a line of cases142 leading up to Campell v MGN143 the Court of Appeal had incorporated 
a test from a decision of the Australian High Court144 while simultaneously ignoring 
Strasbourg jurisprudence on the matter.145 Moreover, even though the House of Lords 
did turn to the Strasbourg position in Campbell and anticipate the development made by 
the Strasbourg Court in Von-Hannover, judicial reasoning in privacy cases following 
that decision appeared to ascribe very little influence to Von-Hannover, preferring 
instead to rely on the domestic reasoning in Campbell.146 This particular predilection 
has recently been re-addressed by the House of Lords147 but the remarkable reluctance 
to ignore Von Hannover in a number of decisions evidences a worrying lack of rigour in 
judicial reasoning under s.2. Similarly, the House of Lords in Limbuela148 held s.55 of 
the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to contravene Article 3 ECHR and, 
in doing so, appeared to expand the scope of Article 3 beyond the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence without any express discussion on the duty under s.2 HRA.149 
 
Most interesting is the recent decision in Animal Defenders International150 (ADI) 
where the House of Lords did not attempt to justify departure from what was arguably 
the most relevant Strasbourg decision, Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland151 
(VgT). ADI concerned the compatibility of the absolute prohibition on paid political 
advertising in the Communications Act 2003 with Article 10 of the Convention, and the 
facts of VgT were almost identical. In that case, the Strasbourg Court found a violation 
                                                 
142 See: A v B plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195; Campbell v MGN [2002] EWCA Civ 1373; 
[2003] QB 633.  
143 Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22. 
144 Australian Broadcasting Association v Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199 [42]. 
145 See e.g: Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 149; Z v Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 371; Tammer 
v Estonia (2003) 37 EHRR 43. 
146 G. Phillipson, ‘The Common Law, Privacy and the Convention’ in H. Fenwick, R. Masterman, G. 
Phillipson, Judicial Reasoning Under the UK Human Rights Act (n 2) 219. 
147 Eg Regina v G (Secretary of State for the Home Department intervening) [2008] UKHL 37. 
148 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Limbuela [2005] UKHL 66; [2006] 1 AC 
396.   
149 As Leigh and Masterman have pointed out, ‘[h]ad the ‘no less/no more’ doctrine been applied 
rigorously, then presumably the threshold at which Article 3 would be engaged should have been the 
same as – not broader than – that recognised by Strasbourg’ Making Rights Real (n 2) 79-80. 
150 Animal Defenders International (n 60). 
151 (2002) 34 EHRR 4. 
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of Article 10 of the Convention on the basis that the absolute ban was not proportionate 
to the legitimate aim pursued (protecting the rights of others) and therefore not 
necessary in a democratic society. In doing so the Court emphasised that, as a result of 
the value ascribed to political speech, the Swiss authorities enjoyed only a narrow 
margin of appreciation.  
 
Despite the clear similarities in the decisions, the House of Lords favoured the 
reasoning of another Strasbourg decision in which the Court had found no violation of 
Article 10: Murphy v Ireland.152 Yet, in contrast to ADI and VgT (both concerned with 
political advertising), the applicant in Murphy was prevented from broadcasting a 
religious advertisement by Irish legislation prohibiting advertisements ‘directed towards 
any religious or political end…’.153 In that case the Strasbourg Court agreed that the 
prohibition satisfied the Article 10(2) qualifications but, importantly, did so on the 
grounds that the Court would accord a wider margin of appreciation in matters of 
religion: a clear contrast to VgT.154 
 
Interestingly, the House of Lords seemed to discount VgT from their reasoning while 
continuing to speak in terms of following the Strasbourg jurisprudence. Baroness Hale 
clearly confirmed the task of domestic courts to be ‘to keep pace with the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence as it develops over time, no more and no less’155 while Lord Bingham was 
careful to repeat that ‘in the absence of special circumstances our courts should follow 
any clear and constant jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court’.156 Yet it is unclear what 
the ‘special circumstances’ feeding departure from VgT might have been or what the 
‘strong reasons’ were for diluting the effect of it. It might in theory have been suggested 
that - since the VgT judgment was given before Murphy and indeed the 2003 Act - the 
House could find the reasoning in Murphy more relevant given time concerns to the 
instant case but the point was not given any mention in the House of Lords, and as Lord 
                                                 
152 (2003) 38 EHRR 212. 
153 Section 10(3) Radio and Television Act 1988 (emphasis added). 
154 The view of the Strasbourg Court was that ‘ … there is little scope … for restrictions on political 
speech or on debate of questions of public interest … However, a wider margin of appreciation is 
generally available … when regulating freedom of expression  in relation to matters … within the sphere 
of morals or, especially, religion … it is this margin of appreciation which distinguishes [Murphy ] from 
[VgT ]’ (n 146) [67].  
155 R (On the Application of Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence [2008] 1 AC 153 [106] 
156 Alconbury (n 54). 
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Scott recognised, the VgT case was in fact considered again more recently in 
Strasbourg.157 Secondly, the Court in VgT emphatically provided that there would be a 
narrow - rather than wide - margin of appreciation and by virtue of religious 
sensitivities Murphy in fact commanded a wider margin of appreciation than VgT.  
Lastly, while the Administrative Court found the VgT decision to be ‘aberrant’158  and 
‘one of those ECtHR decisions which suffers from unclear or unsound reasoning’159 no 
mention was made of the idea in the House of Lords.   
 
Since the House of Lords confirmed the approach of prima facie following relevant 
Strasbourg jurisprudence and gave no substantive reasoning as to why a departure from 
VgT was appropriate, it may be that the House of Lords considered Murphy to be of the 
most relevance and therefore did not consider that it was ‘departing’ from Strasbourg at 
all. However, it is arguable that VgT was at least as relevant and since it is extremely 
difficult to at least see how Murphy was more relevant, that conclusion feels like a 
superficial result. Lord Neuberger recently hinted his agreement: ‘as the recent decision 
of this House in Animal Defenders ... shows, decisions of the ECtHR are not always 
followed as literally as some might expect’.160 The reasoning in ADI might have been 
more convincing if the House of Lords had followed its own guidance, recognised the 
proper relevancy of VgT and outlined the ‘special circumstances’ or given the ‘good 
reason’ for diluting the effect of that case. Instead, domestic courts seemed to explicitly 
rule out the VgT decision as a persuasive factor altogether:161 the opinion of Ouseley J 
in the Administrative Court was that the decision in VgT offered ‘no useful guidance’162 
                                                 
157 As a result of the continued Swiss prohibition on broadcasting the television commercial in question 
following the original application the Strasbourg Court found a new and continuing violation of Article 
10: Verein Gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VGT) v Switzerland (no. 32772/02) Chamber judgment of 4 
October 2007; On 19 December 2007 the Swiss Government requested that the case be referred to the 
Grand Chamber. That request was accepted on 31 March 2008 and the decision was confirmed on 8 July 
2008.  
158 R (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport [2006] EWHC 3069 (Admin) [30] (Auld LJ). 
159 Ibid [121] (Ousley J).  
160 Regina (on the application of RJM) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Equality and Human 
Rights Commission intervening) [2008] 3 WLR 1023 [64]. 
161 Of course this is prima facie justified within the normal meaning of s.2: since the obligation of 
domestic courts is expressly only to ‘take into account’ Strasbourg jurisprudence, once they have done so 
courts may legitimately choose to disregard it. 
162 Animal Defenders International (n 60) [121].  
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while, in the House of Lords, Lord Scott found it impossible to ‘assume from the VgT 
case that the European Court would disagree with your Lordships' conclusion that the 
statutory ban on the broadcasting of ADI's ‘political’ advertisement does not infringe 
ADI's Article 10 rights’.163  
 
It is tempting to suggest that the House of Lords emphasised instead an arguably less 
relevant decision (Murphy) because it better supported the conclusion which the court 
wished to reach.164 In her study Elizabeth Wicks identified this kind of approach as: 
describ[ing] judges who assess the relevance of Strasbourg case law by reference to their own 
perception of the case law’s value and integrity. In other words, some judges will primarily take 
into account those judgments which support their own pre-determined opinions.165 
Other commentators have had similar reactions to such reasoning. Luc Heuschling’s 
hypothesis was that ‘comparative law assumes mainly a legitimation function’166 while 
McCrudden noted that: 
There are concerns increasingly voiced by academic commentators such as that substantial 
‘cherry picking’ of which jurisdiction to cite occurs, and that those jurisdictions chosen will be 
those which are likely to support the conclusion sought, leading to arbitrary decision-making, not 
legitimate judging.167 
 
A possible explanation for the altogether perplexing reasoning in ADI may be linked to 
the evident desire among domestic courts to avoid charges of judicial activism. It is 
plausible that the senior judiciary, mindful of negative public perceptions of the HRA - 
coupled with the inclination to avoid allegations of unwarranted activism - may operate 
a restrained approach to human rights adjudication under the Act in cases concerning 
less serious breaches of the Convention (reserving stricter scrutiny for more serious 
                                                 
163 VgT (n 145) [43]. 
164 I. Loveland, 'Does Homelessness Decision-making Engage Article 6(1) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights?' (n 135) 192. 
165 E. Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg?’ (n 10) 410 other commentators have contributed similarly 
on this point, eg Justice Antonin Scalia, ‘The Bill of Rights: Confirmation of Extent Freedoms or 
Invitation to Judicial Creation?’ in G. Huscroft and P. Rishworth, eds, Litigating Rights: Perspectives 
from Domestic and International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2002); J. Allan, ‘A Defence of the Status 
Quo’ in T. Campbell, J. Goldsworthy and A. Stone, eds, Protecting Human Rights: Instruments and 
Institutions (OUP, Oxford, 2003). 
166 L. Heuschling ‘Comparative Law and the European Convention on Human Rights Cases’ (n 114) 47. 
167 C. McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights? Trans-national Judicial Conversations on 
Constitutional Rights’ [2000] OJLS 449, 507. 
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‘battles’). It may be possible to explain ADI in this way: the possible breach of rights in 
that case is plainly not as serious as, for instance, that in A and Others168 (concerning 
personal liberty) where the House of Lords was prepared to take a more activist stance 
on human rights adjudication.169 Secondly, since the Communications Act 2003 sought 
to protect the level playing field of political expression, the finding that the 2003 was 
not incompatible with Article 10 of the Convention arguably did not undermine Article 
10 but gave effect to it through other means. 
 
Whatever the explanation, if domestic courts can reconstruct the guidance - that 
domestic courts should normally follow the ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg 
jurisprudence departing only in ‘special circumstances’ - to suit the desired outcome, or 
‘cherry pick’ the cases to which it will be applied, the weight of that guidance seems 
somewhat superficial.170 While s.2 allows domestic courts the flexibility and discretion 
to depart from Strasbourg jurisprudence, an approach which has this effect without 
giving clear reasons for doing not only flies in the face of the House of Lords’ own 
guidance on the provision, but makes it difficult to support the constitutional legitimacy 
of these decisions. The lack of clear reasons for any conclusion tends towards a 






Despite perceivable Parliamentary intentions that s.2 was designed to give domestic 
courts ‘flexibility and discretion,’ the tenets that domestic courts must ‘follow clear and 
constant Strasbourg jurisprudence’ in the absence of ‘special circumstances’ or that they 
ought not to ‘dilute’ such case law without ‘good reasons’ have been consistently 
upheld during the first decade of judicial reasoning under the HRA. The ‘good reasons’ 
                                                 
168 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. 
169 Finding that where Convention rights were in issue, national courts were required to afford them 
effective protection by adopting an intensive review of compatibility with the Convention and that the 
courts were not precluded by any doctrine of deference from examining the proportionality of a measure 
taken to restrict such a right.   
170 This possibility has been of considerable controversy in the US Supreme Court, eg Justice Scalia’s 
well known dissent in Lawrence v Texas (2003) 539 U.S. 558. 
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justifying departure from relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence broadly remain where the 
decision is ‘old’, where a wide margin of appreciation was ascribed or where the 
decision was unclear or had misunderstood some aspect of domestic law. As Masterman 
has written, however, ‘in practice, [the] grounds on which departure from Strasbourg 
might be justified have been both narrowly drawn and infrequently used’,171 and the 
direction to ‘follow clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence’ would appear to rule 
out departures outside these ‘good reasons’ altogether.  
 
As a result of such narrowly drawn guidance departures without justification or clear 
reasons from Strasbourg jurisprudence not falling within the guided exceptions are not 
surprising. In the end, the emphasis on ‘following’ Strasbourg jurisprudence (however 
clear and constant) may itself have resulted in a restrictive reading of the otherwise 
flexibly worded duty to ‘take it into account’. Perhaps a better construction would 
impose a duty on domestic courts to take relevant Convention jurisprudence as a 
starting point, considering that case in the specific circumstances of its adjudication.172 
In many cases, this will require domestic courts to decide matters for themselves. 
                                                 
171 I. Leigh, R. Masterman, Making Rights Real (n 2) 65. 
172 R. Clayton, H. Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 2000) 134. 
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CHAPTER II 
‘ESCAPING’ STRASBOURG  
 
The guidance given by the House of Lords to ‘follow’ the ‘clear and constant’ 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court appears prima facie to preclude departure from 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. As it was suggested in chapter I, however, in many cases this 
guidance overstates the obligation under s.2 and results in a more restrictive reading of 
the otherwise flexibly worded duty to ‘take it into account’. Ultimately the words ‘take 
into account’ were specifically designed not to oblige courts to ‘follow’ Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in the manner of precedent: Strasbourg decisions are ‘a source of 
jurisprudence indeed, but not binding precedents which we necessarily should follow or 
even necessarily desire to follow’.1 On this basis blindly following ‘clear and constant’ 
Strasbourg jurisprudence may give rise to an overly deferential attitude towards the 
Strasbourg Court.2  
 
More significantly, following Strasbourg jurisprudence in this way may have a 
detrimental effect on the development of domestic human rights law. For example, 
following ‘old’ jurisprudence may simply transplant an outdated interpretation of 
Convention rights. Similarly, domestic courts following jurisprudence affected by a 
margin of appreciation may copy a margin into domestic law which would not 
necessarily be given to the UK by the Strasbourg Court in a similar case. For more 
obvious reasons following decisions of the Strasbourg court which are unclear, or based 
on a misunderstanding of domestic law would also be undesirable. The Lord Chancellor 
explained that s.2 furnished domestic courts with the ‘flexibility and discretion ... so as 
to aid the development of human rights law’3 and domestic courts have shown some 
willingness to ‘depart’ from Strasbourg jurisprudence affected by these factors. 
Arguably, however, s.2 may not only allow domestic courts to ‘depart’ from decisions 
of this type but also go further than them. This chapter therefore seeks to explore the 
                                                 
1 Hansard HL vol 583 col 515 (18 November 1997) (emphasis added).  
2 E. Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg? The British Judiciary’s Approach to Interpreting Convention 
Rights’ [2005] European Public Law 405, 410. 
3 Hansard HL vol 584 cols 1270-1271 (19 January 1998).  
 - 31 - 
 
circumstances in which domestic courts may be encouraged not only to ‘depart’ from 




‘A LIVING INSTRUMENT’ 
 
Implicit in the construction of the European Convention on Human Rights as a ‘living 
instrument’4 is the presumption that domestic courts may properly conclude that ECHR 
jurisprudence has lost its relevance per s.2 because of ‘old age’. As one commentator 
has pointed out, this is virtually a mirror image of the classical common law approach: 
instead of a doctrine of precedent, the Strasbourg Court has operated a doctrine of 
evolutionary law in which the most recent case law is usually the most persuasive.5 The 
Convention itself does not require reliance on its own jurisprudence; for ‘old’ decisions 
to be ‘carved in stone’6 is plainly undesirable and a fortiori incompatible with the 
construction of the Convention as a ‘living instrument’.7 Accordingly, the ECtHR can 
and does overrule its own decisions on the basis of its ‘living instrument’ principle.  
 
In Cossey v United Kingdom the European Court explained that it may depart from an 
earlier decision ‘if it was persuaded that there were cogent reasons for doing so’8 and 
one such ‘cogent reason’ seems to arise where the Court considers there to have been 
developments in the broad consensus among the member states.9 From that view it is 
probably true that UK courts should consider whether, notwithstanding any societal 
changes, a Strasbourg Court would reach the same conclusion as in a previous decision. 
According to Feldman, ‘should there be reason to believe that the European Court 
would not follow one of its own previous decisions, that would be a good reason for 
                                                 
4 Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1 [31]. 
5 F. Klug, ‘The Human Rights Act – A ‘Third Way’ or ‘Third Wave’ Bill of Rights’ [2001] EHRLR 361, 
366. 
6 Hansard HL vol 583 col 513 (18 November 18, 1997) (Lord Browne Wilkinson). 
7 Tyrer (n 4). 
8 Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 622 [35]. The court also referred to the case of Inze v 
Austria (1987) 10 EHRR 394; The ‘cogent reasons’ test was also used in Wynne v United Kingdom 
(1995) 19 EHRR 333, 347. 
9 Eg Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 447; I v United Kingdom (2003) 40 EHRR 967. 
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domestic courts and tribunals to interpret a provision differently’.10 Other commentators 
have similarly noted the need to keep ‘constantly up to date’:11 
... [I]t would appear to be insufficient simply to identify a previous decision of the ECtHR on the 
matter in issue and to follow it; some consideration would also be required, if that decision were 
not a recent one, of whether it held good in the face of changes in society that had occurred in the 
meantime.12 
 
The possibility that the HRA and the Convention might have this effect has been ill 
received by the judiciary. In Anderson, for example, Simon Brown LJ (as he then was) 
opined that ‘it would seem somewhat presumptuous for us, in effect, to pre-empt [the] 
decision [of the Strasbourg Court]’13 and in N Lord Hope explained that ‘It is for the 
Strasbourg Court, not for us, to decide whether its case law is out of touch with modern 
conditions’.14  However, it is clear that the abdication of this exercise is unlikely to 
guarantee Convention compatibility. It is also clear that the Strasbourg Court will not 
look sympathetically upon domestic courts for failing to consider developing conditions 
and consequently falling short of Convention standards.  
 
The duty of a domestic court to keep track of the development in Convention 
jurisprudence is most clearly exemplified by a series of judgments on the rights of 
transsexuals: in the earlier cases, the Court held that the refusal of the United Kingdom 
Government to alter the register of births or to issue birth certificates concerning the 
recorded gender of the individual could not be considered as an interference with the 
rights under Article 8, instead affording the UK a wide margin of appreciation. 15 
However, the Court stressed the importance of keeping appropriate legal measures in 
this area under review.  
 
                                                 
10 D. Feldman, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and constitutional principles’ [1999] 19(2) LS 165, 192 
(emphasis added). 
11 M. Amos, Human Rights Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006) 18. 
12 N. Sheldon, ‘The Effect of the Human Rights Act on Domestic Precedent’ [2001] JR 208, 210. 
13 R. (On the Application of Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 46 
[66].   
14 N v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 WLR 1124 [25] (emphasis added). 
15 Rees v United Kingdom  (1987) 9 EHRR 56; Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 622; Sheffield 
and Horsham v United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 163. 
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The opportunity arose for the UK to review this area of the law in Bellinger v 
Bellinger16 which concerned a transsexual woman who wished to be recognised as 
married to a man under section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 which did not 
recognise gender change. In the Court of Appeal, while Thorpe LJ (dissenting) did seem 
to have ‘taken account’ of social and medical developments since the case previously 
relied on had been decided,17 the majority seemed content to leave open the possibility 
that Strasbourg might decide things differently and ultimately came to the familiar 
conclusion that a change in the law should be effected by Parliament.18 Before the 
matter came to appeal, the ECtHR handed down the judgment in Goodwin v United 
Kingdom. 19  It was there satisfied that European (and international) consensus had 
progressed so that the ‘fair balance’ now tilted in favour of the applicants and the 
position in the UK has now breached the applicant’s rights under Article 8 right. 
Accordingly when Bellinger came before the House of Lords, 20  their Lordships 
considered UK law to be in breach of Article 8. Considering it unsuitable to use s.3 
HRA to interpret the offending provision compatibly, the House of Lords issued a 
declaration of incompatibility. 
 
Crucially, the case exemplifies that where ECHR jurisprudence is affected by age it may 
be necessary for domestic courts to take into account any developments that may 
influence a future Strasbourg decision. As Wabrick has written: ‘…to collaborate fully 
with the Court, national tribunals have to keep on top of the developments in the Court’s 
practice, and even anticipate how it might resolve an issue’.21 Further, Warbrick thought 
this eventuality to be ‘necessarily the case when the Strasbourg Court has not dealt with 
a point’.22 The House of Lords recently made it clear that it interprets the obligation 
                                                 
16 [2001] EWCA Civ 1140; (2001) The Times, 15 August. 
17Ibid (the previous authority was Corbett v Corbett [1971] P 83). 
18 Eg P. Greatorex, ‘The Human Rights Act: s.2(1): Duty to Take into Account Strasbourg Jurisprudence 
[2001] JR 220, 223. 
19 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 447 confirmed more recently in Grant v United Kingdom 
Application no. 32570/03 (Judgment of 23 May 2006). 
20 Bellinger v Bellinger  [2003] 2 WLR 1174. 
21 C. Warbrick, ‘The View from the Outside’, in H. Fenwick, R. Masterman and & G. Phillipson (eds.) 
Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 37. 
22 Warbrick also notes Lord Bingham’s ‘no more … no less’ passage in Ullah and considerers that 
‘[c]ases like [Ullah] must be distinguished from ones where the ECtHR has considered an issue and left it 
to the national legal systems to decide’, Ibid. 
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similarly: the recent decision of the House of Lords in Re P and Others23 concerned an 
unmarried couple who wished to apply jointly to adopt a child in order for the man, who 
was not the child's biological father, to be formally recognised as the father, while 
maintaining the woman's status as the legal mother. The couple were prevented from 
doing so by Article 14 of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 which provided 
that an adoption order could only be made on the application of more than one person if 
the applicants were a married couple.  
 
As per Warbrick’s opinion of cases which may require courts to anticipate Strasbourg, 
no case had been before the Strasbourg Court on the issue of discrimination raised here. 
Thus the House of Lords took into account other relevant decisions of the Strasbourg 
Court. One of theses was Fretté v France, 24  in which the applicant was a French 
homosexual who wished to be considered as an adoptive parent. French law allows 
adoption by individuals but the applicant was rejected at the first stage on the ground 
that he was a homosexual. The Court decided by a majority of four to three that it was 
within the margin of appreciation allowed to member states of the Council of Europe to 
discriminate against homosexuals as applicants to be adoptive parents. The majority in 
Fretté suggested that in areas involving ‘delicate issues’ of sexual relationships, in 
which public opinion in many member states showed strong and vocal prejudices and 
passions, the European Court would treat such decisions, however irrational, as falling 
within the national margin of appreciation. 
 
However, concerned to anticipate any possible developments, Lord Hoffman noted that 
in EB v France25 the Court appeared to be changing its course.26 Similarly to Fretté, EB 
concerned an adoption application by a homosexual (this time a woman). Her 
application was rejected by the French Administrative Court on grounds which the 
European Court treated as having been based substantially upon her sexual orientation 
and which constituted discrimination contrary to article 14. Although the majority in EB 
did not expressly say that the decision overruled Fretté, Lord Hoffman here considered 
that this was the effect of it and that the margin of appreciation has been narrowed.  
                                                 
23 [2008] 3 WLR 76. 
24 (2002) 38 EHRR 438. 
25 (Application No 43546/02) (unreported) 22 January 2008. 
26 Re P (n 23) [25]. 
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Accordingly, his Lordship felt it ‘not at all unlikely’27 that, if the issue in this case were 
to go to Strasbourg, the Court would hold that the discrimination against a couple who 
wish to adopt a child on the ground that they are not married would violate article 14. 
Lords Hope and Mance also agreed that the developing Strasbourg jurisprudence 
indicated that the Court would find a violation of article 14 in this case.28 
 
However, the obligation to anticipate a Strasbourg decision in this way raises one 
concern: by requiring domestic courts to take stock of any evolving consensus where 
the relevant Strasbourg case is not conclusive - e.g. by virtue of age or there being no 
Strasbourg case on the issue (as in Re P) - the HRA may enjoin courts to look beyond 
that jurisprudence. Since a consensus is, by definition, an opinion or position reached by 
a group as a whole, it is logical to suggest that discovering an ‘evolving consensus’ 
would necessitate some inquiry into the constituent parts of that group. In other words, 
an evolving consensus within the Convention states (which, by reason of its evolution, 
will not yet have been outlined by the Strasbourg Court) may logically only be 
discovered by surveying the approach in individual member states; the exercise may 
require domestic courts to consider the domestic jurisprudence of the other member 
states.  
 
The requirement that domestic courts undertake such an exercise cannot have been 
intentional, and to date English courts have not attempted it. Even if this exercise did 
materialise before domestic courts there would be a number of problems. Aside from 
inter alia the foreseeable accessibility and linguistic difficulties,29 the result is probably 
incompatible with the feeling that comparative study should ‘inform the journey 
towards a national system which meets our distinctive needs’,30 rather than ‘lead to the 
attempted mimicry of others’.31 Moreover it is simply not the task of domestic courts to 
                                                 
27 Ibid [27]. 
28 Ibid [53] (Lord Hope); [143] (Lord Mance). Conversely, Lord Walker was not persuaded and reasoned 
that the matter fell into a category of issues upon which a European consensus had not yet emerged, [83]. 
Baroness Hale was also ‘unsure’ that Strasbourg jurisprudence suggested a finding of incompatibility. 
29 As to linguistic difficulty see e.g. N. Weiss, ‘The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights 
on German Jurisprudence’, in E. Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (United 
Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law, Birmingham 2003) 60-61. 
30 D. Feldman, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and constitutional principles’ (n 10) 205. 
31 Ibid. 
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identify a consensus, and doing so would arguably overstep the position of the 
Strasbourg Court. Instead domestic courts might be better placed to clarify their 
understanding of Convention rights insofar as they apply to the UK. This would make 
more of a constructive contribution to human rights jurisprudence in Strasbourg, either 
by (indirectly) establishing evidence of a consensus, or alternatively by establishing 




THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 
AND THE DISCRETIONARY AREA OF JUDGEMENT 
 
A major difficulty with the application of ECtHR decisions in the domestic context 
arises where these are affected by a margin of appreciation. The judges of the 
Strasbourg Court are ‘acutely conscious that on several key issues, the European-wide 
consensus which generally provides the mainspring of their decision-making does not 
exist … precisely because of the prevalence of divergent moral standards and religious 
traditions in the affiliated states’.32 The approach of the European Court has therefore 
been that the lesser the consensus among Contracting States,33 the better placed national 
authorities are to decide on the matter and the more deferential the European Court has 
to be in its review.34 It is also clear that, despite heavy criticism,35 the doctrine remains 
an important and pervasive element of Strasbourg jurisprudence. Yet the idea that 
national authorities are ‘better placed’ to decide on questions of morals because there is 
no uniform European conception creates problems for a court seeking to ‘take into 
account’ Strasbourg decisions for the purposes of domestic adjudication. In the end, the 
doctrine signifies that there are many issues on which there is no persuasive or relevant 
Strasbourg authority at all.36 
                                                 
32 I. Leigh, L. Lustgarten ‘Making Rights Real: The Courts Remedies, and the Human Rights Act’ (1999) 
58 CLJ 509, 544.  
33 Frette v France (2004) 38 EHRR 438, [41]: Where the law ‘appears to be in a transitional stage, a wide 
margin of appreciation must be left to the authorities of each State’. 
34 G. Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation ’ (2006) 26 OJLS 705, 722. 
35 Eg Judge Macdonald ‘The Margin of Appreciation’ in Macdonald, Matscher, and Pretzold (eds), The 
European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1993). 
36 Eg F. Klug ‘A Bill of Rights: Do we need one or do we already have one?’ [2007] PL 701, 708. 
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I. APPLYING THE STRASBOURG MARGIN 
It is well known that the margin of appreciation ‘is not available to national courts when 
they are considering Convention issues arising within their own countries’.37 Fenwick 
has added that ‘[S]ince the doctrine has probably been the key dilutant of Convention 
standards, it is essential that UK judges and other public authorities should reject it as a 
relevant factor in their own decision-making under the Convention’.38 If judges simply 
apply Strasbourg decisions affected by a margin of appreciation directly, the doctrine 
will be ‘smuggled into a situation for which it was never intended’39 and the pursuit of a 
‘domestic law of human rights’ will quickly vanish into the ether of European principles. 
Hunt, Singh and Demetriou predicted that ‘[i]mportation into the domestic sphere of the 
supranational concept of the margin of appreciation will … seriously hinder the 
effective incorporation of the ECHR’40 and that ‘[r]eference to the phrase ‘margin of 
appreciation’ is likely to confuse the picture and give shelter to those who would prefer 
to think that the ECHR requires no more than domestic law already provides...’.41 
 
This danger has manifested itself to some extent by virtue of the ‘margin of discretion’ 
which some judges have evolved from the margin of appreciation, entailing a UK 
court’s deferring to the judgment of Parliament or a public authority.42 In Mahmood43 
Laws J opined: ‘[W]hen the court is … applying the Convention as municipal law we 
shall no doubt develop a jurisprudence in which a margin of discretion … is allowed to 
the statutory decision maker’.44 The existence of a ‘discretionary area of judgment’ has 
since been confirmed in numerous decisions under the Human Rights Act45 and has 
                                                 
37 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebeline [2000] 2 AC 326, 380-381 (Lord Hope); D. 
Feldman, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and constitutional principles’ (n 10) 192. 
38 H. Fenwick, Civil Rights: New Labour and the Human Rights Act (Pearson Education , Harlow 2000). 
39 H. Fenwick, G Phillipson, Media Freedom Under the Human Rights Act (OUP, Oxford 2006) 146. 
40 M. Hunt, R. Singh, M. Demetriou, ‘Current Topic: Is There a Role for the ‘Margin of Appreciation’ 
after the Human Rights Act?’ [1999] 1 EHRLR 15, 22. 
41 Ibid 16. 
42 Eg R  v DPP ex parte Kebeline [1999] 3 WLR 972; Paul Kearns, ‘United Kingdom Judges and Human 
Rights Cases’ in Esin Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (n 29) 71. 
43 R v SSHD ex parte Mahmood [2000] All ER 2191. 
44 Ibid; See further Lord Steyn, ‘Deference: a tangled story’ [2005] PL 346 .  
45 Eg R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebeline [2000] 2 AC 326, 381; International 
Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 3 WLR 344 [376]-[378]; R 
(ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] UKHL 23; [2004] AC 185 [136].  
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prompted a vast array of academic literature.46 The extent of the debate falls outside the 
scope of this study, for now it is sufficient simply to point out that the doctrine 
represents the disinclination and difficulty for domestic courts to divorce the margin of 
appreciation from the decision it is taking into account. Some commentators have even 
thought it ‘typical of judicial reasoning under the HRA’47 that no effort is made to 
disregard any afforded margin from the Strasbourg jurisprudence. In fact, in some cases 
it is clear that domestic courts have sought to emphasis the existence of a margin of 
appreciation in order to justify their conclusions. 
The recent House of Lords judgment in Animal Defenders International48 (ADI) is 
particularly illustrative of this approach: As it will be recalled from the discussion in 
chapter I, the case concerned the compatibility of the absolute prohibition on paid 
political advertising in the Communications Act 2003 with Article 10 of the 
Convention.49 One decision of the Strasbourg Court in which a breach of Article 10 was 
found, Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland50 (VgT), was very similar on the facts to 
ADI since it dealt with a similar ban on political advertising. However, the House of 
Lords in ADI unanimously concluded that the decision in VgT did not lead to a finding 
of incompatibility concerning the UK ban and preferred the reasoning of another 
Strasbourg decision in Murphy v Ireland.51  
In contrast to VgT the applicant in Murphy was prevented from broadcasting a religious 
advertisement by Irish legislation prohibiting advertisements ‘directed towards any 
religious or political end…’. 52  Nevertheless, Lord Bingham relied in part on the 
Strasbourg Court’s observations in that case that ‘there appeared to be no clear 
                                                 
46 Eg R Clayton ‘ Judicial Deference and “ Democratic Dialogue”: the legitimacy of judicial intervention 
under the Human Rights Act 1998’  [2004] PL 33; F. Klug, ‘Judicial deference under the Human Rights 
Act 1998’, [2003] EHRLR 125; Lord Steyn, ‘Deference: a tangled story’ (n 44); Sir David Keene, 
‘Principles of deference under the Human Rights Act’ in H. Fenwick, R. Masterman and & G. Phillipson 
(eds.) Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (n 21).   
47 D. Bonner, H. Fenwick, and S. Harris-Short, ‘Judicial Approaches to the Human Rights Act’ (2003) 52 
ICLQ 549.  
48 R (On the Application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport (Respondent) [2008] UKHL 15.  
49 The facts were described in Chapter I from n 144.  
50 (2002) 34 EHRR 4. 
51 Murphy v Ireland (2003) 38 EHRR 212. 
52 Section 10(3) Radio and Television Act 1988. 
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consensus between member states…’53 and suggested that ‘the same may be said of 
political advertising’.54 Further, his Lordship reasoned that ‘[t]he European Court has 
regarded such a lack of consensus as tending to widen the margin of appreciation 
enjoyed by member states’. 55  However, the Strasbourg Court in Murphy in fact 
confirmed that the Court would accord a narrower margin of appreciation to 
advertisements of a political nature than in matters of religion, making it difficult to see 
how Lord Bingham felt able to find a wide margin on the matter in ADI.56 Since the 
advertisement in ADI involved political and not religious speech it is submitted that the 
House ought to have assumed, as a starting point, that any margin accorded to the UK in 
this context would be narrow, in line with the judgment in VgT.57 Nevertheless, on the 
basis that such a margin would be given, the House of Lords seemed to think it 
appropriate to defer to Parliament on the compatibility of the legislation concerned.58 In 
Lord Bingham’s opinion, ‘the judgment of Parliament … should … be given great 
weight’.59 
Yet, a finding of compatibility of these grounds is, as Fenwick and Phillipson have 
pointed out, ‘a paradoxical result since Parliament considered that [the blanket ban] was 
probably incompatible’; 60  the Communications Act 2003 was the only piece of 
legislation to have been passed without a declaration of compatibility under s.19. 
Considering VgT, the Government during the passage of the Bill felt unable to certify 
that the legislation was Convention compatible and made a statement under s.19(1)(b) 
                                                 
53 Animal Defenders International (n 48) [35]. 
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
56It is worth re-capping from chapter I that the view of the Strasbourg Court in Murphy was that ‘ … there 
is little scope … for restrictions on political speech or on debate of questions of public interest … 
However, a wider margin of appreciation is generally available … when regulating freedom of expression  
in relation to matters … within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion … it is this margin of 
appreciation which distinguishes [Murphy ] from [VgT ]’ (n 51) [67].  
57 Eg Fenwick & Phillipson who, in the context the 2003 Act have suggested that ‘since the ban concerns 
political, not religious or commercial speech, an intense focus should be brought to bear on the issues’, H. 
Fenwick, G Phillipson, Media Freedom Under the Human Rights Act (n 39) 1026.  
58 Animal Defenders International (n 48) [33]. 
59 Ibid; Lending support, Baroness Hale noted that ‘the [ban] has all-party support. Parliamentarians of all 
political persuasions take the view that the ban is necessary in this democratic society. Any court would 
be slow indeed to take a different view on a question such as this’ [52].  
60 H. Fenwick, G Phillipson, Media Freedom Under the Human Rights Act (n 39) 1027. 
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HRA to the effect that the Government wished Parliament to pass the Bill despite being 
unable to make a statement of compatibility under s.19(1)(a). The House of Lords in 
ADI seem to have been acutely aware of this uncertainty in the passage of the Bill; 
indeed Lord Bingham gave a detailed account of it.61 Nevertheless, Lord Bingham felt 
able to support the compatibility of the Bill on the grounds that Parliament had 
proceeded with the Bill under s.19(b) HRA ‘while properly recognising the 
interpretative supremacy of the European Court’.62 As such, he was of the opinion that 
‘the judgment of Parliament on such an issue should not be lightly overridden’.63  
Of course, the fact that Parliament felt unable to make a statement of compatibility 
under s.19 may mean one of two things: 1) that Parliament considered Strasbourg to be 
mistaken in their analysis of VgT and that there was in fact no incompatibility with the 
Convention; 2) that Parliament intended to enact the Communications Act 2003 
notwithstanding the finding of incompatibility of the Strasbourg Court in VgT. If the 
House of Lords had taken the view that the first of these possibilities was correct, the 
hesitation to declare an incompatibility may be better understood. However, none of 
their Lordships in ADI evidenced a view that this was the case. Remarkably, Lord 
Bingham in fact emphasised the second of these scenarios and, by curious logic, his 
Lordship seemed to consider that Parliament’s adoption of the blanket ban 
notwithstanding possible incompatibly itself justified the generous deference. 64 
Following ADI it is clear that where a ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg decision is in 
conflict with the perceived will of Parliament, Strasbourg will not be ‘a priori always 
‘right’’.65  
Even more perplexing is that this reasoning comes as a marked contrast to the analysis 
in R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General66 which preceded ADI by just one year. 
In that case, Lady Hale was very clear to explain that she did not … think that it is open 
                                                 
61 Animal Defenders International (n 48) [13]-[21]. 
62 Ibid [33]. 
63 Ibid.  
64 See also the opinion of Ouseley J in the Administrative Court: ‘The experience, expertise and judgment 
of Parliament expressed in the legislation can demonstrate the necessary justification’, R (on the 
application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport [2006] 
EWHC 3069 (Admin) [85].  
65 J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ [2007] PL 720, 727. 
66 [2007] UKHL 52. 
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to [courts] to wash [their] hands of such difficult issues on the ground that this is a 
matter for Parliament’.67 
... Parliament has entrusted us with the task of deciding whether its legislation is compatible with 
the Convention rights. If it is not, it is our duty to say so. The fact that the issue raises moral 
questions on which views may legitimately differ does not let us off the hook … When we can 
make a good prediction of how Strasbourg would decide the matter, we cannot avoid doing so on 
the basis that it is a matter for Parliament. Strasbourg will be largely indifferent to which branch 
of government was responsible for the state of the domestic law.68 
In the end a domestic court that concludes on the compatibility question by taking into 
account a margin of appreciation risks that the possibility that the margin will be 
narrower than anticipated. Moreover, since the Strasbourg Court usually neglects to 
differentiate the grounds upon which a margin of appreciation is ascribed, the 
possibility that a domestic court applying such a case will fall below the Strasbourg 
standard is a real one. For these reasons domestic judges should be careful to avoid 
transplanting a margin of appreciation into the corpus of domestic human rights law. 
Along these lines, Fenwick and Phillipson have suggested that the ‘sparse and 
tokenistic’ reasoning in much of the case law may in some cases mean that ‘stripping 
away’ the effects of the doctrine might simply involve ‘treating certain judgments as 
non-determinative of the points raised at the domestic level’.69 Baroness Hale appeared 
to take a similar approach in Countryside Alliance70 where she was careful to explain 
that even if the Strasbourg Court were not to grant a margin of appreciation to the UK 
her conclusion would be the same: 
... I believe that the ban would fall within the margin of appreciation [the Strasbourg Court] 
would allow to the United Kingdom on a matter such as this. Even if I were eventually to be 
proved wrong ... I would not think that the 1998 Act now required us to declare the Hunting Act 
2004 incompatible.71   
 
                                                 
67 R(Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General [2007] UKHL 52 [125]. 
68Ibid (emphasis added). 
69 H. Fenwick, G Phillipson, Media Freedom Under the Human Rights Act (n 39) 146. 
70 [2007] UKHL 52. 
71 Countryside Alliance (n 67) [127]. 
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II. ANTICIPATING THE STRASBOURG APPROACH  
Fenwick and Phillipson have suggested that domestic courts may deal with a Strasbourg 
case affected by a margin of appreciation ‘by having regard to the possible alternative 
outcome of the jurisprudence in question had the margin not been so applied’. 72 
However, this relies 1) on the judgments themselves being clear enough so that a 
domestic court may dissect them in this manner and 2) that such an exercise is even a 
desirable one. The transplantation of the doctrine into domestic law is plainly 
undesirable, but to assume of the judiciary an ability to evaluate the extent of the margin 
afforded, how far it would apply in the domestic context of the UK as well as what a 
Strasbourg Court might have concluded had there been no margin available, seems 
optimistic. Most commentators complain about the lack of a uniform or coherent 
application of the margin of appreciation doctrine in the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights,73 making it difficult to see how a domestic court may be able to 
conclude differently. Additionally, the margin of appreciation is little more than a 
‘conclusory label which only serves to obscure the true basis on which a reviewing 
court decides whether or not intervention in a particular case is justifiable’.74 As Hunt, 
Singh and Demetriou have pointed out:  
When a court ... [gives] as its ‘reason’ that the matter is within the authority’s margin of 
appreciation, it may be saying one of two things. First, it may be saying that it is not appropriate 
for the court to substitute its judgment on a particular matter for the judgment of the challenged 
authority. Or, secondly, it may be saying that it has reviewed the decision and finds there to be, 
no unjustifiable breach. The margin of appreciation obscures this important distinction ...75  
 
A safer approach might be to consider the margin afforded in the relevant case and 
assign that as the ‘ceiling’ for the restriction on the right in hand. Fittingly, the principle 
occasion when a departure from relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence is encouraged (by 
commentators on s.2 HRA at least) is where it pursues a progressive view of the 
                                                 
72 H. Fenwick, G Phillipson: Media Freedom Under the Human Rights Act, (n 39) 146. 
73 R, Macdonald, ‘The Margin of Appreciation’ (n 35) 85, quoted in George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the 
Margin of Appreciation’ (n 34) 705.  
74 M. Hunt, R. Singh, M. Demetriou, ‘Is there a role for the ‘Margin of Appreciation’ in national law after 
the Human Rights Act?’ (n 40); See also H Fenwick and G Phillipson ‘Public protest, the HRA and 
judicial responses to political expression’ [2000] PL 627, 630; B. Dickson, ‘ The Common Law and the 
European Convention’  in Dickson (ed.), Human Rights and the European Convention (LAG, London 
1997) 216-217.  
75 Ibid 21; George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’ (n 34) 705. 
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Convention and its case law. Ian Leigh thought it ‘implicit that in any given case UK 
judges might adopt a more rigorous approach than Strasbourg and declare legislation 
incompatible that the Strasbourg Court would find to be within the margin of 
appreciation’.76 This point has also been recognised by Masterman who suggests that 
‘UK laws which have been upheld or would be upheld at Strasbourg because of the 
margin should be open to be given a more rights-friendly reading at the domestic 
level’.77 
 
Clearly a restrictive reading of Convention rights based on Strasbourg jurisprudence 
which is furnished with a wide margin of appreciation is no guarantee of compatibility 
with the Convention in the first place. This is an especially large concern where the 
doctrine forms part of the reasoning in a domestic court; since the margin of 
appreciation may disguise reasons for the compatibility in Strasbourg case law, 
applying the outcome of such decisions in a similar domestic case would be to import 
factors which may not apply to the UK. Indirectly applying these factors in this way 
may then lead to a more restrictive interpretation of Convention rights than would 
otherwise be appropriate in the UK.78 Domestic courts may avoid this danger by simply 
divorcing the outcome of Strasbourg jurisprudence burdened with a wide margin of 
appreciation from their reasoning and attempting instead to decide the matter for 
themselves.  
 
The view is given support by the decision of the House of Lords in Re P79 discussed 
earlier above. It will be recalled that the case concerned an unmarried couple who 
wished to apply jointly to adopt a child but were prevented from doing so by article 14 
of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 (which provided that an adoption order 
could only be made on the application of more than one person if the applicants were a 
married couple.) Notwithstanding the fact that a case of the kind had not yet been before 
the Strasbourg Court and the fact that the Court had previously granted a margin of 
appreciation on matters of social policy such as this, Lord Hoffman, Lord Hope and 
                                                 
76 I. Leigh, L. Lustgarten ‘Making Rights Real’ (n 32) 517.  
77  I. Leigh, R. Masterman, Making Rights Real: The Human Rights Act in its First Decade (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2008) 55. 
78 A. Mowbray, ‘No Violations but Interesting: A Study of the Strasbourg Court’s Jurisprudence in Cases 
where no Breach of the Convention has been Found’ [2008] 14 European Public Law 237.  
79 Re P (n 23). 
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Lord Mance felt it appropriate to anticipate a development in the Strasbourg Court and 
find an incompatibility with the Convention.80 In Lord Hoffman’s view, it would make 
‘no difference’ if the Strasbourg Court were to revert to its earlier position and say that 
these are delicate questions which should therefore be left to the national margin of 
appreciation. Accordingly, his Lordship did not feel that the House should be inhibited 
from declaring the 1987 Order incompatible ‘by the thought that [they] might be going 
further than the Strasbourg Court’.81  
 
Repeating the tenets delivered by Lord Bingham in Ullah (that the duty of domestic 
courts is to ‘keep pace’ with Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘no more, no less’) Lord 
Hoffman emphasised that ‘[t]hese remarks were not … made in the context of a case in 
which the Strasbourg Court has declared a question to be within the national margin of 
appreciation’82 and explained that ‘none of these considerations can apply in a case in 
which Strasbourg has deliberately declined to lay down an interpretation for all member 
states, as it does when it says that the question is within the margin of appreciation’.83 
For that reason, his Lordship concluded that ‘the question is one for the national 
authorities to decide for themselves and it follows that different member states may well 
give different answers’84 and ‘it is for the court in the United Kingdom to interpret 
articles 8 and 14 and to apply the division between the decision-making powers of 
courts and Parliament in the way which appears appropriate for the United Kingdom.85 
Lord Mance evidently agreed, adding that 
It would be contrary to the Strasbourg court’s purpose, and circular, if national authorities were 
to take the view that they should not consider any question other than whether a particular 
solution was within the United Kingdom’s margin of appreciation. Under the 1998 Act, United 
Kingdom authorities (legislators and courts) have domestically to address the impact of the 
domestically enacted Convention rights in the particular context of the United Kingdom.86 
 
                                                 
80 Baroness Hale also found the bar on unmarried adoption in article 14 of the Adoption (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1987 to be incompatible with the Convention but did not base this finding in any 
anticipation of developing Strasbourg jurisprudence.  
81 Re P (n 23) [37]. 
82 Ibid [31]. 
83 Ibid [36]. 
84 Ibid.  
85 Ibid [37] (emphasis added). 
86 Ibid [129]. 
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The approach in Re P represents a more realistic approach to Strasbourg jurisprudence 
burdened by a margin of appreciation. Rather than seeking to undertake the wholly 
unrealistic guesswork about the reasons behind a margin of appreciation, this decision 
serves as an encouraging indication that domestic courts are not only able to interpret 




UNCLEAR AND ERRONEOUS JURISPRUDENCE 
 
It seems clear that s. 2 HRA for the most part imposes an obligation of referral first to 
relevant decisions of the Strasbourg Court. But must a court follow this approach, even 
where Strasbourg decisions are ultimately not that useful? Gearty has made neat 
analysis of the situation, concluding that ‘British judges have the double challenge of 
retaining analytical coherence while at the same time seeking both to understand the 
Strasbourg case law and to apply it within the jurisdiction’.87 For Gearty, s.2 HRA was 
the saving grace: ‘[f]ortunately [it] gives them some freedom of manoeuvre in that … it 
does not require such decisions to be followed, merely taken into account’.88 In line 
with these conclusions judicial reasoning has pointed to some exceptions to the 
generally loyal approach where relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence is unclear or where 
the Court has misunderstood some aspect of domestic law. 
 
 
I. UNCLEAR REASONING  
As was mentioned in chapter I, Loveland considers that ECHR decisions are so 
important as to be considered as authority even in instances in which they did not ‘argue 
the point through in a coherent and thorough manner’.89 That position invites criticism: 
the extent to which Convention jurisprudence is afforded authority was surely not 
envisaged to embrace unclear decision making. 
                                                 
87 C. Gearty, ‘Tort Law and the Human Rights Act’ in Tom Campbell, K.D Ewing, and Adam Tomkins 
(eds) ‘Sceptical Essays on Human Rights’ (OUP, Oxford 2001) 258 (emphasis added). 
88 Ibid. 
89 I. Loveland ‘Making it up as they go along? The Court of Appeal on same sex spouses and succession 
rights to tenancies’. [2003] PL 222, 233. 
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At the heart of the problem is the view that the House of Lords has taken concerning the 
importance to be attached to the Strasbourg jurisprudence. As it will be recalled from 
Chapter I, Lord Hope expressed the view in N90 that ‘[i]t is not for [domestic course] to 
search for a solution to [the appellant’s] problem which is not to be found in the 
Strasbourg case law … [courts] must take its case law as [they] find it, not as [they] 
would like it to be’.91 Yet in that case Lord Nicholls described the Strasbourg authorities 
as ‘in a not altogether satisfactory state’92 and that the available decisions ‘lacked [the 
ECHR’s] customary clarity’.93  Lords Hope and Brown also thoroughly analysed the 
ECtHR’s case law but had trouble identifying any clear principles. It must be open to a 
domestic court in such cases to conclude against the helpfulness of that Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in order to ‘escape’ the unclear reasoning. As the Lord Chancellor pointed 
out during the Parliamentary debates, ‘… [Strasbourg decisions] are a source of 
jurisprudence indeed, but not binding precedents which we necessarily should follow or 
even necessarily desire to follow’.94 
  
 
II. MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT DOMESTIC LAW 
A connected and perhaps more serious quandary arises where relevant Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is based on a misunderstanding of domestic law. Lord Hoffman offered 
guidance on the possibility in R v. Lyons: his Lordship felt that there was ‘room for 
dialogue’ where an English court ‘considers that the ECtHR has misunderstood or been 
misinformed about some aspect of English law’ and ‘it may wish to give a judgment 
which invites the ECtHR to reconsider the question’.95 Warbrick recently agreed: ‘There 
is … space for national courts to reconsider Strasbourg cases which appear ‘wrong’, 
either because they are founded on a misunderstanding of national law or because they 
are poorly reasoned’. 96 
 
                                                 
90 N (n 14) [25]. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid [11]. 
93 Ibid [14]. 
94 Hansard HL vol 583 col 515 (18 November 1997). 
95 R v. Lyons (No  3) [2003] 1 AC 976 [46].   
96 Although Warbrick was also careful to suggest that ‘a strong case would need to be made that this were 
the case’, C. Warbrick, ‘The View from the Outside’ (n 21). 
 - 47 - 
 
That domestic courts follow or apply decisions of the Strasbourg Court based upon 
misunderstandings would clearly be inappropriate. Rather, domestic courts ought to – 
legitimately - be able consciously to depart from Strasbourg while firmly offering an 
opinion about the mistake. Lord Bingham recently confirmed as much in Kay97 where 
he explained that ‘there are occasions … when a domestic court may challenge the 
application by the Strasbourg Court of the principles it has expounded to the detailed 
facts of a particular class of case, peculiar within the knowledge of national 
authorities’.98  
 
A well known example of such a situation is found in Osman v United Kingdom99 where 
the European Court found that the blanket immunity granted to the police (over liability 
for possible negligence) in the English law to be a violation of Article 6 of the 
Convention because the action against the police had not been allowed to proceed to 
trial. The matter was the cause of some controversy amongst the English judiciary, who 
considered that the European Court had been mistaken in its understanding of domestic 
law, and in Z and others v United Kingdom100 the European Court in fact did admit that 
the judgment in Osman was based on ‘an understanding of the law of negligence … 
which has to be reviewed in the light of the clarifications subsequently made by the 
domestic courts and notably the House of Lords’.101 The incident provoked widespread 
concern about the position of European judgments in domestic law. For example, Lord 
Hoffman set out his opinion of the affair extra judicially:  
We have had a very recent example of a decision of the Strasbourg court giving an interpretation 
to the Convention which, I venture to suggest, it is inconceivable that any domestic court in this 
country would have adopted … the case serves to reinforce the doubts I have had for a long time 
about the suitability, at least for this country, of having questions of human rights determined by 
an international tribunal made up of judges from many countries.102 
 
In the end this line of cases clearly illustrates at least one situation in which domestic 
courts are willing to find reasons for departure and assert a domestic interpretation of 
                                                 
97 Kay and others v London Borough of Lambeth [2006] UKHL 10 [28]. 
98 Ibid. 
99 (2000) 29 EHRR 245; On the Osman judgment, see Lord Steyn, ‘2000–2005: Laying the Foundations 
of Human Rights Law in the United Kingdom’ 2005 EHRLR 349, 361. 
100 [2002] 34 EHHR 3. 
101 Ibid [100]. 
102 Lord Hoffmann, ‘Human Rights and the House of Lords’ (1999) 62 MLR 159, 162-164. 
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human rights. Moreover, the Osman saga shows that the Strasbourg Court may even be 
persuaded to revise its own jurisprudence and is probably the clearest example of the 
‘dialogue’ between domestic courts and Strasbourg envisaged in the enactment of the 
HRA and by commentators since.  
 
 
III. PURPOSELY FINDING FAULT WITH STRASBOURG JURISPRUDENCE 
Some commentators have suggested that departing from Strasbourg jurisprudence on 
these grounds usually pursues a desire to avoid conflicting Strasbourg jurisprudence per 
se.103 For instance Merris Amos has concluded that ‘the means by which conflicting 
Strasbourg jurisprudence is usually avoided is by a finding that the reasoning of the 
Court (or Commission) was inadequate’ while Elizabeth Wicks identified one of the 
prevalent judicial approaches under s.2 to be ‘assessing relevance by reference to own 
perception of merits’.104 In other words, ‘the Strasbourg jurisprudence is being used 
merely to substantiate domestic reasoning: it is not taken into account as a factor in 
reaching the decision; merely as a factor in justifying the decision’.105 
 
In R v Spear,106 it was clear that their Lordships did not wish to follow the conclusion of 
the European Court in Morris v United Kingdom107 (where the same issue had arisen) 
that trial by court-martial necessarily involves a violation of rights protected by Article 
6 ECHR. Lord Bingham accepted that ‘any judgment of the European Court commands 
great respect, and section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires the House to take 
any such judgment into account, as it routinely does’ but thought there to be ‘a large 
number of points in issue in [Morris]’, and that ‘the European Court did not receive all 
the help [on the particular aspect disputed in Spear] which was needed to form a 
conclusion’.108  
 
                                                 
103 M. Amos, Human Rights Law (n 11) 19. 
104 E. Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg?’ (n 2) 419. 
105Ibid 423. 
106 R v Spear and Others [2003] 1 AC 734. 
107 (2002) 34 EHRR 1253. 
108 Spear (n 106) [12]; see also the judgment of lord Rodger, particularly [92]. 
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Similarly, the Privy Council in Brown v Stott109  felt able to conclude that the use of 
evidence gathered under s.172(2)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 did not interfere with 
rights under Article 6 of the Convention, despite there being a Strasbourg judgment 
(Saunders v United Kingdom110) pointing to the contrary conclusion.111 Lord Steyn 
described the reasoning of the Court in this case as ‘unsatisfactory and less than clear’112 
while Lord Hope found it ‘unconvincing’113 and described ‘the main weakness in the 
reasoning of the Court in Saunders [as the] … failure to examine the issue’.114  
 
It was also tempting to draw similar conclusions when considering the reasoning in 
ADI115 above. The judgment of the European Court in VgT116 was very similar to the 
case in ADI and the Court in that case had found a breach of Article 10 of the 
Convention. However, despite evidence that Parliament had itself been uncertain as to 
the compatibility of the legislation in question, it became clear that the courts 
considering ADI were unwilling to apply VgT and reach the same conclusion. When the 
case came before the Administrative Court it found the VgT decision to be ‘aberrant’117  
and ‘one of those ECtHR decisions which suffers from unclear or unsound reasoning’118 
but no mention was made of the idea in the House of Lords. The House of Lords instead 
found alternative reasons to follow another decision of the Strasbourg Court and 
ultimately find no incompatibility with the Convention.  
 
The argument is given particular weight by evidence from Anderson119 that domestic 
courts do not always feel departure to be necessary, despite considering Strasbourg 
jurisprudence to be unsatisfactory. That case concerned the question of whether the 
Home Secretary’s power to determine the minimum period of a mandatory life 
sentences was incompatible with the principle of the separation of powers as expressed 
                                                 
109 Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681. 
110 Saunders v United Kingdom (1997) 2 BHRC 358. 
111 Ibid.  
112 Brown v Stott (n 109) 711. 
113 Ibid 721. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Animal Defenders International (n 48). 
116 (2002) 34 EHRR 4. 
117 Animal Defenders International (n 64) [30] (Auld LJ). 
118 Ibid [121] (Ousley J).  
119 Anderson (n 13).  
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in Article 6 ECHR. The Court of Appeal showed an obvious reluctance to depart from 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence even though it considered that the domestic legislation 
may fall foul of compatibility with Article 6 if Strasbourg were to re-examine the issue. 
Indeed, Simon Brown LJ felt that it would be ‘presumptuous’ to ‘pre-empt’ such a 
decision.120 
 
While it is clear that domestic courts have been willing to depart from Strasbourg 
jurisprudence on the basis that the reasoning of the Strasbourg Court has been unclear 
or based on a misunderstanding of domestic law, it is also clear that this willingness is 
more obvious where the departure results in a more restrictive view of the Convention 
than given in that jurisprudence. Conversely, departures on this basis resulting in a more 
generous interpretation of Convention rights are unusual. With this in mind it is 
tempting to agree that departing from Strasbourg jurisprudence on these grounds usually 
pursues a desire to avoid Strasbourg jurisprudence per se. The problem arguably 
remains a product of guidance to ‘follow’ the ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. Rather than seeking to categorise Strasbourg jurisprudence into the 
strictly circumscribed circumstances feeding departure, it would be surely be better if 
domestic courts were guided to decide matters for themselves and, in this way, be 






Several factors may encourage domestic courts to decide matters independently of 
Strasbourg: doctrinal tools developed by the Court, such as the margin of appreciation, 
represent a teleological approach to its own adjudication which makes it difficult for 
domestic courts to ‘keep pace’ simply by following the jurisprudence of that Court. The 
status of the European Convention of Human Rights as a ‘living instrument to be 
interpreted in light of present-day conditions’ 121  similarly carries the danger that 
following Strasbourg jurisprudence domestically, without anticipating its development 
or being prepared to expand upon it, may cause domestic human rights law to fall 
                                                 
120 Ibid [66]. 
121 Tyrer (n 4) [31]. 
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behind it. Similarly, it is clearly undesirable that domestic courts apply Strasbourg 
jurisprudence which is itself unclear or based on a misunderstanding of domestic law. It 
is also clear that domestic courts simply cannot follow Strasbourg where no relevant 
jurisprudence exists. Remembering that in none of these situations is a domestic court 
discharged from its duty as a public authority under s.6 HRA to act compatibly with 
Convention rights, it is suggested in all of these situations s.2 HRA allows room for 
manoeuvre.122 At the very least it must allow domestic courts to ‘escape’ Strasbourg 
and decide the matter for themselves.  
 
But how far can domestic courts go? It is suggested that domestic courts may not only 
be encouraged to ‘escape’ Strasbourg jurisprudence, but also to expand upon it. This 
may be of special relevance where the matter before the domestic court is subject to a 
national margin of appreciation, or where there is no steer from Strasbourg at all.123 
Encouragingly, while some judges clearly have reservations about expanding the scope 
of Convention rights even in this context,124 others have shown an increased willingness 
to interpret s.2 so as to allow such a result. The majority of the House of Lords appeared 
to construct the problem similarly in Re P,125 and Baroness Hale (discussing Re P) has 
since hinted that it may be better to make ‘a small but significant advance upon the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence’126 rather than to ‘[defer] to the wisdom of the crowd – even 
when convinced of its stupidity’. 127  In the end while English courts may have a 
tendency to follow decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, it is crucial that 
they do so as a matter of choice, not obligation.128 
                                                 
122As Lord Slynn emphasised in Alconbury, ‘the Human Rights Act 1998 does not provide that a national 
court is bound by [Strasbourg] decisions’, ‘ it is obliged to take account of them so far as they are 
relevant’ (n 69) [26] (emphasis added). 
123 See also R. Masterman, ‘The Status of Strasbourg Jurisprudence in Domestic Law’ in H. Fenwick, R. 
Masterman, G. Phillipson (eds), Judicial Reasoning Under the UK Human Rights Act (n 21) 81; H. 
Fenwick and G. Phillipson, ‘Direct Action, Convention Values and the Human Rights Act’ (2001) 21 LS 
535, 564. 
124 Eg in Re P (n 23). 
125 Ibid. 
126  Baroness Hale, ‘Who Defines Convention Rights?’ (JUSTICE Tom Sargant Memorial Annual 
Lecture, 15 October 2008) <http://www.justice.org.uk/trainingevents/annuallecture/index.html> accessed 
7 November 2008. 
127 Ibid.  
128 D. Feldman (ed) English Public Law (OUP, Oxford 2004) 390. 
- 52 - 
 
CHAPTER III 
MOVING BEYOND STRASBOURG? 
 
 
It was suggested in chapter I that Parliamentary debates during the drafting of the 
Human Rights Act supported a flexible approach to Strasbourg jurisprudence. It was 
proposed that, on the basis of these identifiable intentions, domestic courts are not 
obliged to follow the decisions of the Strasbourg Court and that judges are probably free 
to develop human rights jurisprudence under the Convention in keeping with domestic 
traditions. To that end, the instances in which domestic courts may be encouraged to 
depart from (or ‘escape’) the Strasbourg jurisprudence (either on the basis of age, a 
margin of appreciation or unclear reasoning) were outlined in Chapter II. In this chapter, 
the possibility that domestic courts are, or should consider themselves, able to depart 
from Strasbourg in order to apply a more generous interpretation of Convention rights 
will be considered.  
 
It has been repeatedly stressed that the Strasbourg institutions insist only upon a 
minimum threshold: 1  during the Parliamentary debates it was said that the HRA 
established ‘a “floor”, not a “ceiling”, for human rights’2 and that domestic courts ‘must 
be free to try to give a lead to Europe as well as to be led’.3 In the early years of the 
HRA, Grosz, Beatson and Duffy took this approach to s.2, writing:  
It is … open to national courts to develop a domestic jurisprudence under the Convention which 
may be more generous to applicants than that dispensed in Strasbourg, while remaining broadly 
consistent with it.4 
However, domestic courts have largely resisted an interpretation of the HRA that gives 
rise to a progressive approach to human rights. The source of this reluctance is usually 
found in a specific construction of the HRA as a statute designed to ensure the 
compatibility of domestic law with the Convention (and little more) but it will be 
                                                 
1 Eg R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Amin [2004] 1 AC 653 [44]-[45]. 
2 Hansard, HL vol 583 col 510 (18 November 1997). 
3 Ibid. 
4 S. Grosz, J. Beatson and P. Duffy, Human Rights: The 1998 Act and the European Convention (Sweet 
and Maxwell, London 2000) 20. 
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suggested that the HRA, as a statute designed to ‘bring rights home’, gives domestic 




THE ARGUMENT FROM PURPOSE 
 
In large part, the debate around the possibility of domestic courts applying a more 
expansive interpretation of Convention rights turns on the effect the HRA 1998 is 
perceived to have on these rights. As Baroness Hale has recently asked, ‘[a]re the ‘ 
Convention rights’  for the purpose of section 1(1) of the 1998 Act, the rights as defined 
by Strasbourg but given effect in UK law, or are they the rights defined by United 
Kingdom law within the parameters defined by Strasbourg?’5  
 
Proponents of the progressive view often argue that the HRA was enacted with the 
intention of developing a domestic or ‘municipal’ law of human rights6 or that it is 
nature of rights arising under the HRA - as distinct from rights arising under the 
Convention - that could ‘indicate that a more generous interpretation [than that provided 
by the Strasbourg court] is possible’.7 For instance, Professor Wintemute has suggested 
that ‘if a country voluntarily incorporates the exact wording of the Convention into its 
national law, the Convention ceases to be a European text and becomes a national text, 
to which national courts are free to give a more generous interpretation’.8 Similarly, 
Jonathan Lewis pointed out that ‘the Convention has not been moved but copied’.9  
 
Some support for this construction of rights under the HRA is to be found in judicial 
reasoning. Laws LJ in Begum felt the task of domestic courts under the HRA was ‘not 
                                                 
5 Re P and Others [2008] 3 WLR 76 [84]. 
6 Laws LJ, ‘The limitations of Human Rights’ [1998] PL 254; R. Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence into account: developing a ‘municipal law of human rights’ under the Human Rights Act' 
[2005] 54 ICLQ 907; S. Grosz, J. Beatson and P. Duffy, Human Rights (n 4) 20; J. Lewis, ‘The European 
Ceiling on Human Rights’ [2007] PL 720.  
7 M. Amos, Human Rights Law, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006) 22. 
8 R. Wintermute, ‘The Human Rights Act’s First Five Years: too strong, too weak or just right?’ (2006) 
17 Kings College Law Journal 209.  
9Ibid 724. 
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simply to add on the Strasbourg learning to the corpus of English law, as if it were a 
compulsory adjunct taken from an alien source, but to develop a municipal law of 
human rights…’.10 In Re McKerr Lord Nicholls said that ‘rights, arising under the 
Convention, [were] to be contrasted with rights created by the 1998 Act’ and considered 
there to be ‘significant differences’ between the two.11 In the same case Lord Hoffman 
held that the Act had 
…create[d] domestic rights expressed in the same terms as those contained in the Convention. 
But they are domestic rights, not international rights. Their source is the statute, not the 
Convention. They are available against specific public authorities, not the United Kingdom as a 
state. And their meaning and application is a matter for domestic courts, not the court in 
Strasbourg.12 
 
This passage from Re McKerr has been given specific endorsement by the House of 
Lords in Re P13 where Lord Hoffman explained that ‘Convention rights’ within the 
meaning of the 1998 Act were domestic rights, not international rights and that the duty 
of UK courts was to give effect to them according to what they considered to be their 
proper meaning as they would any other statutory rights: ‘As this House affirmed in In 
re McKerr ... “Convention rights”  within the meaning of the 1998 Act are domestic and 
not international rights’.14 Accordingly, Lord Hoffman explained that it was ‘[i]n the 
interpretation of these domestic rights [that] the courts must “take into account” the 
decisions of the Strasbourg court’.15 Lord Mance was also clear on the point:  
The Act creates as “ part of this country's law”  rights in the same terms as the Convention rights, 
and the interpretation and impact of those new domestic rights depends upon the 1998 Act ... the 
meaning of the new domestic rights scheduled to the 1998 Act is a matter of domestic law ... [and] 
[u]nder the 1998 Act, United Kingdom authorities (legislators and courts) have domestically to 
address the impact of the domestically enacted Convention rights in the particular context of the 
United Kingdom.16 
 
The decision in Re P is arguably the clearest example of a willingness to differentiate 
between rights arising under the ECHR and rights arising under the HRA. As Jonathan 
                                                 
10 Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2002] 2 All ER 668 [17]. 
11 In Re McKerr [2004] UKHL 12; [2004] 1 WLR 807 [25]. 
12 Ibid [65]. 
13 Re P (n 5). 
14 Ibid [33]. 
15 Ibid (emphasis added). 
16 Ibid [128]-[129] (emphasis added). 
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Herring has pointed out ‘[t]his means that there are rights under the ECHR that English 
applicants may be able to claim against their government, but that an applicant in another 
country might not. So the HRA does not just give citizens rights that are established in the 
ECHR by the ECtHR. It also enables the English courts to generate rights found to exist 
in the ECHR that would not be found by the ECtHR’.17 Indeed, in Re P, this construction 
of Convention rights under the HRA 1998 lent support to a ‘a small but significant 
advance upon the Strasbourg jurisprudence’ 18  but it should not be assumed that a 
domestic view of human rights is either synonymous with or always supports a 
progressive view of Convention rights under the HRA. While the two tend to be 
associated, a construction that champions the separation of rights arising domestically 
under the HRA from those arising under the Convention could equally lend weight to an 
approach that restricts the scope of Convention rights to the Strasbourg standard.  
 
A good example of this possibility is given by two Court of Appeal judgments in which 
Laws LJ - a strong proponent of the domestic view of human rights - seemed to restrict 
rights under the Convention in this manner: the first of these decisions came in A and 
Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department.19 The facts of the case are well 
known, but, briefly, the appellants were ten foreign nationals (all Arab Muslims and 
suspected of links to Al Qa'eda or Osama bin Laden) who had been detained under 
sections 21 and 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. The Court of 
Appeal unanimously dismissed their appeals, but was split 2:1 on the important issue of 
the admissibility of evidence obtained by torturing third parties abroad, which was 
argued to have breached the appellants’ right to a fair trial contained in Article 6(1) of 
the Convention. In the course of his reasoning, Laws LJ thought it ‘obvious’ that 
‘neither the Strasbourg court nor (since the coming into force of the 1998 Act) our 
courts can abdicate their duty to safeguard the Convention rights,’20 and ‘elementary’ 
that ‘there is a strong presumption that our law, judge-made or statutory, should be 
interpreted so as not to place the United Kingdom in breach of an international 
                                                 
17 J. Herring, ‘Who decides on human rights?’ [2009] LQR 1, 4. 
18 Baroness Hale, ‘Who Defines Convention Rights?’ (JUSTICE Tom Sargant Memorial Annual Lecture , 
15 October 2008) <http://www.justice.org.uk/trainingevents/annuallecture/index.html> accessed 7 
November 2008. 
19 [2004] EWCA Civ 1123. 
20 Ibid [258]. 
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obligation’.21 Nevertheless, guided by the view that ‘the right's application, and its 
scope in practice, is highly dependent upon the practical context in which it is 
asserted’22 and that ‘under section 2 of the 1998 Act our duty is no more nor less than to 
‘take into account’ the Strasbourg jurisprudence’23 his Lordship found reason to depart 
from the Strasbourg jurisprudence where breaches of Article 6 had been found24 in 
order to conclude that the admissibility of evidence obtained by torture would not be 
incompatible with the Convention where the UK had not ‘procured’ or ‘connived in’ 
that torture and where it had no control over those responsible for it.25   
 
Laws LJ again disappointed human rights activists in the Court of Appeal judgment in 
Limbuela26 which concerned provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 
Act 2002. Section 55(1) of that Act provided that the Secretary of State might not 
provide support under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to a person who claims 
asylum where he is not satisfied that the claim was made as soon as reasonably 
practicable after that person's arrival in the UK. In other words, asylum seekers who did 
not meet the time requirements would fall outside the protection granted by the 1999 
Act. The majority in the Court of Appeal held that destitution resulting from denying 
the assistance provided by that Act could amount to inhuman or degrading treatment 
under Article 3 of the Convention. Laws LJ, however, dissented from the majority view. 
His Lordship evidently felt that ‘… a person is not degraded in that particular, telling 
sense, if his misfortune is no more - and of course, no less - than to be exposed to 
suffering (not violence) by the application of legitimate government policy’.27  The 
danger of the ‘municipal’ or domestic approach to human rights adjudication is 
                                                 
21 Ibid [266]. 
22 Ibid [260]. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Eg Saunders v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 313, where the ECtHR held that the applicant's 
conviction for offences related to illegal share dealing breached the Article 6(1) right to freedom from 
self-incrimination because of the use at his trial of statements obtained from him under statutory powers 
of compulsion. Laws LJ did not consider the case to be ‘of any assistance at all’ on the grounds that it was 
a case about self-incrimination in the context of company law legislation’ [264].  
25 Ibid [252]; The decisions was overturned by the House of Lords: [2004] UKHL 56.  
26 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Limbuela [2004] EWCA Civ 540. 
27 Ibid [71]. 
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therefore plainly that the view may result in the restriction of those rights.28 The danger 
is made clearer still by the decision of the House of Lords in Limbuela29 that s.55 of the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 did contravene Article 3, upholding the 
majority decision of the Court of Appeal.   
 
Despite these dangers, it is clear that courts have been concerned to apply at least the 
minimum standard of rights set out by the Strasbourg Court on the basis that ‘[t]o do 
otherwise would defeat one of the purposes of the HRA 1998’.30 In Amin Lord Slynn 
confirmed that:31 
 ... where the [Strasbourg] court has laid down principles and … a minimum threshold 
requirement … United Kingdom courts should follow what the Strasbourg court has said. If they 
do not do so without good reason the dissatisfied litigant has a right to go to Strasbourg where 
existing jurisprudence is likely to be followed.32 
However, while it is clear that courts are concerned to follow at least the minimum 
threshold, it is also clear that they are generally unwilling to go any further. Instead, it is 
becoming clearer that this kind of dicta is better classified as part of a cautious approach 
often evidenced by the judiciary.33 
 
Several explanations may be advanced for this caution. First, it is usually argued by 
courts administering it that the language of the HRA emphasises compatibility as the 
                                                 
28 Laws LJ’s inquiry in Limbuela has been criticised for being concerned ‘not so much to seek assistance 
from the Strasbourg case law but to leave his own mark on the understanding of the Convention right 
under Article 3’ C. Warbrick, ‘The View from the Outside’ in H. Fenwick, G. Phillipson, R. Masterman, 
Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 48. 
29 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Limbuela [2005] UKHL 66; [2006] 1 AC 
396.   
30 D. Feldman (ed) ‘English Public Law’ (OUP, Oxford 2004) 390; D. Feldman, ‘The Human Rights Act 
1998 and constitutional principles’ (1999) 19 LS 165, 193; This approach was predicted by Fenwick and 
Phillipson in a publication around the time that the HRA came into force: ‘it would seem safe to predict 
that domestic courts will wish to provide at least as high a protection for the Convention rights as has 
Strasbourg, since to do otherwise, ‘would defeat one of the main purposes of the 1998 Act and lead to a 
flood of applications to Strasbourg’. H Fenwick and G Phillipson ‘Public protest, the HRA and judicial 
responses to political expression’ [2000] PL 627-50, 640 quoting E. Barendt, ‘ Freedom of Assembly’ in 
Beatson and Cripps (eds), Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information (2000) 168. 
31 Amin (n 1).  
32 Ibid [44]. 
33 Recall eg R (On The Application of Animal Defenders International) V Secretary of State For Culture, 
Media and Sport (Respondent) [2008] UKHL 15. 
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primary aim, or that ‘Bringing Rights Home’ through the HRA simply means 
‘improving UK co-operation with the ECHR system by providing a better means for 
resolving disputes about the meaning and application of the ECHR in the UK legal 
system’.34 For instance, in Quark35 Lord Nicholls described the purpose of the Act to be 
to ‘provide a means whereby persons whose rights under the Convention were infringed 
by the United Kingdom could, in future, have an appropriate remedy available to them 
in the courts of this country’36 while Lord Bingham explained that ‘a party unable to 
mount a successful claim in Strasbourg can never mount a successful claim under [the 
HRA]’37 and (in another case) that the purpose of the HRA ‘was not to enlarge the 
rights or remedies of those in the United Kingdom whose Convention rights have been 
violated but to enable those rights and remedies to be asserted and enforced by the 
domestic courts of this country and not only by recourse to Strasbourg’.38 
 
Moreover, the Court of Appeal in Al-Jedda39 sought to rely on this ‘purpose’ of the 
HRA in order to resist granting effect to Convention rights beyond the standard of the 
European Court. Mr Al-Jedda submitted that the detention of a person by British 
authorities in Iraq was in violation of his Convention rights under Article 5. In the 
course of his judgment, Brooke LJ considered the outcome of Al Skeini40 (in the same 
court) where it was conceded that one of six claimants had rights upon which he could 
rely in a complaint against the UK in Strasbourg. Relying in part on the purpose of the 
HRA as given in Quark, the court held that since the claimant would have a case in 
Strasbourg the HRA enabled him to bring his claim in UK courts. Brooke LJ felt his 
conclusion to be a ‘natural complement’ to the conclusion in Quark and Al Skeini, 
considering that, ‘[b]y parity of reasoning,’41 because Mr Al-Jedda would have failed in 
asserting his claim before the Strasbourg Court, ‘it would contradict the purpose of the 
1998 Act … if he could get a better remedy at home than he could achieve in 
                                                 
34 C. Warbrick, ‘The view from the outside’ (n 28) 25. 
35 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth affairs, ex parte Quark Fishing Limited [2005] 
UKHL 57. 
36 Ibid [33]. 
37 Ibid [25]; [88] (Lord Hope). 
38 R. (on the application of SB) v Denbigh High School [2007] 1 AC 100 [29].  
39 R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] EWCA Civ 327; The case 
was confirmed on appeal to the House of Lords: [2008] 1 AC 332. 
40 R (On the Application of Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence [2008] 1 AC 153. 
41 Ibid [98]. 
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Strasbourg’.42 However, while the reasoning in Al-Skeini (that a claimant able to rely 
upon rights in Strasbourg must also be able to rely upon them domestically) is a logical 
application of the purpose of the HRA as explained in Quark (to do otherwise would 
fail to follow at least the minimum standard as given by the Strasbourg Court and run 
counter to the scheme of the Act by failing to ‘bring rights home’), it is not at all clear 
that it should apply in reverse. Although Brooke LJ felt able to apply the reasoning in Al 
Skeini in this way to conclude that, because Mr Al-Jedda would not have succeeded in 
Strasbourg he could not be granted a remedy domestically, this only follows if it is 
accepted that domestic courts are prohibited from giving further effect to Convention 
rights than the Strasbourg Court. It has already been argued that the language of s.2 
does not itself prohibit this and judicial guidance that domestic courts must ‘keep pace 
with the Strasbourg jurisprudence … no more and no less’ is directed only to avoid 
falling below a minimum standard. The reasoning in Al Jedda is a good example of 
courts not simply following the minimum Strasbourg standard, but in fact restricting 




THE ARGUMENT FROM CONSISTENCY 
 
An increasingly common argument for judicial restraint in the development of domestic 
rights jurisprudence is that the Convention must be understood and applied uniformly 
amongst all member states. In Ullah43 Lord Bingham stressed that while member States 
can of course legislate so as to provide for ‘rights more generous than those guaranteed 
by the Convention, national courts should not interpret the Convention to achieve this: 
the Convention must bear the same meaning for all states party to it’.44 Accordingly his 
Lordship felt that the task of domestic courts was ‘no more, [and] no less’ than keeping 
pace with Strasbourg. As discussed in chapter I, this restrained approach has been 
adopted in a line of cases since Ullah. In R (Clift)45 Lord Hope added that ‘[a] measure 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Regina (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator; Do v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2004] UKHL 26.  
44 Ibid [20] (emphasis added); Kay and others v London Borough of Lambeth [2006] UKHL 10. 
45  R (on the application of Clift) (FC) (Appellant) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(Respondents) [2006] UKHL 54. 
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of self-restraint is needed, lest we stretch our own jurisprudence beyond that which is 
shared by all the States Parties to the Convention’46  and Lord Brown gave recent 
endorsement to this cautious approach in Al-Skeini,47 further suggesting that ‘no more, 
but certainly no less’ could be read as ‘no less, but certainly no more’.48 
 
A major justification for this type of ‘uniform’ approach among the Convention states is 
the preservation of legal certainty ‘through a coordinated and harmonized approach 
designed to avoid confusion and relativism’. 49  But arguments with this basis are 
palatable only when the ‘uniform’ approach represents a minimum protection of the 
Strasbourg standard. Where the approach results in a better protection of Convention 
rights than might otherwise have been given by a domestic court unconcerned with such 
judicial coordination there is little cause for criticism. However, where a domestic court 
is minded to develop domestic jurisprudence beyond the current Strasbourg standard, 
the argument that domestic courts should ‘coordinate’ reasoning with the Strasbourg 
line will serve only to stifle that development. Given the very deliberate formulation of 
the ‘flexibility and discretion’ in s.2,50 it is difficult to see that a limitation of this kind 
would not run counter to the scheme of the provision. As one commentator has recently 
asked, ‘why should the United Kingdom's human rights protection be reduced to 
Europe's lowest common denominator?’51 Furthermore, the ‘uniformity’ goal may itself 
be unrealistic given the structural features of the Convention which allow for diverse 
application of the Convention (for instance, the margin of appreciation and the 
qualifications in Articles 8-11 which almost guarantee some variation in the protection 
afforded to Convention rights). Accordingly, ‘uniformity’ amongst Convention states 
can arguably only be desirable in terms of the meaning of the Convention itself, or the 
                                                 
46 Ibid 49 (Lord Hope of Craighead). 
47 Al-Skeini (n 40). 
48 Ibid [106]; cf Re P (n 5) [50] (Lord Hope). 
49 Council of Europe, Conference on the Position of Constitutional Courts Following Integration into the 
European Union’, addressed by Luzius Wildhaber, 30 September 2004, 4 
 <http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/5D1C0CCF-B026-4E68-AC9E-
AB0A2CDB66E6/0/2004_Bled__Slov%C3%A9nie__Const_Court.pdf> accessed 01/02/2007. 
50 Eg The Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine, firmly upheld that domestic judges required ‘flexibility and 
discretion’ in developing human rights law’ Hansard HL vol 584 col 1270 (19 January 1998). 
51 J. Lewis, ‘In Re P and others: an exception to the "no more, certainly no less" rule’ [2009] PL 43. 
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scope of the primary right in question and therefore can only really be considered in the 
fairly abstract sense of a minimum level of protection.52  
 
Early in the academic debates on s.2, Masterman argued that the loyalty domestic courts 
were showing to the Strasbourg line would have the result of binding domestic courts to 
Strasbourg.53 The practice of striving for consistency or uniformity with the Strasbourg 
Court, neither falling below the minimum not developing rights more generously, 
understandably gives this impression. In similar terms, Jonathan Lewis described the 
approach as ‘the mirror principle’ and felt the result to be that domestic human rights 
law would affect be ‘nothing more than Strasbourg's shadow’.54 Accordingly, Lewis has 
argued that the effect of Lord Bingham’s dictum in Ullah (that ‘…provid[ing] for rights 
more generous than those guaranteed by the Convention … should not be the product of 
interpretation of the Convention by national courts: the Convention must bear the same 
meaning for all states party to it’) 55  ‘wrongly conflates rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) with rights under the Human Rights Act 1998’.56 
Moreover, the ‘consistency’ approach also carries a significant risk that domestic 
jurisprudence under the HRA will result in a more restrictive reading of Convention 
rights than the one given by the European Court. Sedley LJ recognised the risk that ‘in 
trying to stay level, we shall fall behind’.57  
 
The argument from consistency also assumes that by giving higher protection to 
Convention rights domestically, there would be some onerous effect on the meaning of 
                                                 
52 If the guidance as to consistency with the Convention is to be understood in this way, the decisions in 
Campbell and Limbuela (discussed in chapter I) are all the more surprising since in both cases the House 
of Lords appeared to openly expanded the scope of the primary right in point. In Campbell, the House of 
Lords pre-empted the expansion of privacy under Article 8 to cover relations between private parties (in 
advance of the decision in Von-Hannover) while in Limbuela it is arguable that the House of Lords - 
finding a violation of Article 3 - expanded the scope of ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ beyond that 
previously recognised by the European Court (See further J. Lewis ‘The European Ceiling on Human 
Rights’ (n 6) 736).   
53 R. Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act: Binding domestic courts to Strasbourg?’ [2004] 
PL 725. 
54 J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ (n 6) 730. 
55 Ullah (n 43) [20]. 
56 J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ (n 6).  
57 Ibid. 
- 62 - 
 
the Convention for other member states. Lord Bingham appeared to rely on this 
possibility in Brown v Stott when he counselled against expanding the scope of 
Convention rights domestically: ‘…the process of implication is one to be carried out 
with caution, if the risk is to be averted that the contracting parties may, by judicial 
interpretation, become bound by obligations which they did not expressly accept and 
might not have been willing to accept’.58 Yet it is difficult to imagine how an English 
decision granting a greater protection of rights in English law could upset the uniformity 
at Strasbourg. Neither the European Court of Human Rights nor the Convention itself 
would require other member states to follow that standard, nor indeed would it be 
required to keep its own case law in line with it. Baroness Hale recently agreed:  
Lord Bingham can only have meant one of two things. That Strasbourg will be cautious in its 
interpretations for fear of committing member states, which are bound by its decisions, to 
obligations which they did not want. Or that UK courts should be cautious for fear of committing 
the UK to obligations which it did not want … But there is no particular reason why either 
Strasbourg or other member states should object if we go forging ahead in interpreting the scope 
of the Convention rights in UK law.59 
Indeed, if an English case of the kind were ever brought before the Strasbourg Court by 
the appellants in a case against another member state, the Court would be more likely to 
allow a margin of appreciation to the contracting state than to hold it to the standards 
upheld by the English decision.60 
 
Equally, while many commentators propose that a ‘dialogue’ may evolve between 
domestic courts and Strasbourg 61  and that the Strasbourg Court is influenced by 
                                                 
58 Brown v Stott (Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline) and another [2003] 1 AC 681, 703. 
59 Baroness Hale, ‘Who Defines Convention Rights?’ (n 18). 
60 The point has also recently been recognised by R. Singh, ‘Interpreting Bills of Rights’ [2008] Stat LR 
82; also, J. Lewis ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights (n 6) 737: ‘realistically it is unthinkable that 
Strasbourg would reprimand a state for its generous rights protection. It would no doubt revert to the ‘ 
margin of appreciation’  doctrine’; C. Warbrick, ‘The View From the Outside’ (n 28)  31: It should be 
remembered that this reasoning is of course subject to the situation whereby the higher standard is 
recognised enough member states so as to provide a European consensus on the issue. An example of this 
kind of development concerning the rights of transsexuals was discussed in chapter II (from n 14) and is 
arguably an example of the ‘dialogue’ that domestic courts may have with Strasbourg.  
61 Eg R. Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: the legitimacy of judicial intervention 
under the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2004] PL 33. 
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domestic decisions62 this result is almost exclusively restricted to instances where the 
Court is considering cases to which the UK is a party.63 Further, as Baroness Hale has 
recently pointed out, in practice ‘the main contribution [domestic] judgments make in 
Strasbourg is to explain why [domestic courts] have not found a violation of the 
Convention in a particular case’.64 Recall for example Z v United Kingdom65 where the 
ECtHR departed from its decision in Osman v United Kingdom66  after considering the 
discussion given to that case by the House of Lords in Barrett v London Borough of 
Enfield67 in order to find the UK position not to be incompatible with the Convention. 
Similarly, in Evans v United Kingdom68 the ECtHR made express reference to the 
discussion of proportionality in the UK Court of Appeal, upholding the view of the 
English courts that the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 was compatible 
with Article 8 of the Convention. Furthermore, Strasbourg judgments concerning other 
member states do not appear to give any weight to UK domestic adjudication. A clear 
example of this is the decision of the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN69 which 
seemingly pre-empted the Strasbourg decision in Von Hannover v Germany70 on the 
scope of privacy in Article 8 (discussed further below); the Strasbourg Court was not 
influenced by Campbell in that case, in fact, Campbell was not even considered.  
 
The argument for uniform application also overlooks Strasbourg’s own view of the 
Convention system. Colin Warbrick has explained that ‘[i]t was not the object of the 
Convention to establish a uniform set of human rights for all the party states, still less an 
optimum standard’.71  Grotz, Beatson and Duffy noted that ‘there is no imperative that 
parties to the Convention should adopt a uniform approach, only that they should not 
fall below an irreducible minimum, which will be monitored by the Strasbourg 
                                                 
62 Eg Department for Constitutional Affairs, Review of the Implementation of the Human Rights Act (2006) 
1; I. Leigh, R. Masterman, Making Rights Real: The Human Rights Act in its First Decade (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2008) 294. 
63 Eg Evans v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 21; Dickson v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 21. 
64 Baroness Hale, ‘Who Defines Convention Rights?’ (n 18). 
65 (2001) 34 EHRR 97. 
66 (1998) 29 EHRR 245. 
67 [2001] 2 AC 550. 
68 Evans (n 63). 
69 [2004] UKHL 22. 
70 (2005) 40 EHRR 1. 
71 C. Warbrick, ‘The View From the Outside’ (n 28) 29. 
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institutions’72 while Masterman also thought it ‘clear that the Strasbourg institutions do 
not anticipate the Convention standards be uniformly applied as between all contracting 
states’.73 Further, Masterman has reasoned that the Convention itself ‘assumes that the 
domestic courts will also take a progressive approach’ to rights and should be ‘free to 
develop an enhanced protection within their national legal system’.74 As one former 
European Court judge has written, ‘the ECHR's injunction to further realise human 
rights and fundamental freedoms contained in the preamble is also addressed to 
domestic courts’.75 Accordingly, Judge Sibrand Karel Martens considered that the role 
of domestic courts ‘goes further than seeing to it that the minimum standards in the 
ECHR are maintained’.76 Quoting Judge Martens, Singh recently concurred: ‘[t]here is 
therefore no bar to individual states adopting more generous interpretations of 
Convention rights’.77  
 
Even more persuasively, the principle that English courts must apply the Convention 
strictly in line with Strasbourg case law is not the approach used in other Council of 
Europe countries like France or Germany.78 While the French political and judicial 
systems ‘have grown increasingly open’ and ‘the constitutionally mandated superiority 
of the ECHR over domestic legislation is now widely accepted,’79 Luc Heuschling has 
noted that ‘French judges ... are very attached to the preservation of their own authority 
and legitimacy’.80 Nico Krisch has similarly observed that ‘French scholars and judges 
prefer to see the relationship between the legal orders as one of coordination and that of 
French and European judges as a “dialogue” … [and] they often regard the authority of 
                                                 
72 S. Grosz, J. Beatson and P. Duffy, Human Rights (n 4) 20; Amin (n 1). 
73 R. Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act’ (n 53), 732. 
74 R. Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account’ (n 6).  
75 Judge Sibrand Karel Martens, ‘Incorporating the European Convention: the role of the judiciary’ [1998] 
EHRLR 5, 14. 
76 Ibid.  
77 R. Singh, ‘Interpreting Bills of Rights’ (n 60). 
78  Eg E. Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (United Kingdom National 
Committee of Comparative Law, Birmingham 2003). 
79 N. Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2008) MLR 71 (2) , 183–216, 
191. See also E. Steiner, ‘France’ in C. Gearty (ed), European Civil Liberties and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1997); L. Heuschling, ‘Comparative 
Law and the European Convention on Human Rights in French Human Rights Cases’ in E. Örücü (ed), 
Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (ibid). 
80 L. Heuschling ‘Comparative Law and the European Convention on Human Rights Cases’ (Ibid) 33. 
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ECtHR judgments as limited, especially in cases France has not been a party to’.81 
Indeed, Kirsch discovered that not only do the French courts readily disagree with 
Strasbourg on the interpretation of the Convention, but they also ‘set autonomous limits 
and protect a constitutional core from European interference;’82 ‘French practice … 
ultimately reflect a “oui, mais …” vis-à-vis Strasbourg’.83  
 
The margin of appreciation doctrine discussed earlier in chapter II itself lends support to 
the possibility of interpreting Convention rights more expansively than Strasbourg. 
Since the margin of appreciation does not operate domestically, and it is undesirable to 
transpose the doctrine into domestic law adjudication, it may even be desirable for a 
domestic court to grant more generous protection to Convention rights than is set out by 
the Strasbourg Court.84 The European Court has made it clear that where little or no 
consensus exists on a particular matter, national authorities are better placed to 
adjudicate on the matter by reason of their being in ‘direct and continuous contact with 
the vital forces of their countries’.85 Yet, as Rabinder Singh has also noted, the rationale 
‘sits uneasily’ with the reasoning of the senior judiciary that the European Court, not 
only better understands the ‘ambit and reach’86 of Convention rights, but also brings to 
its adjudication ‘a range of knowledge and principle that a national court cannot aspire 
to’.87 Masterman has elaborated that ‘[t]his rigid interpretation of s.2(1) … arguably 
undermines the role of national authorities as the primary mechanism for securing the 
protections afforded by the Convention’.88 
 
Interestingly, the initial reluctance of the senior judiciary to ‘go further’ than the 
Strasbourg Court in such cases appears to be under revision. The House of Lords 
arguably broadened the scope of Article 3 beyond the Strasbourg interpretation in 
                                                 
81 N. Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (n 79) 192. 
82 Ibid 193. 
83 Ibid 196. 
84 Eg S. Grosz, J. Beatson and P. Duffy, Human Rights (n 4) 22. 
85 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737. 
86 R (on the application of Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 AC 837 
[65]. 
87 Ibid [91].  
88 I. Leigh, R. Masterman, Making Rights Real (n 62) 63-64. 
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Limbuela 89 and, as is well known, the House of Lords in Campbell90 found a violation 
of Article 8 following the publication of photographs of Naomi Campbell (a celebrity) 
taken in a public place before such a finding by the Strasbourg Court and pre-empting 
the later decision in Von Hannover91 (where the publication of photographs taken of 
Princess Caroline in a public place were also found in breach of Article 8). In EM 
(Lebanon) v Secretary of State for Home Department92 the House of Lords found that 
returning the appellant to Lebanon where she would almost certainly be separated from 
her child amounted to an infringement of Article 8, despite there being no Strasbourg 
jurisprudence to indicate a violation. As discussed earlier, the House of Lords also made 
a ‘a small but significant advance upon the Strasbourg jurisprudence’93 in Re P94 finding 
that Article 14 of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 was incompatible with 
Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention.  
 
However, despite these few exceptions and promising dicta in early cases under the 
HRA, it is clear that the judiciary have shown little enthusiasm for the proposition that 
the HRA was enacted with a progressive view of human rights development generally. 
As the few cases discussed above show, it is easier to count the examples in which the 
courts have arguably furthered the Strasbourg interpretation of a Convention than cases 
in which they have not. Even if the proper construction of the legislative intentions is 
that Parliament positively gave domestic courts the opportunity and discretion to 
develop domestic human rights jurisprudence beyond the interpretations of the 
Strasbourg organs, it is less than clear that English courts themselves have understood – 
or been willing to construct - s.2 in this way. Instead, judicial reasoning has focused on 
developing jurisprudence consistently with Strasbourg, leading to a ‘restrained’ and 
‘cautious’ approach.  
 
In fact, it is particularly clear that domestic courts will only ‘go further’ when there is a 
very clear reason to do so. For example, in Re P Lord Hoffman justified the departure 
from Strasbourg jurisprudence on the basis that ‘none of [the reasons usually given for 
                                                 
89 Limbuela (n 29). 
90 Campbell (n 69). 
91 Von Hannover (n 70). 
92 [2008] UKHL 64 
93 Baroness Hale, ‘Who Defines Convention Rights?’ (n 18). 
94 Re P (n 5). 
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following the Strasbourg decisions] can apply in a case in which Strasbourg has 
deliberately declined to lay down an interpretation for all member states, as it does 
when it says that the question is within the margin of appreciation’.95 Lord Mance 
agreed 96  and it was in reliance on this margin that Lord Hope was concerned to 
emphasise that ‘[Lord Bingham in Ullah] said that the duty of the national courts is to 
keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: “no more, but 
certainly no less”. Not, it should be noted, “certainly no more”97 ... [t]he Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is not to be treated as a straightjacket from which there is no escape’.98 
 
Further, domestic courts are especially willing to make an ‘advance’ upon Strasbourg 
where the development can be constructed in such a way as to suggest the court is not 
‘going further’ at all: of the majority in Re P, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope and Lord 
Mance all reasoned that it was actually the jurisprudence of the ECtHR which indicated 
that discrimination on (non)marital grounds was incompatible with the Convention. It 
was only Baroness Hale that felt the ‘advance’ on Strasbourg to be justified per se (in 
fact, she could not agree that the Strasbourg Court would hold the discrimination in this 
case to be incompatible)99 and, on this basis, only Baroness Hale outwardly concluded 
that, for the purposes of the Convention rights as given effect in the UK by the HRA, the 
Order was unjustifiably discriminatory. Both Lord Hope and Lord Mance agreed with 
Lord Hoffman that the incompatibility was derived from the developing Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and, consequently, that the ‘dilemma’ as to whether a domestic court 
might further the Strasbourg position was ‘less acute’ than Baroness Hale had 
suggested.100 This is compounded by his Lordship’s emphasis in Re P that there are 
usually ‘good reasons … [to] follow the interpretation adopted in Strasbourg’.101 The 
best of these reasons was ‘the old rule of construction that when legislation is based 
upon an international treaty, the courts will try to construe the legislation in a way 
                                                 
95 Ibid [36]. 
96 Ibid [129]. 
97 Cf. Al-Skeini (n 40) [106] (Lord Brown). 
98 Re P (n 5) [50], Lord Hope refers to the guidance of the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords debates 
on the Act: ‘putting the courts in some kind of straitjacket where flexibility is what is required’ Hansard 
HL,vol 583 col 515 (18 November 1997)  (Lord Irvine of Lairg). 
99 Ibid [115]. 
100 Ibid [50], [122]. 
101 Ibid [35]. 
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which does not put the United Kingdom in breach of its international obligations’102 but 
his lordship also confirmed that other reasons are ‘ordinary respect for the decision of a 
foreign court on the same point’ as well as ‘the general desirability of a uniform 






A short while ago, Bonner, Fenwick and Harris-Short suggested that ‘the ability to 
depart from the ECHR jurisprudence … enable[s] a court to build extra protection 
above [the Strasbourg] “floor”’.104 The language of s.2 certainly leaves it open to the 
judiciary to build upon the Strasbourg interpretation of Convention rights and on this 
basis, it is possible that domestic courts can go further than the Convention requires, 
either by adopting a minimum standard, constructing the approach as the development 
of a domestic law of human rights, or when considering relevant jurisprudence in an 
area given a wide margin of appreciation. Crucially however, that the courts may ‘go 
further’ is not because the HRA (or the Convention) requires it of them, rather, it is 
because the HRA 1998 allows it to them. As one commentator has written, the 
introduction of the HRA ‘gave UK courts the opportunity - rather than a mandate - to 
make a greater contribution to international human rights jurisprudence’105 and at least 
this much was confirmed by the House of Lords in Re P.  
 
Yet – as Re P also shows - there is a clear reluctance on the part of domestic courts to 
openly ‘go further’ than the Strasbourg Court and give a more generous interpretation to 
Convention rights at the domestic level. The continued eagerness to maintain 
consistency with the reasoning of the European Court and the central importance of 
Lord Bingham’s guidance in Ullah to ‘keep pace’ with Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘no 
more, no less’ has in this way placed obvious limits on judicial reasoning under s.2. 
                                                 
102 Ibid.  
103 Ibid [36]. 
104 D. Bonner, H. Fenwick, and S. Harris-Short, ‘Judicial Approaches to the Human Rights Act’ (2003) 
52 ICLQ 549, 553 
105 J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ (n 6) 725. 
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Unfortunately, as Leigh and Masterman recently concluded, ‘so long as the “no less/no 
more” doctrine continues to hold sway there will continue to be doubts over the ability 
of our judges to constructively ‘contribute to [the] dynamic and evolving interpretation 
of the Convention’ at the Strasbourg level’.106 
 
The resultant desire for consistency is also enlarged by another fear: as Hunt has 
explained, ‘pre-HRA positivistic legal approach allowed judges to avoid the charge of 
making value choices that might undermine their legitimacy. … Such judges were far 
from eager to explicitly develop the common law lest they be accused of illegitimate 
judicial law-making’. 107  Post HRA, the mood is similar and it is not difficult to 
sympathise with the reasoning behind this caution: by interpreting the Convention more 
generously than Parliament may have anticipated the danger is that it may effectively tie 
the UK to obligations which Parliament did not contract into and may not have been 
willing to accept. 108  As one commentator put it, there is ‘no opportunity for the 
Government to “appeal” to Strasbourg’109 and ‘[t]here is no provision in the ECHR 
enabling a Convention state to bring a claim against one of its citizens (as a means to 
challenge a domestic court's interpretation of a particular right)’.110 Nor is there any 
mechanism similar to the procedure for a reference to the European Court of Justice in 
Luxembourg.111 Writing extra judicially, Sedley LJ has given an account of judicial 
reasoning which suitably sums up such a view: 
Our courts have set their face against any interpretation of the Convention that carries individual 
rights further than Strasbourg has carried them. The logic of this is intelligible: it avoids judicial 
legislation and prevents member states from` getting out of step with one another.112 
 
Section 2 HRA offers no normative guidance, the ambit of the duty to ‘take into 
account’ Strasbourg jurisprudence and, predictably, ‘[i]t all depends on the juridical 
                                                 
106 I. Leigh, R. Masterman, Making Rights Real (n 62) 294; Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights 
Bill, Cm 3782 (October 1997) [2.5]. 
107 M Hunt, ‘The Human Rights Act and Legal Culture: The Judiciary and the Legal Profession’, in L 
Clements and J Young (eds), Human Rights: Changing the Culture (Blackwell, Oxford 1999) 93. 
108 Eg Brown v Stott (n 58) 703 (Lord Bingham). 
109 R. Singh, ‘Interpreting Bills of Rights’ (n 60). 
110 J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ (n 6) 737. 
111 R. Singh, ‘Interpreting Bills of Rights’ (n 60). 
112 Sedley LJ, ‘Bringing Rights Home: Time to Start a Family?’ (2008) 28 LS 327.  
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political complexion and energy of the current judiciary’.113 At a time when Law Lords 
are themselves identifying and publicising critical reasons for growing judicial 
activism 114  the likelihood of any willingness to judicially expand the scope of 
Convention rights or move beyond Strasbourg jurisprudence under the HRA seems slim. 
Judicial awareness of cynical public perceptions may alone render these conclusions 
moot. As Sedley LJ has put it (extra-judicially), ‘[a]ll of this makes it a pity that, instead 
of setting out in a reasonably sanguine and collaborative mood to see how we can build 
on the Human Rights Act, we are starting from a low and defensive base’.115 Perhaps 
however, Re P at least represents a step in the right direction: the acknowledgement that 
domestic courts ought to decide cases in the domestic context will at least allow a 
development beyond the Strasbourg position in certain circumstances. However, the 
possibility for domestic judges to legitimately adopt an expansive reading of 
Convention rights outside such (circumscribed) circumstances remains doubtful.  
 
  
                                                 
113  P. Kearns, ‘United Kingdom Judges in Human Rights Cases’, in E. Örücü (ed), Judicial 
Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (n 78) 66. 
114 Speaking recently to the Bar Conference Lord Neuberger identified several factors that are pushing 
UK judges into being more activist and concluded that ‘increased judicial activism means increased 
media and political scrutiny of the more senior judges — at appointment and thereafter’. F. Gibb, ‘Should 
MPs interview new Supreme Court Judges?’ The Times, (London 04 November 2008) 
<http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article5080873.ece?openComment=true>  accessed 8 
November 2008.   
115 Sedley LJ, ‘Bringing Rights Home: Time to Start a Family?’ (n 112). 
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CHAPTER IV 
COMPARATIVISM UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 
 
 
If any of the situations giving rise to a ‘departure’ or ‘escape’ from Strasbourg 
jurisprudence (as set out in chapters I and II) arise in a domestic case, it has so far been 
argued that domestic courts should be ready to decide the matter for themselves. 
However, this exercise may not always be workable and where domestic law does not 
present a solution, it may be possible - or even preferable - that the domestic court look 
outside the Convention for comparative assistance. Yet, an important quandary is raised 
by a specific duty in section 2 to take into account Strasbourg jurisprudence.  
 
Historically, English judges have looked to a wealth of jurisprudence in the course of 
domestic adjudication,1 typically taking the form of decisions emanating from other 
Commonwealth systems (similarly rooted in the common law) and the language of the 
Act prima facie retains that possibility. As chapter I sought to clarify, the rejection of 
the amendment to replace the words ‘must take into account’ with ‘shall be bound by’ 
positively confirmed the intention that section 2 was designed to give Strasbourg 
jurisprudence the effect of strictly persuasive authority in UK law2 which is essentially 
the same status traditionally afforded to authority from other jurisdictions. Indeed, it is 
the subsidiary nature of the Convention system that provides for doctrinal tools such as 
the margin of appreciation and provisions for derogation, and it must be for the same 
reasons that the traditional regard to other (common law) jurisdictions - classically 
rationalised by a basic ‘like for like’ breed of reasoning - is an approach that Section 2 
nowhere prohibits.3 As Fenwick has written, ‘… it was always clear that the courts 
could also consider jurisprudence from other jurisdictions’.4  
 
Yet while the Act does not strictly prohibit reference outside the Convention 
jurisdiction, neither does it necessarily encourage such an approach. Even more 
                                                 
1 Eg M. Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1998). 
2 R. Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account: developing a ‘municipal law of 
human rights’ under the Human Rights Act' [2005] ICLQ 54.  
3 F. Klug, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998, Pepper v Hart and All That’ [1999] PL 246. 
4 H. Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Cavendish, London 2007) 192. 
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significant, is the possibility that section 2 operates to positively discourage such 
recourse, advocating instead a closer harmonisation of the common law with European 
human rights standards. Since ‘legal cultures are neither homogeneous nor 
unchanging’,5 what might have been ‘relevant’ before the HRA may not be so now. It is 
also possible that some jurisdictions may be (or may become) more appropriate for 
comparison than others.  
 
Some enquiry into the human rights principles sought to be protected by HRA is 
necessary at this juncture. Christopher McCrudden has made some useful analysis of 
this point and loosely identifies three possibilities.6 Firstly the Act may intentionally 
recognise universal principles of human rights. If so, domestic reliance on any human 
rights jurisdiction whatsoever may be acceptable. Secondly is the possibility that it is a 
tradition of domestic rights (so to speak), or at least rights not altogether transposed 
from ‘foreign’ legal systems that is to be promoted. If this is the case, then the 
application of standards borrowed from the familiar common law systems may be more 
appropriate. Lastly, if the Act were to incorporate wholly European principles of human 
rights, one might assume that courts applying section 2 would rightly favour European 




UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES, UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE 
 
The possibility that courts may legitimately refer to any jurisdiction whatsoever in the 
course of domestic adjudication is given by virtue of s.11(a) HRA, which seems at least 
to confirm that the principles protected by the HRA are not exclusively European. 
According to that provision, reliance on a Convention right ‘does not restrict any other 
right or freedom conferred on [the applicant] by or under any law having effect in any 
part of the United Kingdom’.7 The preamble to the ECHR also clearly states that the 
Convention aims at ‘securing the universal and effective recognition and observance’ of 
                                                 
5 J. Bell, ‘Mechanisms for Cross Fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe’ in J Beatson & T 
Tridimas, New Directions for European Public Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1998) 156. 
6 C. McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights? Trans-national Judicial Conversations on 
Constitutional Rights’ [2000] OJLS 449, 503.  
7 Section 11(a) HRA 1998. 
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certain rights declared by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’.8 In fact the 
common membership of most Convention signatories to other international human 
rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and,  
more recently, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), has 
probably had the effect of influencing Convention jurisprudence, albeit indirectly. As 
one commentator has written, ‘The Convention protects certain universal human rights, 
not some sui generis, internationally agreed upon rights’9 and in Re P (in support of his 
dissent) Lord Walker was careful to note that ‘in principle the content of human rights 
should (almost by definition) be the same world-wide’.10 
 
If universal principles of human rights influenced the drafting of the European 
Convention, and the HRA gives effect to that Convention, it follows that the HRA must 
also be giving effect to those universal principles, albeit indirectly. If this ‘equation’ 
works, it must be legitimate for a domestic court adjudicating potentially universal 
human rights matters to do the same by reference to the jurisprudence under any of the 
treaties the UK is signatory to (e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Feldman has suggested that ‘such instruments 
are used by the Court in Strasbourg as an aid to interpreting rights under the ECHR, and 
can be used by our courts and tribunals for the same purpose’.11 Rabinder Singh has 
added that ‘[h]uman rights lend themselves to this approach, given that they are 
frequently cast in universalist terms, and very often in a form similar to corresponding 
provisions in other jurisdictions.12  
 
Some decisions of the senior judiciary have shown the willingness to use comparative 
sources in this way: for example, in A and Others13 Lord Bingham made considerable 
reference not only to the Convention and its jurisprudence, but to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations as well as the General 
Commission for Human Rights, Resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
                                                 
8 G. Letsas, ‘The Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’ (2006) 26(4) OJLS 705, 707. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Re P and Others [2008] 3 WLR 76 [80]. 
11 D. Feldman (ed) English Public Law (OUP, Oxford 2004) 395-396. 
12 R. Singh, ‘Interpreting Bills of Rights’ [2008] Stat LR 82 (emphasis added). 
13 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. 
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Council of Europe.14 In Jones,15 while Lord Phillips focused on the approach of the 
Strasbourg Court,16 Lord Mance drew heavily from a wide range of international 
instruments as well as United States jurisprudence.17  
 
The approach is not mirrored by other Convention states, where, generally speaking, a 
broad comparative method is not popular. For example, legal writers are unanimous in 
saying that in comparison to the United Kingdom, comparative law has played only a 
minor role in French courts.18 French judges appear to have recourse almost exclusively 
to western, and more specifically to European legal sources. Examples of liberal 
democracies with a different cultural background are either ignored or rejected.19 In 
fact, where courts do take account of broader – universal – jurisprudence, the practice is 
more often a symbolic, rather than a substantive, contribution to judicial reasoning. For 
instance, in a decision of the Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris, the commissaire 
du gouvernement, Mirielle Heers, was obliged to take notice of comparative law after 
heavy reliance on it by the applicants, but essentially concluded that different 
philosophical influences and cultural traditions rendered reliance on those standards 
inappropriate.20 
 
A similar result is detectable in Germany, although there the hesitant attitude towards 
judgments of foreign or international courts has been put down to the differences in the 
working orders of those jurisdictions. Being dominated by written law and no case law, 
the German legal order is simply unfamiliar with applying precedents.21 Equally, the 
relative lack of comparative study in German courts may be explained by the lack of 
adequate translation. (English is not ordinarily a working language for German judges 
                                                 
14 Eg Ibid [58]-[63]. 
15 Jones v Ministry of the Interior [2004] EWCA Civ 1394, [2005] QB 699. 
16Ibid [132]-[134]. 
17 Ibid [61]-[68]. 
18 L. Heuschling ‘Comparative Law and the European Convention on Human Rights Cases’ in E. Örücü 
(ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (United Kingdom National Committee of 
Comparative Law, Birmingham 2003) 38 
19 Ibid 47. 
20 Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris, 9 June 1998, Mme Donyoh and Mme Senanayake, concl M 
Heers, RFDA, 1998, 1231 et seq. 
21 N. Weiss, ‘The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on German Jurisprudence’ , in E. 
Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (n 18) 61. 
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or lawyers).22 Of course, the opposite could be said of the UK: the British judiciary are 
very familiar with the precedent based comparative method and since almost all cases 
are translated into English, UK domestic courts do not suffer the linguistic barriers in 
the terms which confront the German courts. This feeds a compelling argument as to 
why the rejection of broader comparative study should not be applicable in the British 
context and that domestic courts should not be limited to the boundaries of European 
jurisprudence in that way. At least, if there are to be limits, they must be imposed for 
different reasons. 
 
Perhaps a compelling reason arises from the principle that those legal institutions which 
are compared must, in fact, be fit for comparison. Whether true or not, there is a 
perception that different ideological positions on human rights are taken by different 
jurisdictions and, if that is true, comparative standards drawn from a particular 
jurisdiction’s approach to human rights may be regarded, therefore, as a sign of a 
particular orientation towards human rights generally.23 The treatment of comparative 
authority by the South African Constitutional Court is of particular interest in this 
respect since the Constitution expressly declares that ‘[w]hen interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, a court, tribunal or forum may consider foreign law’24 but that it ‘must consider 
international law’.25 The Court has explained that ‘[c]omparative research is generally 
valuable, and is all the more so when dealing with problems new to our jurisprudence 
but well developed in mature constitutional democracies’.26  
 
It is hardly surprising that, as McCrudden has highlighted, ‘it is [in the main] the 
judiciaries of liberal democratic regimes that cite each other’.27 ‘The citation of, for 
example, Chinese cases by the House of Lords, does not seem likely…’28 and the HRA 
can probably be assumed not to alter that principle. While the rights protected under the 
                                                 
22 Ibid 60-61. 
23 See C. McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’ (n 6) 501; R. Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference 
and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: the legitimacy of judicial intervention under the Human Rights Act 998’ 
[2004] PL 33, 47; L. McDonald, ‘New Directions in the Australian Bill of Rights Debate’ [2004] PL 22. 
24 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 s.39(1)(c) (emphasis added). 
25 Ibid s.39(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
26 Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) (emphasis added); R. Singh, 
‘Interpreting Bills of Rights’ (n 12). 
27 C.r McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’ (n 6) 517. 
28 Ibid 517-518. 
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Convention may in essence be read as ‘universal’, this does not necessarily mean that 
there are universal interpretations of such rights. Different constitutional structures, 
institutional arrangements and socio-political traditions make it unlikely that rights will 
be identically interpreted, in different countries. As George Letsas has explained:  
[T]here is no reason to assume in advance that national constitutional courts, regional 
supranational courts and global human rights committees should reach the same result in 
interpreting specific rights. The decisions of these different bodies are primarily propositions of 
the law of the respective instrument, not accounts of the concept of a particular human right.29 
Comparative jurisprudence, of any kind, should therefore be applied with caution. 
Equally, the scope of jurisdictions left open for the judiciary to consider will sensibly 
maintain some boundaries although perhaps not so narrowly defined as to preclude 




DOMESTIC PRINCIPLES, COMMONWEALTH JURISPRUDENCE 
 
The White Paper explained the choice not to entrench human rights legislation on the 
grounds that such an arrangement ‘could not be reconciled with our own constitutional 
traditions, which allow any Act of Parliament to be amended or repealed by a 
subsequent Act of Parliament’.30 The idea that the HRA was framed with the intention 
of developing a domestic or ‘municipal’ law of human rights has also been widely 
discussed in commentary on the Act31 and is in keeping with the idea that the Act was 
supposed to generate ‘evolutionary rather than revolutionary change’.32  Indeed, writing 
the foreword to a publication by S. Grosz, J. Beatson and P Duffy, Stephen Sedley 
considered that it was the HRA’s status as a domestic statute that ‘opens the door to a 
wealth of jurisprudence and experience from other Commonwealth, common law and 
                                                 
29 G. Letsas, ‘The Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’ (n 8) 709. 
30 Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, Cm 3782 (October 1997) [2.16]. 
31 Eg R. Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account’ (n 2); S. Grosz, J. Beatson and P 
Duffy, Human Rights: The 1998 Act and the European Convention (Sweet and Maxwell, London 2000); 
J. Laws, ‘The Limitations of Human Rights’ [1998] PL 254; J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human 
Rights’ [2007] PL 720. 
32 D. Feldman, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and constitutional principles’ (1999) 19(2) LS 165. 
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European jurisdictions, as well as from the Strasbourg Court itself, in its interpretation 
and application’.33 He continued:  
It is through this rich prism that the Convention, it its turn will be read and applied in our courts: 
not as a monochrome exercise in textual interpretation and the application of received authority, 
but as a kaleidoscopic pattern combining the symmetry of law with the variety of experience. We 
may not simply reach down answers from the Strasbourg shelf: in every case the question will 
remain what is the impact of the Convention on our law and our public administration.34  
Similarly, Laws LJ has consistently maintained that while the Act operates to modernise 
the law, ‘common lawyers must administer it, according to their ancient methods’.35 He 
continued, ‘… The judges will not stick out their necks on poles of individual 
predilections, nor feel reluctantly driven to apply a foreign law. It is not ‘foreign’; it is 
no more nor less than a revitalising of the common law’.36 ‘We must develop the 
common law and rules of statutory interpretation conformably with the Convention; but 
it is part of a continuum with everything that has gone before. It is not an alien add-
on’.37  
 
If s.2 was designed to allow domestic courts the scope to enfold the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence ‘within the traditions of the British state’38 (as has been argued in 
previous chapters) it would be wholly appropriate for the judiciary to incorporate the 
Convention in line with domestic habits. Thus while reliance on any jurisdiction 
whatsoever may be inappropriate, having recourse to jurisdictions sharing some 
commonality with the UK may not be. The HRA is not inimitable. More and more 
countries with legal systems rooted in the common law have adopted Bills of Rights. It 
is said that the Labour Party was strongly influenced by the Canadian position when it 
decided to campaign for human rights legislation.39 Like the Canadian Charter, the UK 
                                                 
33 S. Sedley in S. Grosz, J. Beatson and P Duffy, Human Rights: The 1998 Act and the European 
Convention (n 31) foreword vii (emphasis added). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Laws LJ in Cambridge Centre for Public Law, The Human Rights Act and the Criminal Justice and 
Regulatory Process, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1999) (Overview).   
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 J. Laws, ‘The Limitations of Human Rights’ (n 31) (emphasis added). 
39 Eg Lord Irvine, ‘The legal system and law reform under Labour’ in D. Bean (ed), ‘Law Reform for All’ 
(Blackstone, London 1996) referred to in R. Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’’ (n 
23) 45. 
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HRA contains, inter alia, provisions for derogation from Convention rights40 and has 
been drafted to prevent the courts having the final word in human rights adjudication.41 
Accordingly, reference to cases decided under the Canadian Charter may, in some 
cases, be quite appropriate for the domestic context of the UK. Similarly, Feldman has 
suggested that the decisions of the Supreme Court of India under that country’s 1947 
Constitution, those of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand on the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990, and those of the South African Constitutional Court on the rights 
under South Africa’s 1993 and 1996 African Constitutions, may all contain ‘useful 
insights’.42 Lester and Clapinska have gone so far as to surmise that ‘[t]he developing 
principles contained in the constitutional case law of courts in other common law 
countries…are likely to be at least as persuasive as the Strasbourg case law’.43 Starmer 
has even considered these sources to be ‘invaluable’ in assisting the interpretation of 
Convention rights.44 Comparison with jurisprudence under Bills of rights that are of 
recent origin and share strong similarity with the HRA are likely to be especially 
relevant in this respect. The Canadian and New Zealand jurisprudence would fall into 
this category, as would the HRA of the Australia Capital Territory which was passed in 
March 2004 and the ‘Charter of Rights and Responsibilities’ introduced in Victoria 
(both modelled on the British HRA).45  
 
In line with these conclusions, a willingness to continue referral to jurisdictions outside 
the Convention has been shown by some of the early decisions made under the HRA.46 
In Montgomery and Coulter47 Lord Hope’s judgment contains, in addition to references 
to numerous Strasbourg decisions, an impressive citation of New Zealand, Canadian, 
                                                 
40 Section 16 HRA 1998.  
41 R. Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’’(n 23) 45. 
42 D. Feldman (ed) English Public Law (n 11) 397  
43 A Lester and L Clapinska ‘Human Rights and the British Constitution’ in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds) 
The Changing Constitution (5th edn OUP, Oxford 2004) 83. 
44 K. Starmer, 'European Human Rights Law - The Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention 
on Human Rights' (LAG, London 1999) 27. 
45 F Klug ‘A Bill of Rights: Do we need one or do we already have one?’ (2007) PL 701. 
46 R. Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act: Binding domestic courts to Strasbourg?’ [2004] 
PL 725. 
47 Montgomery and Coulter v HM Advocate 2001 SLT 37. 
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Australian and Irish case law.48 Similarly, in Lambert Lord Steyn referred to judgments 
of the Canadian Supreme Court and South African Constitutional Court49 while In R v A 
(No 2)50 Lord Hope analysed rape shield provisions in the United States, Australia, 
Canada, and Scotland. In A and Others51 considerable reference was made to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations as well as 
the General Commission for Human Rights, Resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe.  
 
The Privy Council in Brown v Stott52 also continued to refer to jurisdictions outside the 
Strasbourg remit and in doing so seemingly opted not to follow developing Strasbourg 
jurisprudence as to the absolute nature of the privilege against self-incrimination in 
Article 6.53 The case concerned whether evidence led by prosecution obtained under s. 
172(2)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 violated the freedom from self-incrimination as 
protected by Article 6 of the Convention. The Strasbourg Court has held in Saunders v 
United Kingdom54 that the use of statements obtained from him by DTI inspectors under 
statutory powers of compulsion at trial breached the Article 6 right but Lord Steyn, Lord 
Hope and the Rt Hon Ian Kirkwood found the reasoning of the Court in that case to be 
‘unsatisfactory’, ‘unconvincing’ and a ‘more absolute standard than the other 
jurisprudence of the court indicates’.55 In truth the Privy Council appeared to 
circumvent the European jurisprudence in order to avoid a finding of incompatibility. 
While Lord Steyn took the view that the observations in Saunders ‘were never intended 
to apply to a case such as the present’56 Lord Bingham clearly felt that ‘all who own or 
drive motor cars know that by doing so they subject themselves to a regulatory regime 
                                                 
48 A. O’Neill QC, ‘Judicial Politics and the Judicial Committee: The Devolution Jurisprudence of the 
Privy Council’ [2001] MLR 603, 610. 
49 R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545 [34]-[35], [40].  
50 [2002] 1 AC 45. 
51 A and Others (n 13). 
52 Brown v Stott (Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline) and another [2003] 1 AC 681.  
53 see eg Funke v France (1993) 16 EHRR 297; Saunders v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 313; A. 
O’Neill QC, ‘Judicial Politics and the Judicial Committee’ (n 48) 610. 
54 (1996) 23 EHRR 313 
55 Brown v Stott (n 52) 733. 
56 Ibid 712. 
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which does not apply to members of the public who do neither’57 and made reference to 
the Canadian Charter or Rights and Freedoms, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, the Constitution of South Africa, the Constitution of the United States, the Indian 
Constitution, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights before concluding that the  right not to self-incriminate 
oneself was an ‘implied right’ (on the basis that such a right was contained in many of 
those international instruments) but not an ‘absolute’ right as suggested in Saunders.58  
 
The reasoning in Brown and the reliance on ‘foreign’ jurisprudence instead of the 
Strasbourg decision in Saunders makes it difficult not to agree with Luc Heuschling’s 
‘intuitive hypothesis’ that ‘comparative law assumes mainly a legitimation function’.59 
The asymmetry in the use of comparative case law in some domestic decisions also 
does little to rebut the suggestion: for instance Lord Walker found a judgment of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa ‘very helpful’ when giving judgment in 
Williamson and borrowed heavily from Sachs J’s reasoning in that decision60 in order to 
conclude that the ban on corporal punishment did not violate Article 9 of the 
Convention while Lord Nicholls distinguished the decision of the Strasbourg Court in 
Campbell and Cosans61 in order to reach the same conclusion.  
 
In a multitude of cases, however, the use of comparative jurisprudence outside the 
European Convention has aided the development of domestic human rights in areas 
where relevant Strasbourg decisions are unhelpful or non-existent. For instance, the 
development of the common law breach of confidence action so as to protect the Article 
8 privacy right owes much to a decision of the Australian High Court in Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats.62 Most recently Lord Hoffmann drew 
                                                 
57 Ibid 705. 
58 Ibid 703-704. 
59 L. Heuschling, ‘Comparative Law in French Human Rights Cases’ (n 18) 47. 
60 R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] 2 WLR 590 [67]. 
61 (1982) 4 EHRR 293. 
62 [2001] H.C.A. 63; R. Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act’ (n 46) 726; G. Phillipson, 
‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy Under the Human 
Rights Act’ (2003) 65 MLR 726, 731; By contrast, the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN [2004] 
UKHL 22 appeared to consider the jurisprudence of the Australian High Court less influential to the 
development of the Breach of Confidence action than in previous decisions but nevertheless continued to 
develop the law in this direction.  
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comparison with a decision of the South African Constitutional Court in Du Toit and 
Vos v Minister for Welfare and Population Development (concerning adoption by a 
same-sex couple) in order to fill gaps in the Strasbourg jurisprudence on unmarried 
adoptions in Re P.63 Baroness Hale has recently added that ‘… there is nothing in the 
Act … to support the reluctance shown in Sheldrake v DPP to seek such guidance as we 
can from the jurisprudence of foreign courts with comparable human rights instruments 
… especially on subjects where Strasbourg has not recently spoken’.64 Thus, it seems 
clear that in cases where there is ‘little or no steer from the Strasbourg organs’65 the use 
of comparative jurisprudence beyond Strasbourg appears to remain important to the 
development of domestic human rights. Moreover, the burgeoning volume of UK HRA 
case law is likely to have an impact on those common-law jurisdictions that historically 
placed great emphasis on English case law such as Hong Kong66 and Canada,67 so that 
the jurisprudence of those legal systems may develop in accordance with Convention 
principles by default so that it may even become incrementally more suitable to have 




EUROPEAN PRINCIPLES, EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE 
 
It is crucial at this juncture to recall the rationale for the reliance on Commonwealth 
authority in the first place: common heritage, cultural traditions and legal orders. 
Although there is hesitation to divorce domestic principles from the familiarity of the 
common-law, reliance on that species of jurisprudence may not fit as easily if the UK 
has developed away from that common ground.  
 
                                                 
63 Re P (n 10) [17]. 
64 Baroness Hale, ‘Who Defines Convention Rights?’ (JUSTICE Tom Sargant Memorial Annual Lecture , 
15 October 2008) <http://www.justice.org.uk/trainingevents/annuallecture/index.html> accessed 7 
November 2008 (emphasis added). 
65 F. Klug, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998, Pepper v Hart and All That’ (n 3) 251. 
66 A. Byrnes, Jumpstarting the Hong Kong Bill of Rights in its Second Decade? The Relevance of 
International and Comparative Jurisprudence (2002) <http://hdl.handle.net/1885/41125> 17 accessed 29 
January 2007. 
67 B. McLachlin, ‘Bills of Rights in Common Law Countries’ [2002] ICQL 97. 
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That the United Kingdom has moved steadily towards convergence with the rest of 
Europe is hardly contentious. A construction of domestic traditions as entirely divorced 
from those of our European neighbours can now probably be dismissed as no longer 
applicable. Indeed, the UK was among the first members of the Council of Europe to 
ratify the Convention, and it is usually assumed that English lawyers made a substantial 
contribution to the drafting of the document. Rather ironically a major factor said to be 
involved in the reluctance of the French judges to rely on Strasbourg decisions is their 
national pride in front of a new instrument, which is supposed to be dominated by 
English legal conceptions.68 More significantly, and as Masterman suggested, cases 
from jurisdictions outside the Convention borders are ‘unlikely to point to the direction 
in which the common law should be developed to ensure compatibility with the 
Convention rights’.69 Furthermore, the Convention and its jurisprudence are built into 
the structure of the HRA70  and therefore expressly tie domestic rights to those existing 
in the European Convention on Human Rights (in contrast to the Canadian, Victorian 
and New Zealand experiences which do not draw from another treaty). The upshot of 
this reality may be that reliance on Strasbourg jurisprudence ought to be treated as 
preference.  
 
The senior judiciary seem to agree: In Ullah71 Lord Bingham considered that national 
courts should ‘keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence … as it evolves’ and again 
expressed reservations about the value of examining Commonwealth case law in HRA 
cases in Sheldrake, saying that even though the Lords had on a number of occasions 
‘gained valuable insights from the reasoning of Commonwealth judges’ the UK ‘must 
[now] take its lead from Strasbourg’.72 In Gillan73 Lord Bingham thought it was 
‘perilous ... to seek to transpose the outcome of Canadian cases’74 by reason of their 
being ‘decided under a significantly different legislative regime,’75 while in Marper 
                                                 
68 J-F Burgelin and A Lalardrie, ‘L’application de la Convention par le juge judiciaire français’, Mélanges 
Pettiti (Bruzelles: Bruylant, 1998) 160 referred to in Luc Heuschling ‘Comparative Law and the European 
Convention on Human Rights Cases’ (n 18) 36. 
69 R. Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account’ (n 2) 923. 
70 Schedule 1 HRA 1998. 
71 Regina (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator; Do v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2004] UKHL 26 [20]. 
72 Sheldrake v DPP [2004] 3 WLR 876 [33]. 
73 R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2006] 2 AC 307. 
74 Ibid [23]. 
75 Ibid.  
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Lord Steyn rejected the idea that domestic traditions bear any relevance to the scope of 
Convention rights at all.76 The court in British American Tobacco77 recognised that ‘it is 
instructive … to see how another respected jurisdiction has dealt with a related but 
confined problem’ but also considered that comparison (with the jurisprudence of the 
US First Amendment) should be undertaken with care: 
…the balance between State legislation and federal legislation in the United States is a subject of 
renowned complexity. Decisions on such matters can have limited effect on our consideration of 
the balance to be struck in considering a restriction of a limited Convention rights and the 
measure of a discretion to be afforded to Parliament and ministers under our own rather different 
constitutional system.78 
 
Accordingly, Strasbourg jurisprudence has been preferred. The House of Lords made 
reference to German constitutional law in Aston Cantlow,79 and in Pretty80 Lord 
Bingham referred to section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 
associated judgments, but noted that the judgments were directed to a provision with no 
close analogy in the ECHR.81 It is clear that - for the majority of cases - domestic courts 
show a tendency to confine themselves to considering jurisprudence which the 
European Court of Human Rights would itself have been likely to consider if it were 
dealing with the case. As Aidan O’Neill wrote in the first years of HRA: ‘[i]n the early 
days of wrestling with human rights arguments there will clearly be a temptation for 
practitioners and the courts to elevate dicta of the European Court of Human Rights into 
binding pronouncements on the law…’.82  
 
Yet such an approach would not be consistent with the Government’s stated intention of 
producing a ‘creative dialogue’ between the judges in the United Kingdom and the 
European Court of Human Rights and may perhaps be criticised as overly deferential to 
                                                 
76 R (Marper) v Chief Constable of Yorkshire [2004] 1 WLR 2196 [27]. 
77 R (on the application of British American Tobacco UK Ltd) v The Secretary of State for Health) [2004] 
EWHC (Admin) 2493s. 
78 Ibid [36]. 
79 Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, 
[2004] 1 AC 546 
80 R (on the application of Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2001] UKHL 61, [2001] 3 WLR 
1598. 
81 Ibid [23].  
82 A. O’Neill QC, ‘Judicial Politics and the Judicial Committee’ (n 48) 612. 
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that court.83 It is appropriate to recommend caution about a Strasbourg loyalty which 
ignores alternative comparison altogether. If s.2 does inspire focus on cases and 
decisions of the Strasbourg institutions, it should be recalled that it only requires 
domestic courts to do so insofar as they are ‘relevant’. For instance, where a relevant 
decision of the Strasbourg court is, say, thirty years old, more recent Commonwealth 
case law may provide a more contemporary take on how a certain right had been 
balanced against the public interest. Equally, it is not to be automatically assumed that 
the jurisprudence of other member states can be treated as quintessentially ‘European’ 
in character for the purpose of discovering any changing ‘consensus’ as discussed in 
chapter II. For example, it has been said that German constitutional law has more 
resemblance to American constitutional law than to French constitutional law. 
Similarly, French law’s Roman origins, strongly conceptual and deductive style of legal 
reasoning with distinctive legal concepts, make it different from the English common 
law despite the common liberal political ideology.84 In reality, local conditions produce 
difficulties ‘which are often subtle and require … sophisticated analytical tools’ to 
separate them from their ‘culturally-determined realities’.85  
 
Institutions of government are also very divergent. For example, forms of local 
government, structures of ministries and the organisation of the civil service are quite 
different between France, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom.86 Further, many 
European countries have a monist (rather than dualist) construction of the relationship 
between municipal and international law which can significantly affect the way in 
which they give effect to human rights.87 In fact, Legrand has made much of the idea 
that differences in mentalité are actually an obstacle to genuine Europeanisation.88 
 
This is in addition to the fact that different Convention states have different attitudes to 
the position of the ECHR in the first place. For example, while the Spanish 
                                                 
83 Ibid.  
84 J. Bell, ‘Mechanisms for Cross Fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe’ (n 5) 154. 
85 Nicholas HD Foster, ‘The Journal of Comparative Law: A New Comparative Resource’ 
<http://www.wildy.co.uk/jcl/pdfs/foster.pdf> accessed 01 February 2007. 
86 J. Bell, ‘Mechanisms for Cross Fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe’ (n 5) 167. 
87 D. Feldman (ed) English Public Law (n 11) 397, also Judge Sibrand Karel Martens, ‘Incorporating the 
European Convention: the role of the judiciary’ [1998] EHRLR 5, 14. 
88 P. Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems and not Converging’ (1996) 45 ICLQ 52. 
- 85 - 
 
Constitutional Court is one of the most active in the reception of Strasbourg 
jurisprudence this may be attributable to ECHR ranking above ordinary legislation in 
Spain (in contrast to the UK position).89 In France too, the constitution grants the 
Convention a rank above statutes.90 Conversely, one commentator has observed that 
‘the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights appear … to lose their 
importance when compared with the case law on the German constitution’ since ‘it is 
often thought that human rights are sufficiently protected by the German constitution’.91 
Consequently, judgements of the ECtHR have to be ‘taken into account’ by German 
courts but may have to be ‘integrated’ or ‘adapted to fit into the domestic legal system’. 
Moreover, if they run counter to legislative intention, or are ‘contrary to German 
constitutional provisions,’ such judgements must be fully disregarded.92 Seeking to rely 
on such jurisprudence may therefore present some problems; a more workable solution 
for courts dealing with Strasbourg jurisprudence has been suggested by Feldman:  
If the focus of attention in human rights jurisprudence moves to Europe, there will be a need to 
investigate the human rights traditions and constitutional arrangements in far more depth and 
breadth than has usually been attempted in the United Kingdom, and to make the findings 
accessible to English Lawyers… We will have to avoid being blinded by the impressive 
traditions of our neighbours to the point where we lose sight of the object of the exercise: 
comparative study should not lead to attempted mimicry of others, but should inform the journey 
towards a national system which meets our distinctive needs.93 
 
It is clear that HRA moves domestic law closer to European human rights standards. 
Section 2 represents this intention simply by requiring that relevant Strasbourg 
jurisprudence be taken account of. But, where there is such relevant Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, there will be a need to investigate the human rights traditions and 
constitutional arrangements in far more depth and breadth than has usually been 
attempted previously in the United Kingdom. 
 
                                                 
89 N. Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2008) 71 (2) MLR 183, 188. 
90 Ibid 187. 
91 E. Voss, ‘Germany’, in C. Gearty (ed), European Civil Liberties and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. A Comparative Study (M. Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1997) 169; See also N. Weiss, ‘The Impact 
of the European Convention on Human Rights on German Jurisprudence’ (n 21) 60-61. 
92 N. Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (n 89) 196-7. 
93 D. Feldman, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and constitutional principles’ (n 32) 205. 




Domestic courts have preferred to show loyalty to decisions of the Strasbourg court. Regard 
to jurisprudence outside the Convention remit has not been outlawed, but it has become less 
than automatic and the prediction that Francesca Klug made before the Act came into force 
appears to have become the rule: domestic courts may legitimately turn to comparative 
jurisprudence where there is ‘little or no steer from the Strasbourg organs’.94 Where there is 
‘relevant’ Convention jurisprudence, a true construction of section 2 HRA appears now to 
impose a duty on the court to take that jurisprudence as a starting point.  
 
The approach unfortunately endangers one of the major justifications for Comparativism in 
the first place, which is that it can aid not only with applying the under-theorised Strasbourg 
jurisprudence but also in encouraging the domestic judiciary to adopt a more theorised 
approach to human rights. As one commentator has hypothesised, ‘where the difference 
between comparative jurisdictions is so great as to render the use of comparative 
jurisprudence irrelevant, it may nevertheless perform a cognitive function … the 
confrontation of both legal systems may force some consideration and better understanding 
of the nature of domestic law’.95 If comparison to jurisprudence outside the Convention 
remit becomes less common, it could significantly hamper the development of the domestic 
law of human rights.  
  
                                                 
94 F. Klug, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998, Pepper v Hart and All That’ (n 3) 251. 
95 Eg L. Heuschling, ‘Comparative Law in French Human Rights Cases’ (n 18) 44; see also R. Singh, 
‘Interpreting Bills of Rights’ (n 12): ‘courts are increasingly turning to comparative jurisprudence to 
better understand the content of human rights provisions’ (emphasis added). 
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CHAPTER V 
DOMESTIC ADJUDICATION ON CONVENTION RIGHTS: 
The effect of factors external to the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
 
 
Previous chapters have sought to clarify the intentions, purposes and possibilities 
behind section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Notwithstanding the direction that 
domestic courts must ‘take into account’ Strasbourg jurisprudence, it has been argued 
that in no case is it right for domestic courts to follow Strasbourg jurisprudence as a 
matter of course. Ultimately, circumstances exist to allow – or even require – domestic 
courts to depart from that Strasbourg jurisprudence. It has also been argued that, in 
certain situations, domestic courts may not only simply depart from but also expand 
upon Strasbourg jurisprudence, and that, in these cases, the discretion in the HRA 
leaves it open for domestic courts to decide matters for themselves. 
 
Thus far these arguments have drawn impetus from the nature and qualities of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence itself. For instance, where the Strasbourg reasoning is unclear 
or based on a misunderstanding of domestic law it was argued that domestic courts 
could openly depart from the jurisprudence of that court. Similarly, jurisprudence 
tainted by age or a wide margin of appreciation feed reasons for departure but also 
allow scope for a domestic court to expand upon the Strasbourg position.1 Yet the 
reality is that the s.2 exercise is affected by a backdrop of concerns external to the 
jurisprudence itself: the type of right in point (qualified or unqualified rights); the 
domestic system of precedent; whether a possible incompatibility with the Convention 
derives from statute or common law; whether Parliament has considered the issue(s) in 
play and determined upon a particular response (which may be prima facie incompatible 
with the Strasbourg jurisprudence); and the effect of the institutional position of the 
Strasbourg Court itself. Indeed, the effect of these additional factors may provide a 
better explanation for otherwise unclear or confusing decisions under s.2 HRA such as 
Animal Defenders International (discussed further below).2  
                                                 
 
1 Recent confirmation of this position was given in Re P and Others [2008] 3 WLR 76. 
2 R (On The Application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State For Culture, Media and 
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QUALIFIED AND UNQUALIFIED RIGHTS 
 
As Leigh and Masterman have recently pointed out, ‘…plainly not all rights are alike 
and the situations in which they might be limited varies enormously’.3 This being so, it 
is clear that different types of right are treated differently by the Strasbourg Court.4 It 
follows that a domestic court under a duty to ‘take into account’ Strasbourg 
jurisprudence will similarly be guided by these variations. More significantly, the 
operation of s.2 itself may vary. Specifically, the possibilities inherent in the discretion 
under the provision may significantly change, depending on whether a court is 
concerned to evaluate the compatibility of domestic law with either a qualified or 
unqualified Convention right.5  
 
 
I. UNQUALIFIED RIGHTS 
Since the Convention does not permit the restriction of unqualified rights, any state 
interference will render domestic law incompatible with the Convention. Accordingly, 
domestic adjudication on unqualified Convention rights does not necessitate any 
balancing exercise but instead encompasses one chief concern: whether a particular 
claim falls within the ‘scope’6 of the right in point. For this purpose, the intuitive 
suggestion is that unqualified rights (by reason of their being ‘absolute’) ought to bear 
at least the same scope domestically as in Strasbourg. By this it is meant that domestic 
courts taking into account Strasbourg jurisprudence (per s.2) should apply the 
Strasbourg position as a minimum; domestic courts should find a right to be engaged 
                                                                                                                                               
 
of the Strasbourg Court  in order to avoid making a declaration of incompatibility under s.4 HRA 1998. 
See chapter II from n 48 for facts and analysis of the decision. 
3 I. Leigh, R. Masterman, Making Rights Real: The Human Rights Act in its First Decade (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2008) 168. 
4 Ie there is scope for justified interference with qualified rights, whereas unqualified rights are treated as 
‘absolute’. 
5 ‘Qualified rights’ refer to those rights (enshrined in Articles 8-11, Protocol 1 Article 1, Protocol 6 
Article 2) with which, under certain specified circumstances, interference may be justified. ‘Unqualified 
rights’ (or ‘absolute rights’) refer to those rights (enshrined in Articles 2-5,7,12,14, Protocol 1 Articles 2 
and 3, Protocol 6 Article 1) with which no interference may be justified.  
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domestically in at least every case in which it would be engaged in Strasbourg. 
Domestic law would be prima facie incompatible if the domestic court did not attach 
this meaning to the duty in s.2.  
 
It may be possible to go further. It would be reasonable to suggest that the interference 
with unqualified rights ought to attract the strictest scrutiny at the domestic level (by 
virtue of their being ‘absolute’).7 Along these lines, Gearty has proposed that  
the closest the issues before the court connected with one of the key underlying principles of the 
Convention, then the more likely it is that the judges can be assertive and intrusive in their 
application of the disputed right to the facts before them… If a decision directly involves the 
principle of the protection of civil liberties, or an issue of legality, or a clear matter of human 
dignity, then the more confident can a judge inclined to activism be that he or she is on the right 
lines.8   
If Gearty is right, that a judge inclined to activism may be more confident ‘if a decision 
directly involves the principle of the protection of civil liberties, or an issue of legality, 
or a clear matter of human dignity’, it may be possible to support a more rigorous 
approach where that kind of ‘fundamental’ right is in point; since Strasbourg inherently 
views ‘unqualified’ rights as ‘absolute’, it may be assumed that these represent rights of 
central importance - or ‘fundamental’ - to the Convention.  
 
In these terms, arguments that domestic courts should ground analysis on the principles 
which inform the Convention and be ready to interpret Convention rights more 
generously than the Strasbourg Court (especially where the Strasbourg position is 
unclear) are persuasive.9 However, since a court judging a case to fall within the scope 
of such a right gives the state no opportunity to justify the interference, stretching 
beyond Strasbourg as to the scope of an unqualified right is almost certain to attract 
                                                 
 
7 This distinction between qualified and unqualified rights carries weight in the context of judicial review, 
where courts have a tendency to apply more intense scrutiny to cases concerning unqualified rights than 
to qualified rights cases: I. Leigh, R. Masterman, Making Rights Real (n 3) 168-169. 
8 C. Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (OUP, Oxford 2004) 122; conversely, ‘[w]here 
none of these principles is directly engaged, then it is likely to be a case that a restrained, or at least, less 
aggressive, application of the Human Rights Act is called for’. 
9 Eg R. Masterman, ‘Aspiration or Foundation? The Status of the Strasbourg Jurisprudence and the 
‘Convention Rights’ in Domestic Law’ in H. Fenwick, R. Masterman, G. Phillipson (eds), Judicial 
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criticism on the grounds that it may result in holding the state to obligations that it did 
not intend to subscribe and thus risk blurring the boundary between interpretation and 
legislation.10 Perhaps for this reason UK domestic courts do not appear willing to place 
too heavy reliance on Convention principles or the possibility that such reasons could 
feed a development beyond the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court where relevant 
jurisprudence exist.  
 
Yet there remain circumstances in which domestic courts should be willing to decide 
matters for themselves. For example, while a (narrow) margin of appreciation may exist 
as to the scope of an unqualified right, courts should deal with this in the manner 
described in chapter II (either divorcing it from domestic reasoning or, where possible, 
seeking to anticipate how Strasbourg may have decided the matter notwithstanding the 
existence of the margin). Equally, while it would be inappropriate to paste the 
Strasbourg approach into domestic law, recognising a discretionary area of judgment 
may also tend towards abdicating judicial responsibility on this count: since there are no 
provisions for interference with unqualified rights there is no balance to be struck in 
these cases. Therefore, the possibility that domestic courts should recognise a 
discretionary area of judgment on the matter simply does not exist. As Lord Hope 
pointed out in Kebeline  
… It will be easier for [the discretionary area of judgment] … to be recognised where the 
Convention itself requires a balance to be struck, much less so where the right is stated in terms 




                                                 
 
10 Of course, all the arguments set out in chapters II and III as to the legitimacy of expanding the scope of 
an Article where a court is concerned to anticipate the development in Strasbourg (eg where there is an 
evolving European consensus) continue to apply. A court may expand the scope of an unqualified 
Convention right where it is minded to believe that the Strasbourg Court will develop its own 
jurisprudence in this direction. 
11 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebeline [2000] 2 AC 326, 381 (emphasis added); Lord 
Justice Laws agreed in International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2002] 3 WLR 344, paras 376-8, as did Lord Walker in R (ProLife Alliance) v British 
Broadcasting Corporation [2004] AC 185 [136] (although Lord Walker’s approval on this point is strictly 
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II. QUALIFIED RIGHTS 
While the concern with unqualified rights is focused upon the scope of the right, 
qualified rights present two distinct questions for a domestic court using Strasbourg 
jurisprudence under s.2 HRA. As Lord Mance observed in the recent Re P case, there is 
a distinction between the basic content of the right - which in his view should generally 
receive a uniform interpretation throughout the member states - and the justifications for 
interference, where different cultural traditions might be material.12  
 
Admittedly a uniform interpretation as to the scope of the basic (or ‘primary’) right is 
necessary to maintain at least a minimum standard and avoid falling foul of 
compatibility with the Convention. For reasons put forward in chapter III, however, it is 
clear that Lord Mance’s distinction should not require domestic courts to give a uniform 
interpretation to the basic right where doing so would place a bar on otherwise more 
generous domestic protection; an interpretation of this kind is not prescribed by either 
the HRA or the Convention itself.13 Thus Lord Mance’s distinction as to the 
interpretation of the basic content of the right must pertain more specifically to the 
uniform application of the Strasbourg minimum. Furthermore, it is suggested that 
domestic courts must interpret only the minimum scope of the primary right consistently 
with Strasbourg. As was pointed out in chapter III, the argument from consistency 
against expanding upon the Strasbourg position holds little weight:14 since qualified 
rights inherently allow state interference to some extent (so long as it is necessary and 
proportionate), it must be preferable from any human rights perspective that the court 
turns greater scrutiny upon the justifications for the interference rather than on 
expanding the right in point. To this end an approach which seeks simply to follow 
                                                 
 
12 Re P (n 1); Lord Mance based this on some observations of Lord Steyn in R(S) v Chief Constable of 
South Yorkshire Police [2004] UKHL 49, [2004] 1 WLR 2196 [27]; see also M v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions [2006] UKHL 11, [2006] 2 AC 91 [130]. 
13 See chapter III from n 71. 
14 Neither the European Court of Human Rights nor the Convention itself would require other member 
states to follow that standard. Moreover, despite the possibility that domestic courts may open up a 
‘dialogue’ with the Strasbourg Court and ‘make a distinctively British contribution to the development of 
the jurisprudence of human rights in Europe’ (Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, Cm 3782 
(October 1997) [1.14]) it is clear that the Strasbourg Court is not required to keep its decisions in line 
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Strasbourg jurisprudence as to the scope of the primary right would be unnecessarily 
timid.  
 
The problem for a domestic court adjudicating on qualified rights is that Strasbourg 
jurisprudence applies to a question beyond the scope of the primary right. Since 
qualified rights may be interfered with, decisions of the Strasbourg Court are also 
relevant to the justification for interferences. For instance, in order to determine whether 
the breach is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ a domestic court remains enjoined by 
s.2 HRA to take the Strasbourg position into account. As discussed in chapter II, the 
jurisprudence (as well as domestic circumstances) in connection with such questions is 
a shifting one and what can be deemed ‘necessary’ may be subject to development. This 
reality is cemented further by the margin of appreciation doctrine which usually 
operates in connection with these justifications and creates a further concern for a court 
minded to follow Strasbourg jurisprudence rather than develop a domestic application 
for it. The possibility that qualified rights are particularly likely to be affected by the 
margin of appreciation doctrine or any evolving consensus makes an even more 
convincing case for more intense scrutiny of the justifications for any interference with 
qualified rights and a vigilant approach to the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg organs 
will be especially pertinent in order to avoid falling behind. 
 
An additional factor is the problem that, inherent in justifications such as ‘protection of 
morals’ or ‘in the interests of public safety’ is a balancing exercise which ultimately 
allows a varying level of interferences among the various Convention states. Thus the 
very existence of ‘qualified rights’ represents a view that the operation of human rights 
provisions depends on considerations that exist independently of the right itself: 
whether a Convention right has been breached ultimately turns on how far it may be 
qualified because of legal or political circumstances.  
 
In this vein the perceived competence of the court may affect the conception of the duty 
under s.2: whether the qualification falls within the traditional judicial realm of 
competence (e.g. criminal justice) or whether the matter appears to fall into a more 
“political” domain (e.g. immigration control or national security) is likely to have an 
impact on the approach to Strasbourg jurisprudence and consequently the justification 
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that ‘some potential limitations on qualified rights (for example protection of national 
security) would be treated more generously than others (for example prevention and 
detection of crime) according to the perceived familiarity or competence of the 
courts’.15 That courts alter the standard of review according to this basis is relatively 
clear. One need only be reminded of the factors set out by Lord Steyn in Samaroo to be 
considered by a court debating whether to defer to a decision maker’s judgment. 
Roughly speaking these were given as:  
whether the right is unqualified or qualified; the extent to which the issue requires consideration 
of social, economic and political factors; the extent to which the court has a special expertise, for 
example, in criminal matters; and whether the right has a high degree of constitutional protection 
such as freedom of expression and access to the courts.16  
An interference in an area seen as ‘political’ for instance, would therefore feed a judicial 
tendency to defer to the appropriate body and therefore dilute the level of scrutiny given 
to the potential violation. This explanation may go some way to explaining the approach 
of the House of Lords in cases like ADI (where it will be recalled that the House was 
concerned with evaluating whether the absolute prohibition on paid political advertising 
was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ so as to be compatible with Article 10 of the 
Convention). It was clear that the House of Lords in that case had considered the matter 
to be an appropriate one for deference even though there appeared to be clear 
Strasbourg jurisprudence indicating the incompatibility of the legislation in question 
with Article 10. 
 
                                                 
 
15 I. Leigh, R. Masterman, Making Rights Real (n 3) 168-169; I. Leigh, ‘The Standard of Judicial Review 
after the HRA’ in H. Fenwick, R. Masterman, G. Phillipson, Judicial Reasoning Under the UK Human 
Rights Act (n 9) 204. 
16R. (on the application of Samaroo) v Secretary of State of the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 
1139; R. Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: the legitimacy of judicial intervention 
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THE DOMESTIC SYSTEM OF PRECEDENT 
 
While it is argued that s.2 leaves it open for domestic courts to follow, depart or (in 
certain circumstances) expand upon Strasbourg jurisprudence and that courts should 
fully utilise these possibilities to aid the development of domestic human rights law, it is 
important to point out that these possibilities are affected by a factor outside these 
concerns: the domestic system of precedent.  
 
The first problem is that a lower court applying House of Lords guidance to follow 
‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence may have to resolve a conflict between 
binding domestic precedent and a later decision of the Strasbourg Court. The matter 
raises no problem where the inconsistent domestic decision was given before the 
enactment of the HRA: where a lower court considers ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg 
jurisprudence to be in conflict with a pre-HRA decision of a higher UK court, the HRA 
may itself be seen as overruling the previous decision through its requirement in section 
6 to act compatibly with the Convention. As Sheldon has put it:  
... the court is expressly required by the Act to take any relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence into 
account. There is no such requirement in relation to the decisions of domestic courts prior to 
incorporation. It would appear, therefore, that where there is a Strasbourg authority on the issue, 
it should be followed. Where there is a pre-incorporation domestic decision, the court is free to 
make such use of it as it sees fit.17  
Butler Sloss P evidently viewed the matter in the same way in NHS Trust A v M18 which 
concerned the lawfulness of feeding two patients defined to be in a permanent 
vegetative state: the matter had been resolved by the House of Lords in Bland19 but, 
‘since the implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights’ Butler Sloss 
P felt ‘no longer bound’ by that decision.20  
 
                                                 
 
17 N. Sheldon, ‘The Effect of the Human Rights Act on Domestic Precedent’ [2001] JR 208 [11].  
18 [2001] 2 WLR 942. 
19 [1993] AC 789. 
20 From this example Sheldon concluded that ‘even decisions of the House of Lords are no longer binding 
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The scope for departure from pre-HRA precedent was further addressed by D v East 
Berkshire Community NHS Trust21 where the Court of Appeal departed from the House 
of Lords decision in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council22 on the basis that it 
could not survive the introduction of the HRA. However, while no criticism of the 
Court of Appeal's approach was expressed when that case reached the House of Lords, 
Lord Bingham has later been careful to point out that ‘there were other considerations 
which made X v Bedfordshire a very exceptional case’.23 These not only included the 
fact that the judgment was given prior to the HRA, but also that no reference was made 
to the European Convention and, ‘importantly’, that the children whose claim the House 
had rejected as unarguable succeeded at Strasbourg in establishing a breach of their 
Convention rights.24 Lord Bingham concluded that ‘[o]n these extreme facts’ the Court 
of Appeal was entitled to hold in D, that the decision in X could not survive the 1998 
Act but ‘such a course is not permissible save where the facts are of that extreme 
character’.25  
 
This is a curious approach. The two ‘extreme’ facts which Lord Bingham considered to 
exist in D are (1) that the domestic decision made no reference to the European 
Convention and (2) that the claimants had subsequently succeeded in Strasbourg. The 
first of these is intelligible: where reference has been made to the Convention there is at 
least some indication that the superior court considered the conclusion in that case to be 
compatible with it. Yet this overlooks the fact that, prior to the enactment of the HRA, 
domestic courts were not obliged to act compatibly with the Convention and therefore 
might have noted Strasbourg jurisprudence indicative of an incompatibility and 
nevertheless decline to draw Convention compatible conclusions. In many cases courts 
would simply have lacked the power to remedy an inconsistency: in cases where the 
alleged incompatibility derives from legislation rather than the common law, this reality 
would be particularly acute; prior to the HRA domestic courts would simply have 
                                                 
 
21 [2004] QB 558. 
22 [1995] 2 AC 633. 
23 Kay and others v London Borough of Lambeth [2006] UKHL 10 [45].  
24 Z v United Kingdom (2001) 34 EHRR 97. 
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lacked the power in these cases to make Convention compatible conclusions such that 
post-HRA courts are given under sections 3 and 4 of the Act.26  
 
Furthermore, the advantages of this requirement exist only where no Strasbourg 
jurisprudence exists subsequent to the domestic decision in question. If a Strasbourg 
case decided later indicates the conclusions in the domestic authority to be incompatible 
with the Convention, it is difficult to see that there would be a difference between a pre-
HRA case which had made reference to the Convention and one which had not. All the 
reasons to avoid assuming the compatibility of pre-HRA domestic precedent with the 
Convention would continue to apply and would be further compounded by a positive 
indication of the incompatibility at Strasbourg.27  
 
Lord Bingham’s second requirement – that the claimants had subsequently succeeded in 
Strasbourg – is even more curious. Although that result would provide a valuable 
indication that the domestic decision did not correctly reflect the Convention position, 
Lord Bingham cannot have intended to make this a prerequisite for departure from such 
authority. While it is clear that a Strasbourg decision to which the UK is not a party may 
be less persuasive as an indicator that UK domestic law is incompatible with the 
Convention (owing, for example, to a margin of appreciation), where the UK is a party 
the strength of that indication would surely be great in any case. The reality is that - for 
a myriad of reasons (sometimes unrelated to the possible outcome) - not all cases are 
taken to Strasbourg and specifically requiring that the claimants in the pre-HRA 
domestic case had succeeded in Strasbourg risks relying on a measure for compatibility 
which simply may not exist. Further, actively ignoring otherwise relevant Strasbourg 
jurisprudence on this basis would severely dilute the duty of post-HRA courts to take 
into account Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘wherever made or given’.28  
                                                 
 
26 Moreover, even post-HRA courts have shown some reluctance to robustly engage with compatibility 
issues where the source of incompatibility is in statute rather than the common law. Recall eg Animal 
Defenders International which may be explained on these grounds. This distinction is given fuller 
analysis below.      
27 The strength of that indication would clearly be greater where it is given in a case to which the UK is a 
party. Where pre-HRA domestic precedent is followed by a positive account of its incompatibility with 
the Convention it must be open for a post-HRA court to depart from it. 
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Enjoining a post-HRA court to follow pre-HRA authority which is clearly inconsistent 
with later Strasbourg jurisprudence on the basis that the conflict had not been confirmed 
by a successful application to the Strasbourg Court surely flies in the face of the HRA 
as a statute designed to ‘bring rights home’.29 For these reasons it is suggested that, 
where there is a clear conflict between pre-HRA domestic authority and later (‘clear and 
constant’) Strasbourg jurisprudence, the combined duties to ‘take into account’ relevant 
Strasbourg jurisprudence under s.2 and to act compatibly with the Convention under s.6 
almost require a fresh analysis in domestic courts.  
       
For a domestic court faced with Strasbourg jurisprudence that is inconsistent with a post 
HRA decision of a superior UK court, the matter is more complicated. It may first be 
assumed that where the superior court has itself considered the conflicting Strasbourg 
jurisprudence the domestic doctrine of precedent would require inferior courts to follow 
the authoritative decision. This much was clarified by Judge LJ in Bright:30 
Without implying any disrespect for the decisions of the European Court ... where such a 
decision ... has been examined by the House of Lords or Court of Appeal, this [inferior] court is 
bound by the reasoning of the superior courts in our jurisdiction ... So far as we are concerned ... 
we have been told how they should be taken into account.31  
 
However, if a Strasbourg decision indicating the incompatibility of domestic law as 
given by a post-HRA decision of a senior court has not yet been considered 
domestically, the tension is more acute. If after ‘taking into account’ Strasbourg 
jurisprudence a domestic court feels an earlier decision of a superior court to be 
incompatible with the Convention, it may be that s.2 and s.6 HRA would feed a 
departure from that decision notwithstanding the fact that the domestic decision may 
have been decided after the coming into force of the HRA. As Sheldon has pointed out, 
it is readily apparent that judgments of this sort would be extremely difficult to make 
and that such a decision would involve ‘autonomous law-making of a type with which 
                                                 
 
29 Rights Brought Home (n 14). 
30 R (Bright) v Central Criminal Court [2001] 1 WLR 662. 
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our precedent-based legal system has hitherto been unfamiliar’32 which, at a systematic 
level, imposes obvious costs in terms of legal certainty.33  
 
The issue has been the subject of substantial debate, stimulated by a series of domestic 
cases concerned chiefly with possession proceedings. It is worth setting out the (rather 
complex) series of events, beginning in 2004 with the House of Lords decision in 
Harrow London Borough Council v Qazi.34 Qazi concerned the making of a possession 
order in respect of a council house held under a joint tenancy of a husband and wife. 
The marriage broke down and the joint tenancy came to an end when Mrs Qazi served a 
notice to quit. Mr Qazi’s application for a new tenancy was refused but he nonetheless 
remained in occupation with his new family, and sought to resist possession 
proceedings on the ground that they constituted an interference with the right to respect 
for his home under Article 8 of the Convention. The House of Lords unanimously held 
that the property continued to be Mr Qazi's home and that Article 8 was engaged35 but 
the majority (Lord Hope, Lord Scott and Lord Millett) held that since the local authority 
had an unqualified right to immediate possession, there was no infringement of Mr 
Qazi's right to respect for his home under Article 8(1), and therefore no issue arose 
under Article 8(2) as to justification.36 In other words, where the landlord is entitled as a 
matter of domestic law to obtain possession, a possession order would never constitute an 
interference with the occupier's right to respect for his home (or will always be justified 
under article 8(2)).37 
                                                 
 
32 N. Sheldon, ‘The Effect of the Human Rights Act on Domestic Precedent’ (n 17) 210. 
33 I. Loveland ‘Making it up as they go along? The Court of Appeal on same sex spouses and succession 
rights to tenancies’. [2003] PL 222. 
34 [2004] 1 AC 983. 
35 Ibid [11], [26], [68], [95], [99], [110]. 
36 Ibid [84] (Lord Hope of Craighead). 
37 It is worth noting that Lord Bingham and Lord Steyn (dissenting) took the view that, where there was a 
proposed interference with a person's Article 8(1) rights, the question of justification did fall to be 
considered (even though the occasions on which a court would be justified in declining to make a 
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The second instalment arrived with the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in 
Connors v United Kingdom.38 The facts of Connors centred on a Gypsy family who had 
been living on a local authority owned site for 16 years when the authority served a 
notice to quit, requiring the family to vacate the plots. No written or detailed reasons 
were given but the Council continued with possession proceedings and eventually 
evicted the family. The ECtHR found that the eviction was not accompanied by the 
requisite procedural safeguards (namely the opportunity to have the proportionality of 
the measure addressed) and could not be regarded as justified by a ‘pressing social 
need’ or proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued per Article 8(2). The effect 
of Connors is therefore that the right of a landlord to enforce a claim for possession - 
notwithstanding compliance with domestic law - against an occupier whose right to 
occupy, does engage Article 8 and requires justification under Article 8(2).    
The resulting inconsistency between Qazi and Connors first became important in two 
further cases concerning possession proceedings. The appellants in Kay39 and Price40  
both sought to resist these proceedings on the basis that they amounted to a violation of 
their rights under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court of Appeal in Kay felt able to 
distinguish Connors on the basis that it was of assistance to UK courts only in relation 
to cases involving Gypsies (which Kay was not)41 but a differently constituted Court of 
Appeal in Price found Connors to be ‘unquestionably incompatible’ with Qazi and that 
Qazi could not therefore be assumed to correctly reflect the Convention position.42 
Further, the Court did not consider that the reasoning in Connors could be confined to 
the treatment of Gypsies.43 The Court of Appeal in both cases felt bound to follow the 
House of Lords decision in Qazi but raised the question as to the extent which, if at all, 
domestic rules of precedent should be modified to give effect to obligations under the 
European Convention and the duties imposed on domestic courts by the 1998 Act.44  
                                                 
 
38 (2004) 40 EHRR 189. 
39 Kay v Lambeth London Borough Council [2005] QB 352. 
40 Leeds City Council v Price [2005] 1 WLR 1825. 
41 Kay (n 39) [106]. 
42 Price (n 40) [26]. 
43 Ibid, [29]. 
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A seven strong appellate committee of the House of Lords heard Kay and Price as 
conjoined appeals (‘Kay’ herein).45 Lord Bingham (the rest of the House agreed) took 
the view that legal certainty was ‘best achieved by adhering, even in the Convention 
context, to our rules of precedent’:46  
if [judges] consider a binding precedent to be, or possibly to be, inconsistent with Strasbourg 
authority, they may express their views and give leave to appeal, as the Court of Appeal did here.  
Leap-frog appeals may be appropriate.  In this way … they discharge their duty under the 1998 
Act.47 
 
Yet this solution must only be satisfactory if the ‘binding precedent’ has properly 
interpreted the Convention. If, for instance, the superior court had been mistaken in their 
assessment of the Convention and its case law, Lord Bingham’s construction would 
oblige a lower court to follow the erroneous (and potentially Convention incompatible) 
reasoning of a more authoritative court. That result would arguably have some 
resemblance to the early and restrained approach given by Judge LJ in Bright48 which 
Leigh and Masterman have pointed to as a good example of courts ‘treat[ing] the 
previous pronouncements of UK courts as binding where they had considered 
Convention case law, even where it was arguable that the earlier courts had 
misunderstood it’.49 Judge LJ regarded himself bound by the decisions of English courts 
on the meaning of the rule against self-incrimination notwithstanding a recent decision 
of the Strasbourg Court indicating its incompatibility.50 His lordship said: ‘we are not 
permitted to re-examine decisions of the European Court to ascertain whether the 
conclusion of the House of Lords or the Court of Appeal may be inconsistent with those 
decisions’.51 
 
                                                 
 
45 Kay (n 23). 
46 Ibid, [43]. 
47 Ibid, this guidance has since been upheld in a plethora of cases under the HRA, see eg in the context of 
privacy Murray v Express Newspapers plc and another [2008] 3 WLR 1360, para 20; Wood v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, [2008] EWHC 1105 (Admin) [2].  
48 Bright (n 30) (forcing journalists to divulge incriminating letters received from a former MI5 officer, 
was argued to amount to a violation of the right against self-incrimination in Article 6 of the Convention). 
49 I. Leigh, R. Masterman, Making Rights Real (n 3) 57.   
50 Saunders v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 313. 
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Kay is itself a good example of the danger in this approach: taking Connors into account, 
it was said in the House of lords that there might be a defence to possession proceedings 
in ‘exceptional’ cases, namely, (1) where the applicant challenged the domestic law as 
itself being incompatible with Article 8 (as in Connors) or (2) where the action of the 
public authority landlord was challenged on public law grounds. However, the right of a 
landlord to enforce a claim for possession under domestic law against an occupier whose 
right to occupy had ended, would, in most cases, automatically supply the justification 
required under Article 8(2). Further, the majority held that the grant of the right to the 
occupier to raise an issue under Article 8 would have serious consequences for the 
functioning of the system or for the domestic law. Conversely, the minority (Lord 
Bingham, Lord Nicholls and Lord Walker) held that a defendant to possession 
proceedings brought by public authorities should be permitted in principle to raise an 
Article 8 defence since ‘in the overwhelming majority of cases this will be in no way 
burdensome [and] [i]n rare and exceptional cases it will not be futile’.52  
 
Soon after, however, the European Court handed down the decision in McCann v United 
Kingdom53 where it concluded that the House of Lords in Kay had been mistaken on 
their interpretation of Convention rights arising under Article 8. The Court expressly 
rejected the argument that the reasoning in Connors should be confined only to cases 
involving the eviction of Gypsies or cases where the applicant sought to challenge the 
law itself rather than its application in his particular case.54 The applicant claimed that to 
exclude the possibility of individual circumstances rendering an eviction 
disproportionate was to deprive the Convention of any effect and the Strasbourg Court 
appeared to agree. Contrary to the majority in Kay, the Court could not accept that the 
grant of the right to the occupier to raise an issue under Article 8 would have serious 
consequences for the functioning of the system or for the domestic law. In McCann the 
effect of the domestic system was to dispossess the applicant of his home without any 
                                                 
 
52 Kay (n 23) [29]. 
53 McCann v United Kingdom (2004) 40 EHRR 189. 
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possibility of determining the proportionality of the measure;55 as in Connors, the 
procedural safeguards required for the assessment of the proportionality were not met 
and there was a violation of Article 8. It appeared therefore that domestic courts paying 
strict adherence to Lord Bingham’s guidance and following Kay as to the scope of 
Article 8 in possession proceedings would be applying Convention incompatible 
reasoning.  
 
Lord Bingham’s solution was that a lower court which considered binding precedent to 
be inconsistent with Strasbourg authority would discharge their duty under the 1998 Act 
by the expression of their views and by their giving leave to appeal.56 Yet although the 
discretion in s.2 allows such a result (enjoining courts only to ‘take into account’ 
jurisprudence) it is difficult to reconcile with s.6 HRA which enjoins all courts (as 
public authorities under s.6(3)(a)) to adjudicate compatibly with Convention rights.  The 
solution is also inconsistent with Lord Bingham’s own guidance in Ullah: if domestic 
courts are prevented from following recent decisions of the Strasbourg Court by an 
earlier domestic decision, regardless of how clear the inconsistency between these may 
be, it is difficult to see how domestic courts can ‘keep pace’ with the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence.57 Moreover, discharging the s.2 duty by simply giving leave to appeal 
will compel a case to be appealed through the court system at some cost. At best, the 
approach is a compromise between safeguarding legal certainty and truly ‘bringing 
rights home’ in all courts under the HRA. 
 
                                                 
 
55 The procedural protection against the termination of a secure tenancy were applicable only in 
circumstances where the landlord was seeking to terminate the tenancy, not where the joint tenancy was 
brought to an end by a notice to quit. 
56 Kay (n 23) [28]. 
57 Eg H. Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Cavendish, London 2007) 197; Fenwick also 
proposes that the rule in Kay may mean that citizens might have to seek the vindication of their Article 8 
rights at Strasbourg in tension with the UK’s obligations under Articles 1, 8, and 13 of the Convention. 
However, it is respectfully suggested that, although the ‘leap frog’ appeal solution suggested by Lord 
Bingham in Kay would place an undesirable delay on the vindication of Convention rights, the matter 
would still be dealt with domestically by the House of Lords. Where it applies, the rule in Kay postpones 
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Moreover, it is not at all clear that this compromise was itself necessary. The arguments 
put forward in Kay towards a relaxation of the doctrine of precedent also provided 
several conditions to be satisfied before departure from authoritative domestic decisions 
would be appropriate. For instance, JUSTICE and LIBERTY (intervening in the case) 
set out that a lower court is free to follow, and barring some special circumstances 
should follow, the later Strasbourg ruling where four conditions are met: (1) the 
Strasbourg ruling has been given since the domestic ruling on the point at issue; (2) the 
Strasbourg ruling has established a clear and authoritative interpretation of Convention 
rights based (where applicable) on an accurate understanding of United Kingdom law; 
(3) the Strasbourg ruling is necessarily inconsistent with the earlier domestic judicial 
decision; (4) and the inconsistent domestic decision was or is not dictated by the terms 
of primary legislation, so as to fall within section 6(2) of the 1998 Act.58 Furthermore, 
both the appellants and the respondents appeared to accept some relaxation of the 
precedent doctrine, respectively advocating that a domestic court ‘might’ depart from 
the authoritative domestic decision in the event of a ‘very clear’ inconsistency with a 
later Strasbourg decision and that a lower court ‘may decline to follow binding domestic 
authority in the limited circumstances where it decides that the higher courts are bound 
to resile from that authority in the light of subsequent Strasbourg jurisprudence’.59 The 
Secretary of State also favoured a (strictly circumscribed) relaxation of the doctrine of 
precedent, proposing that a lower court should be entitled to depart from an otherwise 
binding domestic decision where there is a clearly inconsistent subsequent decision of 
the Strasbourg Court on the same point, but added that the inconsistency must be clear. 
A mere tension or possible inconsistency would not entitle a lower court to depart from 
binding domestic precedent.60 
  
As Leigh and Masterman have pointed out, ‘[t]hese carefully measured criteria should 
have been sufficient to allay the fear of insubordinate and anarchic rulings by lower 
courts enticed by doubtful arguments about Strasbourg jurisprudence’.61 Indeed, the 
would-be effectiveness of these criteria are made clear by a recent decision purporting 
                                                 
 
58 Kay (n 23) [41].  
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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to uphold the rule from Kay: R (on the application of Purdy) v DPP.62 In that case the 
Divisional Court was unwilling to expand the scope of Article 8 beyond the 
jurisprudence of the House of Lords in R (on the application of Pretty) v DPP63 so that 
it would be engaged by assisted suicide, notwithstanding the fact that the Strasbourg 
Court appeared to move its jurisprudence in this direction in Pretty v United Kingdom.64 
The House of Lords had not subsequently departed from its view on the ambit of Article 
865 and, accordingly, the Divisional Court concluded that Article 8 was not engaged on 
the facts of the instant case. While departing from the House of Lords’ decision in order 
to expand the scope of a right would certainly lean towards an undesirable level of 
domestic inconsistency and legal uncertainty in the manner avoided by the rule in Kay, 
it might equally by pointed out that the criteria for departure proposed by the 
interveners in Kay would not have been met in this case. Plainly, since it is concerned 
with more than a possible incompatibility, expanding the scope of a Convention right 
would not follow a ‘very clear’ inconsistency such that the higher court would be 
‘bound to resile from that authority in the light of subsequent Strasbourg jurisprudence’. 
Rather, the Purdy case can more appropriately be described as one concerned with ‘[a] 
mere tension’ or ‘possible inconsistency’ which would not justify departure.  
 
For many reasons the rule in Kay represents an unnecessary restriction of the discretion 
in s.2 HRA where an inconsistency between domestic and Strasbourg jurisprudence 
comes before a lower court. A possible solution has been offered by Fenwick who 
suggests that domestic courts might attempt to ‘marginalis[e] the rule from [Kay] in any 
affected areas of law while technically adhering to domestic precedent’.66  Fenwick 
proposes that  
... where a statute has been interpreted domestically in a superior court in a post-HRA decision in 
a manner that conflicts with Strasbourg jurisprudence, the court should strive to find an 
interpretation of the domestic precedent that avoids the conflict, but if this is impossible it should 
issue a declaration of the incompatibility, leaving Parliament to over-turn the precedent. That 
                                                 
 
62 [2008] EWCA 2565 (Admin). 
63 [2002] 1 AC 800. 
64 [2002] 2 FLR 45. 
65 R. (on the application of Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General [2008] 1 AC 719. 
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course would be preferable to minimising the interpretation of the right in order to avoid the 
conflict.67 
If Strasbourg always properly understands domestic proceedings and goes on to find an 
incompatibility with the Convention, Fenwick’s suggestion (that the rule from Kay may 
be ‘marginalised’ to apply the Strasbourg decision) must work. However, as chapter II 
sought to show, this is not always the case. Where Strasbourg jurisprudence has 
misunderstood some aspect of domestic law in its finding of incompatibility, it would 
be less agreeable that a lower court attempt to bypass, say, an otherwise binding House 
of Lords decision in order to follow the Strasbourg position. The costs imposed on legal 
certainty if a lower court does so are quite clear, especially where the House of Lords 
goes on to restate its position and depart from Strasbourg in a later decision.  
 
Kay itself is again a good example. As already discussed, the decision of the House of 
Lords in Kay was revisited when McCann v United Kingdom68 came before the 
Strasbourg Court and the Court in that case concluded that the House of Lords in Kay 
had been mistaken on their interpretation of Article 8 of the Convention.  McCann was 
followed by the House of Lords judgement in Doherty69 which directly addressed the 
Strasbourg conclusion in McCann. Mr Doherty and his family had been residents on a 
Gypsy and caravan site for 17 years when a possession order was issued. The council 
commenced possession proceedings on the same day that the Strasbourg Court held the 
eviction in Connors to amount to a violation of rights under Article 8 of the Convention 
and Mr Doherty also claimed that his removal would violate his rights under Article 8 
of the Convention. McCann was handed down by the European Court before Doherty 
was heard in the House of Lords and might therefore have been expected to feed a 
departure from the position of the majority in Kay. Instead however, dismissing Mr 
Doherty’s appeal, the House of Lords strongly criticised the Strasbourg ruling in 
McCann. Lord Scott considered that the McCann decision was based on a ‘mistaken 
understanding’70 of how possession claims by public bodies were dealt with 
domestically and that ‘the McCann judgment discloses a misunderstanding of the 
                                                 
 
67 Ibid. 
68 McCann (n 53).  
69 Doherty & Others v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57. 
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various factors that would have been taken into account by the domestic court that dealt 
with the possession application’.71 Lord Hope was equally critical, explaining that he 
wasn’t sure the ECtHR had appreciated the ‘very real problems’ which would be caused 
by departing from the majority view in Kay.72 Accordingly, the House of Lords rejected 
the submission that the McCann judgment should cause a departure from Kay and went 
on to restate the majority view in that case.   
 
McCann was handed down after Doherty was considered in the lower courts. If, 
however, Doherty had come before a lower court after the decision of the Strasbourg 
Court in McCann, and the court had followed the Strasbourg outcome (marginalising 
the rule from Kay to issue of declaration of incompatibility or reinterpret the 
legislation), it would not only have decided the matter in conflict with the House of 
Lords precedent in Kay, but the result would be compounded by the fact that the House 
later restated their position in Doherty. The obvious costs of departing from binding 
precedent are thus much more obvious where the superior court holds its position.73 
 
Legitimately ‘marginalising’ the rule from Kay would therefore require at least two 
considerations: the court must firstly consider that domestic precedent would be 
affected by the Strasbourg jurisprudence in point and secondly that the Strasbourg Court 
had not misunderstood domestic law. Where this point is unclear (as in the ongoing 
possession proceedings saga) and outside these conditions, it appears that (where there 
exists an inconsistency between domestic and Convention jurisprudence) the 
                                                 
 
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid, [20]. 
73 It is suspected that this particular disparity between the House of Lords will continue to evolve. Indeed, 
the Strasbourg Court has recently repeated its own guidance from McCann in Cosic v Croatia 
(Application no. 28261/06) judgment of 15 January 2009 [22], reiterating that ‘the loss of one’s home is a 
most extreme form of interference with [Article 8] ... [a]ny person at risk of an interference of this 
magnitude should in principle be able to have the proportionality and reasonableness of the measure 
determined ... notwithstanding that, under domestic law, his or her right of occupation has come to an 
end’. It remains to be seen how soon the matter will be revisited by the House of Lords. When it does fall 
for consideration again, it is of course possible that the House of Lords will continue to uphold the view 
of the majority in Kay (n 23). If so, a resolution may have be delayed until the issue is directly address by 
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possibilities inherent in s.2 remain broader in relation to adjudication in the House of 




THE DIFFERING SITUATIONS OF STATUTE AND THE COMMON LAW 
 
A different view of the scope to interpret Convention rights domestically may arise 
according to the source of the potential incompatibility. For instance, where a court is 
concerned to develop the common law in line with the ECHR, providing a higher 
standard of rights protection than the Strasbourg Court may prompt fewer objections 
than a development based on an Act of Parliament. Writing extra judicially around the 
time of the passing of the HRA, Sir John Laws took the view that: ‘… the rigour of the 
common law presents the best and only opportunity to enfold the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence … within the traditions of the British state so that the one will be tranquil 
with the other, and both enhanced’.74 Masterman noted early in the academic debates on 
s.2, ‘[t]hat the HRA might be used as a tool for the development of domestic common 
law standards is not in doubt’75 while Fenwick also offered a model that relies on the 
common law recognising and upholding fundamental human rights.76 On that basis, an 
approach which at times takes an activist stance towards human rights would in fact sit 
harmoniously (rather than conflict) with UK legal tradition. Baroness Hale confirmed in 
Animal Defenders International77 that there is ‘nothing to stop our Parliament from 
legislating to protect human rights to a greater extent than the Convention and its 
jurisprudence currently require … nor is there anything to prevent the courts from 
developing the common law in that direction’.78 
 
                                                 
 
74 J. Laws, ‘The Limitations of Human Rights’ [1998] PL 254, 265 (emphasis added). 
75 R. Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account: developing a ‘municipal law of 
human rights’ under the Human Rights Act' [2005] 54 ICLQ 907, 913.   
76 H. Fenwick, Civil Rights: New Labour and the Human Rights Act (Pearson, Harlow 2000) 31. 
77 Animal Defenders International (n 2). 
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Conversely, it may not be within the power of a domestic court to interpret the scope of 
a Convention right beyond the standard provided by Strasbourg where the source of the 
alleged incompatibility is an Act of Parliament. Giving further effect to Convention 
rights in such cases might readily be viewed as a legislative rather than interpretative 
role since it would arguably result in binding the legislative bodies to a level of 
protection which it had not intended to ascribe (and which crucially goes beyond 
remedying any incompatibility). Lord Bingham spoke in these terms when giving 
reasons for a cautious approach in Brown v Stott: 
The language of the Convention is for the most part so general that some implication of terms is 
necessary ... But the process of implication is one to be carried out with caution, if the risk is to 
be averted that the contracting parties may, by judicial interpretation, become bound by 
obligations which they did not expressly accept and might not have been willing to accept.79  
Thus, where a court is seeking to expand the scope of a Convention right so as to render 
legislation incompatible, the issue becomes one of the separation of powers and one 
which the judiciary are usually loath to engage with.80  
 
Perhaps on this basis, Baroness Hale recently emphasised that it was ‘…tempting to 
draw a distinction between leaping ahead of Strasbourg when developing the common 
law and leaping ahead of Strasbourg in telling Parliament that it has got things wrong’81 
and pointed out that ‘[i]t is in the latter context that most of the strongly Ullah type 
statements have been made’.82 Accordingly, considering the compatibility of the 
Communication Act 2003 in Animal Defenders International, Baroness Hale did not 
believe that ‘when Parliament gave us those novel and important powers [under s.3 and 
s.4 HRA], it was giving us the power to leap ahead of Strasbourg in our interpretation of 
                                                 
 
79 Brown v Stott (Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline) and another [2003] 1 AC 681, 703; Indeed, of the well 
known provision in s.3 HRA for domestic courts to interpret legislation compatibly with the Convention 
‘so far as is possible to do so’, Lord Chief Justice Lord Woolf considered the ‘most difficult task which 
courts face’ to be ‘distinguishing between legislation and interpretation’,  Poplar Housing and 
Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2001] EWCA Civ 595, [2002] QB 48 [76]. 
80 Indeed, the Human Rights Act 1998 preserves Parliamentary Sovereignty. (E.g. declarations of 
incompatibility made under s.4 do not affect the continuing validity of an Act of Parliament).  
81 Baroness Hale, ‘Who Defines Convention Rights?’ (JUSTICE Tom Sargant Memorial Annual Lecture, 
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the Convention rights’.83 Her Ladyship repeated that the task of domestic courts is ‘to 
keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it develops over time, no more and no 
less’84 despite being acutely aware that this ‘cautious approach … has been criticised … 
mainly on the ground that ‘the Convention is a floor and not a ceiling’ … [representing] 
the minimum and not the maximum protection that Member States should provide’.85 In 
her Ladyship’s opinion, the purpose of a declaration of incompatibility is simply ‘to 
warn Government and Parliament that … the United Kingdom is in breach of its 
international obligations. It is then for them to decide what, if anything, to do about it’.86  
 
It is easy to sympathise with this distinction. In their tradition role domestic courts 
adjudicate but do not create law and any approach which allows courts to extend the 
ambit of Parliamentary legislation is never likely to be popular. It is not difficult to see 
how this reality might feed a reluctance to tell Parliament it has ‘got it wrong’. Fittingly, 
domestic courts have taken a restrained approach to declarations of incompatibility 
under s.4 HRA, treating them as a ‘measure of last resort’ which has been at least one 
factor in the scarcity of these declarations.87 But the rationale behind a restrictive view 
of declarations of incompatibility under s.4 HRA is not obvious. The orthodox 
argument based on the enacted provision of the HRA must be this: firstly, a progressive 
approach to s.4 cannot carry the same charge as would the same approach to s.3: by 
issuing a declaration of incompatibility under s.4, domestic courts are not effecting any 
actual change in that legislation or tying Parliament to a protection of rights on a level 
which it did not intend.88 Rather, s.10 HRA makes clear that s.4 triggers only a ‘fast 
track’ procedure and ultimately that any change to the legislation in question is left to 
Parliament. In addition, the thus-far attentive Parliamentary response to declarations 
may itself be revised; differing governments may react to declarations of 
                                                 
 
83 Animal Defenders International (n 2) [53]. 
84 R (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, [2008] 1 AC 153 [106]. 
85 Animal Defenders International (n 2) [53]. 
86 Ibid. 
87 A Liberty consultation paper outlined this attitude to be a ‘key factor’ (Liberty’s response to the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, ‘Implementation of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
and Declarations of Incompatibility’ March 2007 <http://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy07/response-to-jchr-re-implementation.pdf> accessed 15 September 2008. 
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incompatibility with greater or lesser enthusiasm.89 Ultimately, the HRA does not enjoin 
any particular course of action and attaching more than a discretionary meaning to s.4 
would be misleading. As Clayton (drawing on comparison with the Canadian system) 
has reasoned:  
... [a] rationale … can be gleaned from developments concerning the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (which the HRA strongly resembles) … structural features [of the Charter] mean 
that judicial decisions are not the final word on human rights, but provide the opportunity for the 
legislature (and the executive) to respond to court decisions.90 
 
Yet, despite the evidence that s.4 creates a compromise between the protection of 
human rights by domestic courts and the retention of parliamentary supremacy, it may 
be more realistic to ascribe some legislative influence to the court’s role under s.4 than 
is gleaned from an orthodox reading of the provision.91 Declarations of incompatibility 
are themselves rare and it may be that this paucity of declarations under s.4 has directly 
contributed to the effectiveness of the provision: by reason of their scarcity, declarations 
of incompatibly may present more pressure for legislative change. This reality is given 
further confirmation by a recent report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights which 
pledged to ‘be more proactive in relation to declarations of incompatibility, both in 
terms of pressing the Government to take action and, in appropriate cases, 
recommending what action should be taken’.92 Lord Irvine also appeared to ascribe a 
measure of influence to s.4, writing that 
Where a declaration of incompatibility is made, in respect of legislation passed since the Act, and 
which was accompanied by a s.19 statement of compatibility by the minister, the minister must 
inevitably come under some moral pressure to reconsider the position. After all, the declaration 
                                                 
 
89 S. Foster, The Judiciary, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 
2006) 34. 
90 R. Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue: the legitimacy of judicial intervention 
under the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2004] PL 33; For growing literature on dialogue see eg T. Hickman, 
‘Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and. the Human Rights Act, 1998’ [2005] PL 306; D. 
Nicol ‘Law and Politics After the Human Rights Act’ [2006] PL 722; T. Hickman, ‘The courts and 
politics after the Human Rights Act: a comment’ [2008] PL 84. 
91 Cf. Liberty’s response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights (n 87) para 14: ‘section 4 of the HRA 
empowers a court to make a declaration where it believes a piece of legislation to be incompatible with 
the HRA. A declaration of incompatibility has no legal effect and does not bind Parliament, contrary to 
popular belief’. 
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will mean that the view he presented to Parliament has been proved wrong in a fully reasoned 
judgment of a higher court.93 
Paul Kearns has similarly suggested that ‘Parliaments do not subsequently easily reject 
a court’s interpretations and it is arguable that in this way, under the HRA, judicial 
power is not really subject to any overriding domestic pressure and reigns unfettered 
and supreme’.94 
 
Of course, frequent judicial use of s.4 may reduce the impact of declarations of 
incompatibility in Parliament. On this basis, the logic behind the ‘striking aversion’95 of 
the courts to make declarations of incompatibility based on anything more than a 
minimalist interpretation of the Convention is understandable. Nevertheless, this 
position cannot explain the approach of the House of Lords in cases such as Animal 
Defenders International. Baroness Hale explained that a court should be reluctant to 
‘leap ahead’ of Strasbourg in telling Parliament that it has got things wrong,96 but 
consciously avoiding resort to a declaration of incompatibility under s.4 where 
Strasbourg jurisprudence clearly indicates an incompatibly with legislation (as was 
arguably the case in Animal Defenders International) turns the duty to ‘take into 
account’ that jurisprudence under s.2 a symbolic rather than a substantive contribution 
to judicial reasoning.  
 
Encouragingly, since drawing this troublesome distinction between the common law 
and legislation Baroness Hale has herself conceded that she ‘may have put it too high’. 
Baroness Hale instead recognised that ‘the concept of the ‘Convention rights’, upon 
which all our powers and duties under the HRA depend, cannot mean different things 
depending upon whether we are developing the common law, controlling the executive, 
                                                 
 
93 Lord Irvine of Lairg, Human Rights, Constitutional Law and the Development of the English Legal 
System (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2003) 125-126. 
94 P. Kearns, ‘United Kingdom Judges in Human Rights Cases’ in E. Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism 
in Human Rights Cases (n 50) 83; see also T. Campbell, ‘Incorporation through Interpretation’  in T. 
Campbell, K.D Ewing, and Adam Tomkins (eds) Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 2001) 
79. 
95 S. Foster, The Judiciary, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (n 89) 79. 
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or confronting the legislature’.97 In the end, a restrictive reading of Strasbourg 
jurisprudence - for whatever reason - carries the significant danger that domestic law 




THE INSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE STRASBOURG COURT 
 
An interesting question is related to the institutional position of the Strasbourg Court. 
Since it is clear that the Strasbourg jurisprudence does not remain static and that the 
Strasbourg Court is itself subject to review and reform, it is equally clear that a  
domestic court seeking to ‘take into account’ Strasbourg jurisprudence under s.2 HRA 
will be taking into account jurisprudence affected by these variant factors.  
 
The first important point is the effect of the backlog before the European Court of 
Human Rights. It is well known that the Strasbourg Court has an ever increasing 
workload, partly due to the influx of new signatories to the Convention and partly due 
to a growing culture of human rights awareness resulting in more claims under the 
Convention.98 A rise from a handful of cases in 1959 (when individual petition first 
came before the Court) to an annual average of 791 between 1955 and 1982 marked the 
start of a clear trend. Greer estimates that numbers rose to 3,000 a year by the mid 
eighties and by 1998 to over 16,000. Just 3 years later, the 1998 figure had doubled to 
over 31,000 by 2001 and to 44,000 by 2004.99 To Greer’s figures it may be added that 
45,500 applications were lodged in 2005, 51,300 in 2006 and the 2007 Annual Report 
estimated the total number of new applications lodged as 54,000.100 The clearest effect 
of this increase in applications arises out of the limited capacity of the Court to address 
                                                 
 
97 Ibid 9.  
98 The Joint Committee on Human Rights also gave as reasons for the increasing case-load: the entry into 
force of Protocol 12 (containing the general non-discrimination provision); the ratification of additional 
protocols by States not currently parties to them; the Court’s continuing development of the Convention 
as a ‘living instrument’; and eventually, possibly, the accession of the EU to the Convention system. 
99 S. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights – Achievements, problems, and prospects (CUP, 
Cambridge 2006). 
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them. Accordingly, the number of cases pending before the Court is equally dramatic. 
From 12,600 applications pending in 1999101 the number by 2005 was over 81,000,102 
increasing to almost 90,000 in 2006103 and to over 103,850 by the end of 2007.104 
Incredibly, it is estimated that this number is likely to reach 250,000 by 2010.105 
 
This increasing volume of applications to the Strasbourg Court may have several effects 
on judicial reasoning under the HRA in the UK. Firstly, the possibility that domestic 
courts may be required to anticipate any change in the Strasbourg jurisprudence in order 
to avoid a successful challenge before the Strasbourg Court (as discussed in chapter II) 
may become more pertinent: since a backlog of cases will contribute to the delay in the 
resolution of those cases, national courts may come under an increasing obligation to 
take stock of any evolving consensus among the member states to the Convention (since 
the Strasbourg Court may not itself keep pace with it). This exercise may be especially 
important if the UK is to successfully avoid challenges before the Strasbourg Court 
(which is arguably one of the key purposes for which the HRA was enacted). However, 
as was outlined in chapter II, the problems associated with such an exercise are vast and 
it is clear that the domestic judiciary have shown little inclination to engage with it.106 
 
A more significant impact on judicial reasoning under the HRA stems from the 
measures which the Convention institutions have formulated to manage the backlog. 
Protocol No. 11 took the first step towards addressing the increasing case load by the 
creation of a single full-time Court and abolishing both the European Commission of 
Human Rights and the quasi-judicial role played by the Committee of Ministers. 
However, despite effecting significant improvements in the output of the Strasbourg 
system, the case-load of the Court has continued to rise. Protocol No. 14 was brought in 
                                                 
 
101 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Statistics 2004’, 9. 
102 Annual Report 2006 of the European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe’ 96. 
103 Ibid. 
104Annual Report 2007 (n 100) 137.  
105 Lord Woolf, Review of the Working Methods of the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe, 2005) 4; S. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights (n 99) 170. 
106 Although a willingness to engage with this type of exercise appears to be emerging. Recall for instance 
Re P (n 1) in which the House of Lords were openly concerned to anticipate a development in the 
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to institute further reform by improving the efficiency of the Strasbourg Court’s 
operation.107 Under these reforms, cases that have less probability of succeeding before 
the Court will be filtered out108 along with cases that are similar to any previously 
brought against the same member state.109  
 
If (as these reforms suggest) the Strasbourg Court is becoming increasingly tactical 
about the cases it receives, the threshold for the admissibility of applications will 
inevitably grow higher. This is especially clear from the hurdle added to the 
admissibility stage by Protocol No. 14 requiring applicants to have suffered ‘significant 
disadvantage’. The possible implementation of this particular hurdle has raised some 
concerns: firstly, the Joint Committee on Human rights expressed a worry that the 
introduction of the new ‘significant disadvantage’ admissibility requirement would 
‘amount to a restriction on the right of individual petition and therefore inhibit access to 
the European Court of Human Rights by individuals in the UK’. 110 Similarly the 
Committee argued that the effect of the ‘significant disadvantage’ requirement ‘would 
be to restrict the remedies available to individuals in the UK who wish to complain 
about arguable violations of their Convention rights, and potentially leave violations of 
Convention rights unremedied’.111 That unease was also shared by one third of the 
Judges on the Court, including the British Judge, Sir Nicolas Bratza and by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.112  
 
However the Government responses did not reflect the concern, instead emphasising 
that the right to individual petition would be likely to ‘suffer dramatically’ without 
                                                 
 
107 It should be noted that Protocol 14 will enter into force only when all parties to the Convention have 
ratified it. At the time of writing, all but Russia have done so, thus this discussion is - for now - strictly 
academic. 
108 This addresses the delay caused by the large number of inadmissible applications: for instance, in 
2003, 96% of applications considered were declared inadmissible. 
109 The large number of cases concerning repetitive violations after a judgment given in an earlier pilot 
case (60% of cases in 2003 for instance) are also blamed for the backlog. 
110 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
‘First Report for 2004-2005’ HL 8, HC 106 [34]. 
111 Ibid. 
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Protocol No. 14. In the Government’s view, the new criterion ‘will not restrict the right 
of an individual petition’ and the introduction of the new requirement was the only way 
to preserve a practically effective - as opposed to illusory - right of individual petition 
since the increased work-load of the Strasbourg Court is resulting in a diminution of 
access to the Court by people in the UK.113 Yet it is difficult to see that the new 
admissibility criterion would not have this effect. After all, Protocol No. 14 is designed 
to tackle the backlog of cases before the Court and would be somewhat self defeating if 
it did not reduce access to the Court. Indeed, the Council of Europe’s Explanatory 
Report to the Protocol itself concedes that ‘[t]he new criterion may lead to certain cases 
being declared inadmissible which might have resulted in a judgment without it’.114  
 
Additional to these concerns are two possible effects of the new admissibility hurdle 
upon domestic adjudication under the HRA in the UK: firstly, the admissibility criterion 
may directly find its way into the government submissions. Government lawyers 
defending a HRA claim may seek to import the additional hurdle into domestic 
adjudication in order to argue that the claimant had not suffered a ‘significant 
disadvantage’ and thus that there is no violation of the Convention. Of course, it is clear 
that the admissibility criteria have no place in domestic adjudication and that domestic 
courts should make short-thrift of arguments of this kind, choosing instead to simply 
divorce such factors from their analysis.115  
 
The second effect concerns an indirect consequence of the new admissibility criterion. 
Protocol no.14 does not elaborate on exactly what is meant by a ‘significant 
disadvantage’ but it is possible to speculate that an applicant suffering disadvantage - 
but not such as to be considered ‘significant’ - may have succeeded in the Strasbourg 
Court at a time when the Strasbourg system was under less pressure but that, under 
these reforms, the same applicant may be excluded at the admissibility stage 
notwithstanding an albeit less ‘significant’ violation of the Convention. In other words, 
                                                 
 
113 Letter from Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs (13 May 
2004). 
114 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the CETS 194 [79].  
115  Perhaps in the same way as it was suggested domestic courts may divorce a margin of appreciation 
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cases falling short of the ‘significant disadvantage’ threshold (but still constituting a 
Convention violation) may now become hidden within the bulk of admissibility 
decisions and may not reach the Strasbourg Court. It is important to reiterate that there 
will continue to be violations of the Convention even where the disadvantage is not 
‘significant’. Protocol No. 14 does not seek to raise the threshold of admissibility; the 
hurdle simply seeks to filter the most serious cases to the full Court. If, however, 
Convention violations not carrying a ‘significant’ disadvantage are to be excluded from 
a full hearing in the Strasbourg Court, the effect may be a gradual disappearance of 
Strasbourg case law dealing with more trivial breaches of the Convention.  
 
As a result, a domestic court adjudicating under the HRA in accordance with the 
guidance to follow ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence may find only 
Strasbourg decisions connected with a significant disadvantage to ‘take into account’.116 
In this way, domestic courts – minded not to ‘leap ahead’ of that jurisprudence but 
simply to ‘keep pace’ with it – will risk indirectly applying the ‘significant 
disadvantage’ threshold to Convention violations domestically. In other words, as a 
result of a diminution in the jurisprudence of less significant Convention breaches, the 
bar for successful complaints under the HRA may be raised by analogy to the bar for 
admissible complaints before the Strasbourg Court. 
 
Since this consequence will not result in a rise in the number of violations of the 
Convention found against the UK,117 it will not trouble those who view the purpose of 
the HRA as purely addressing that aim. However, to those who view the HRA as a 
vehicle for ‘bringing rights home’ and securing the protection of Convention rights 
domestically rather than relying on the decisions of an international court, the 
possibility that the bar for human rights protection may be raised in this way will come 
as a blow. If domestic courts are to avoid raising the bar for claims under the HRA in 
correlation with the bar in Strasbourg, it is clear that they may have to adopt a more 
                                                 
 
116 While ‘Strasbourg jurisprudence’ for the purposes of s.2 does not exclusively refer to Strasbourg case 
law, it is widely accepted that domestic courts operate a system of hierarchy in relation to the Strasbourg 
organs and that decisions of the Court would likely be given more weight. 
117 Cases falling foul of the ‘significant disadvantage’ hurdle will evidently not come before the 
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confident stance to that evidenced by the cautious approach in judicial reasoning to date. 
Along these lines, the Committee of Ministers declared that the adoption of reform 
under Protocol No. 14 was to ‘be accompanied by effective national measures by the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary to ensure protection of Convention rights at 
the domestic level’.118 Domestic judges ought to be more willing to decide the matter 
for themselves and domestic courts must bear more of the burden.119  
 
Arguably, domestic courts ought also to be prepared to go further than the Strasbourg 
Court has done; the efficacy of the HRA, as well as the Convention system, depends not 
on judicial caution, but upon ‘the existence of effective domestic remedies, with the 
Strasbourg Court exercising an essentially supervisory international jurisdiction’.120 As 
Colin Warbrick has written, ‘[a]ll those who examine the problem [of the Court’s 
increasing workload] agree that an essential ingredient in any reform is that the national 
legal systems must take a greater share of the load’.121  
 
Pursuant to these aims, UK domestic courts may be led to consider and analyse 
admissibility decisions in much more depth and breadth than is usually attempted. 
Ultimately, an overly deferential approach to the decisions of the Strasbourg Court is 
unlikely to benefit the development of domestic human rights law. Indeed, it should be 
emphasised that s.2 HRA requires domestic courts to take into account Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, not Strasbourg case law. While many views differ as to the purpose of 
the HRA, it must at least be agreed that the HRA was not enacted to facilitate the 
                                                 
 
118 ‘Ensuring the effectiveness of the implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights at 
national and European levels,’ Declaration of the Committee of Ministers, adopted on 12th May 2004 at 
its 114th Session; indeed, the HRA has significantly reduced the number of applications lodged against 
the UK. For instance, in 2000 the number of applications was 1,600, declining to 1,275 in 2004.  
119 See also C. Warbrick, ‘The View from the Outside’, in H. Fenwick, R. Masterman and & G. Phillipson 
(eds.) Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (n 9) 31: ‘…the Strasbourg Court simply does 
not have the capacity (even if it had the expertise) to act as a court of last resort for all European states, 
taking appeals, as well as review, ‘bailing out the state which wanted to pass on the responsibility for 
what it could see would be an expensive or unpopular result to the ECtHR’.  
120 A. Lester, ‘The utility of the Human Rights Act: a reply to Keith Ewing’ [2005] PL 249, 256. 
121 C. Warbrick, ‘The View from the Outside’ (n 119) 32. Although it should be noted that Warbrick does 
not himself support a progressive view of human rights so that domestic courts should interpret rights 
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gradual erosion of civil rights and liberties. Yet this is the danger if the reforms of 
Protocol No. 14 are implemented and domestic courts do not begin to take a more 






While domestic courts have devised certain formulae such as ‘clear and constant’ and 
‘no more, no less’ it is apparent that several factors exist which will necessitate differing 
approaches to the s.2 exercise. A domestic court adjudicating on unqualified rights for 
instance, should be ready to apply a rigorous analysis to the scope of the right in point, 
while qualified rights cases will necessitate stricter scrutiny as to the justifications for 
interference. In the latter case, the justifications for interference themselves present a 
whole host of problems connected to the earlier discussion in chapter II: a domestic 
court opting to follow Strasbourg jurisprudence on this point encounters all the 
difficulties presented by evolving jurisprudence and margins of appreciation. 
 
Inconsistencies between domestic precedent and later Strasbourg jurisprudence also 
raise interesting issues under s.2. Kay makes it is clear that a lower court faced with 
such a predicament should follow the domestic precedent, although this remains an 
unconvincing compromise between legal certainty and effective rights adjudication 
under s.2 HRA. Fenwick’s suggestion that courts may be able to legitimately 
‘marginalise’ the rule from Kay would provide one solution where the court is sure that 
the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence is not based on a misunderstanding of UK 
domestic law. Where this is unclear or part of an ongoing dialogue between the superior 
court and Strasbourg (as in the ongoing possession proceedings saga) legal certainty 
would require lower courts to abdicate to the authoritative guidance. In the end, where 
this issue arises it is clear that the discretion in s.2 is reserved for adjudication in the 
superior court.  
 
The possibilities in s.2 also appear to differ in connection to the judicial exercise. For 
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Strasbourg’ varies according to whether the potential incompatibility with the 
Convention arises out of legislation or the common law. Domestic courts are seemingly 
free to develop human rights jurisprudence beyond the ‘ceiling’ in the development of 
the common law but where courts are concerned to evaluate the compatibility of an Act 
of Parliament with the Convention, the House of Lords in Animal Defenders 
International appears to have positively confirmed that they should stick to the 
minimum conception of the rights given in Strasbourg. In overly simplistic terms, 
domestic courts must ‘keep pace’ with Strasbourg in such cases but apply only the 
Strasbourg ‘floor’. While the position sits harmoniously with the separation of powers 
doctrine, it is difficult to see it as anything more than a reluctance to engage too readily 
with legislative provisions. The result also carries the significant danger that a tentative 
or restrictive reading of Strasbourg jurisprudence – for whatever reason – will cause 
domestic law to fall below Strasbourg standard and result in incompatibility with the 
Convention.  
 
The danger carries over when one considers the possible effect of Strasbourg’s own 
reforms. The increasing backlog and implementation of Protocol No. 14 will plainly 
have the effect of reducing access to the European Court of Human Rights. Since it is 
clearly undesirable that domestic courts should imitate this result (it would fly in the 
face of the HRA as a statute that ‘only gives and does not take away’) it is important 
that domestic reasoning does not suffer the effect of these external factors when taking 
into account the Strasbourg jurisprudence under s.2. Rather than supporting a loyal 
approach to the European Court, the review and reform process feeds a compelling 
argument that domestic courts should now be increasingly ready to develop a domestic 
law of human rights which takes guidance from, but is not reliant on, Strasbourg; 
‘taking into account’ Strasbourg jurisprudence requires more than simply ‘keeping 
pace’ with Strasbourg or following the ‘clear and constant’ decisions of that Court.  
 
 





Differing conceptions about the purpose of the Human Rights Act 1998 have inevitably 
led to conflicting interpretations of the duty under s.2 of the Act. Those who view the 
Act as a statute designed to implement remedies for Convention rights in the domestic 
system invariably have difficulty with a construction of s.2 which allows domestic 
judicial reasoning to expand upon the scope of Convention rights. Conversely, those 
who view the Human Rights Act as a statute facilitating the development of domestic 
rights as well as domestic remedies often stress the importance of developing a 
domestic human rights law which draws from the Convention and Strasbourg 
jurisprudence but is not reliant upon it. This thesis has argued that the latter construction 
is the one closest to the scheme of the Human Rights Act 1998 as it was designed by the 
Government1 and enacted by Parliament.2  
 
It was plainly intended that domestic courts would be obliged to ‘take into account’ 
Strasbourg jurisprudence and that ignoring such material altogether would not be an 
option. However, it is also obvious that s.2 was designed to afford ‘flexibility and 
discretion’ to domestic courts: the HRA does not bind domestic courts to Strasbourg. 
Instead, in many situations the discretion in s.2 arguably encourages domestic courts to 
decide matters for themselves.  
 
This is most obvious where following Strasbourg jurisprudence is undesirable or simply 
impossible. Thus, where Strasbourg jurisprudence is affected by age, following it 
without anticipating a development may carry the danger of falling behind it. Similarly, 
following jurisprudence affected by a margin of appreciation may import an overly 
restrictive reading of the Convention into domestic law. This risk is especially clear 
where domestic courts apply the reasoning of jurisprudence to which another state is a 
party: there is simply no way of knowing whether the Strasbourg Court would find the 
margin in a similar UK case to be wider or narrower. The possibility that it might be 
narrower (and thus render UK law incompatible with the Convention) means that 
domestic courts would better discharge their duties under the HRA by focusing on the 
                                                 
1 Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, Cm 3782 (October 1997) 
2 Eg Hansard HL vol 584 cols 1270-1271 (19 January 1998) (Lord Irvine of Lairg). 
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matter as it arises in the specific context of UK domestic law. It is also undesirable that 
domestic courts apply Strasbourg jurisprudence which is itself unclear or based on a 
misunderstanding of domestic law. Remembering that in none of these situations is a 
domestic court discharged from its duty as a public authority under s.6 HRA to act 
compatibly with Convention rights, it is suggested in all of these situations s.2 HRA 
allows domestic courts to decide matters for themselves. 
 
But how far can domestic courts go? In certain circumstances, domestic courts may not 
only be encouraged to ‘escape’ Strasbourg jurisprudence, but also to expand upon it. 
The central question in chapter III was thus concerned with whether domestic courts 
may legitimately ‘move beyond’ or ‘go further’ than the Strasbourg Court in its view of 
Convention rights. It became clear that courts have been concerned to apply at least the 
minimum standard of rights set out by the Strasbourg Court (on the basis that ‘[t]o do 
otherwise would defeat one of the purposes of the HRA 1998’)3 but the perception that 
‘Bringing Rights Home’ through the HRA simply meant introducing no more than 
domestic remedies for violations of Convention rights has led to a restrained approach 
to judicial reasoning. This construction of the HRA has in turn fed a tendency to restrict 
domestic reasoning to the Strasbourg minimum (lest courts be accused of illegitimate 
law-making or unwarranted activism) despite evidence that the Strasbourg organs insist 
only on a minimum threshold.4 Although there is evidence that courts will ‘go further’ 
than Strasbourg, this may be of relevance only where the matter before the domestic 
court is subject to a national margin of appreciation, or where there is no steer from 
Strasbourg at all.5 The eagerness to maintain consistency with the reasoning of the 
European Court and the central importance of Lord Bingham’s guidance in Ullah to 
‘keep pace’ with Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘no more, no less’ place obvious limits on 
judicial reasoning under s.2. While these concerns are evidently conducive to reducing 
                                                 
3 D. Feldman (ed) English Public Law (OUP, Oxford 2004) 390; D. Feldman, ‘ The Human Rights Act 
1998 and constitutional principles’  (1999) 19 L.S. 165 at 193); H Fenwick and G Phillipson ‘Public 
protest, the HRA and judicial responses to political expression’ [2000] PL 627, 640; E. Barendt, 
‘Freedom of Assembly’ in Beatson and Cripps (eds), Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information 
(2000) 168.  
4 Eg R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Amin [2004] 1 AC 653 [44]-[45]. 
5 Eg R. Masterman, ‘The Status of Strasbourg Jurisprudence in Domestic Law’ in H. Fenwick, R. 
Masterman, G. Phillipson (eds), Judicial Reasoning Under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP, Cambridge 
2007) 81; H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, ‘Direct Action, Convention Values and the Human Rights Act’ 
(2001) 21 LS 535, 564. 
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successful challenges in Strasbourg, the result is a judicial diffidence not usually 
associated with a comprehensive system of human rights protection and one that is 
difficult to reconcile with the 1998 Act as a statute which ‘only gives and does not take 
away.’6 Moreover, cautious decisions such as the one given in Animal Defenders 
International represent the consequence that, in striving to do ‘no more’, domestic 
courts appear - at best - to be abdicating responsibility to Strasbourg. At worst, the 
result may be the failure to guard against violations of Convention rights domestically 
and, ultimately, the failure to realise the central purpose for which the Act was enacted: 
to ‘bring rights home’. 
 
The reluctance shown to seek comparison with the jurisprudence of foreign courts7 is 
similarly detrimental to the development of a domestic law of human rights. While it is 
clear that cases from jurisdictions outside the Convention borders are ‘unlikely to point 
to the direction in which the common law should be developed to ensure compatibility 
with the Convention rights’,8 restricting comparison to Strasbourg does not assist a 
domestic court faced with under-theorised Strasbourg jurisprudence. Moreover, the 
approach is probably incompatible with the feeling that ‘comparative study should not 
lead to attempted mimicry of others, but should inform the journey towards a national 
system which meets our distinctive needs.’9 The comparative use of jurisprudence from 
jurisdictions outside Strasbourg may be of immense value, not only in pointing to 
judicial techniques under instruments similar to the Human Rights Act, but also to 
approaches which aid the development of domestic law towards Convention 
                                                 
6 Hansard HL vol 583 col 510 (18 November 1997) (Lord Irvine). 
7 Eg Sheldrake v DPP [2004] 3 WLR 876 [33];.R(Marper) v Chief Constable of Yorkshire [2004] 1 WLR 
2196; R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2006] 2 AC 307. 
8 R. Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account: developing a ‘municipal law of 
human rights’ under the Human Rights Act' [2005] 54 ICLQ 907, 923. 
9 D. Feldman, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998’ (n 4) 205; Indeed, it was the fact that s.2 allows the courts to 
‘range wider than the ECHR and look at the jurisprudence of other human rights treaties’ led Klug to 
characterise the Human Rights Act 1998 as ‘effectively a bill of rights or ‘higher law’, F. Klug, ‘The 
Human Rights Act – A ‘Third Way’ or ‘Third Wave’ Bill of Rights’ [2001] EHRLR 361, 370; F. Klug, 
Values for a Godless Age: The Story of the United Kingdom’s New Bill of Rights (Penguin, London 2000) 
164. 
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compatibility.10 Thus chapter IV sought to illustrate that broader use of comparative 
jurisprudence may provide a useful aid to judicial reasoning which a Strasbourg focused 
comparative exercise fails to fully utilise.  
 
This is compounded by the reality that the s.2 duty is affected by factors which are 
external to the Strasbourg jurisprudence itself. For instance, whether a right is 
‘qualified’ or ‘unqualified’ will alter the possibilities for a domestic court under s.2. 
Further, whether the source of the alleged incompatibility is statute or common law, 
whether Parliament has itself considered the issue(s) in play and the existence of the 
domestic system of precedent may make it inappropriate to ‘follow’ Strasbourg 
jurisprudence at all, however ‘clear and constant’. Lastly, the institutional position of 
the Strasbourg Court and the effect of its own reforms feed a compelling argument that 
domestic courts should now be increasingly ready to develop a domestic law of human 
rights which takes guidance from, but is not reliant on, Strasbourg.  
 
An exercise in these terms will require a more autonomous view of rights adjudication 
than the judiciary have shown willingness to engage with. Doubtless it will also attract 
criticism on the grounds that it supports judicial creativity rather at the cost of legal 
certainty. Nevertheless, as the Lord Chancellor explained in the Parliamentary debates 
on s.2, ‘the courts will often be faced with cases that involve factors perhaps specific to 
the United Kingdom which distinguish them from cases considered by the European 
Court’11 and a Procrustean approach to Strasbourg jurisprudence is therefore unlikely to 
properly give effect to the HRA 1998 as a statute designed to ‘bring rights home.’ In the 
end, ‘taking into account’ Strasbourg jurisprudence requires more than simply ‘keeping 
pace’ with Strasbourg or following the ‘clear and constant’ decisions of that Court: 
domestic courts must instead decide cases in the very specific circumstances that come 
before them, being advised by Strasbourg jurisprudence but not informed by it.  
 
                                                 
10 Most obviously in the line of cases leading up to Campbell in which domestic courts drew from 
Commonwealth jurisprudence to develop the breach of confidence action into a common law remedy for 
privacy in line with article 8 of the Convention. 
11 Hansard HL vol 584 cols 1270-1271 (19 January 1998). 
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